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THE PLIGHT OF THE CONSUMER IN THE
UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE'
By

NEIL 0.

LITTLEFIELD"

The Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) has been introduced
in a number of 1971 state legislative sessions including the past Colorado legislative session. We have asked Professor Neil 0. Littlefield of
the University of Denver College of Law and L. Richard Freese, Jr.,
Esq., a partner in the Denver law firm of Davis, Graham & Stubbs, to
address themselves, in terms of an overview, to issues now being raised
in many state legislatures relative to the UCCC. Our intention is to
present two commentaries which reflect very different experiences with
the UCCC and the legislative considerations surrounding it. Professor
Littlefield has identified himself with those who feel the UCCC should
contain more restrictions on creditors' rights and remedies. Mr. Freese's
experience with the UCCC has been as an attorney for those engaged
in the business of extending credit. In order to create a dialogue between Professor Littlefield and Mr. Freese, we have asked that they
direct their comments to five areas: (1) whether the UCCC should be
a "uniform" act; (2) whether the UCCC has caused a polarization of
attitudes; (3) whether there is effective relief for violations of the provisions
of the UCCC; (4) whether the UCCC's limitations on creditors' rights and
remedies should be more stringent; and (5) whether the UCCC position

on rates is sound.
INTRODUCTION

R

ECENT legislative battles over consumer credit legislation
have revolved around the controversial Uniform Consumer
Credit Code. This author gladly accepted the invitation to participate in a dialogue with Mr. Freese on the broad questions
of the place of the UCCC in the active consumerism of the
seventies. Hopefully, we can learn something from an attempt
to view the process as a whole, even if such a view is distorted
by the particular experiences which Mr. Freese and I have
undergone. This author admits to a predisposition for legislation which drastically alters the relative positions of the consumer and industry. In this sense, what follows is an attempt
to articulate the various factors which it is believed would influence others toward a similar position. The effort is to state
the arguments without the sacrifice of intellectual integrity
which would follow from denying the strength of opposing
arguments or the difficulty of fashioning reasonable alternatives which suggest that a more moderate change is dictated.
The author wishes to express his gratitude to Donald Lojek for his help
in the preparation of this article.
*Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
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THE PROBLEM OF UNIFORMITY

It is naive to measure the success or failure of a uniform
act by the timing of its adoption by state legislatures. The most
successful of the recent uniform acts was promulgated in 1951,
and 6 years passed before Massachusetts followed Pennsylvania's precipitate adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code.'
While it is pretentious to say that the Act was known to be a
success in the early years, it is possible to state that it was under
serious consideration as a uniform act. During the early fifties,
there was a process taking place which at that time could have
been characterized as leading to success. 2 There was little serious fight with the basic assumption that a comprehensive and
uniform redrafting of the commercial law of the states was
overdue. However, it does not seem realistic at this writing
to credit the Uniform Consumer Credit Code with any chance
of success as a uniform act. This deliberate statement is made
with the knowledge that the process of drafting a uniform act
may necessitate a significant redrafting. Already the Special
Committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws 3 is studying the draft of the National Consumer Act and might redraft the present Uniform Act in accordance with some of its objections. 4 But there are considerations aside from this which doom the entire project.
The National Commissioners have understandably been concerned with the criteria of uniformity throughout their history.
The conference's constitution provides that the object of the
conference shall be "to promote uniformity in state laws on all
subjects where uniformity is deemed desirable and practicable." The conference is aware of the two-pronged character
1 Massachusetts adopted the Uniform Commercial Code on September 21,

1957, effective October 1, 1958. MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 106 (1957). For
the early history of the drafting, redrafting, and adoption of the UCC,
see Braucher, Legislative History of the U.C.C., 58 COLUM. L. REV. 798

(1958).

2 In

contrast with the present struggle over the UCCC, it was quite evident that during the early fifties there was a continual process to
determine what version of the UCC would stand the best chance in all
state legislatures. The most evident indications of this process were
activities of the Uniform Commissioners at the hearings of the New
York Law Revisions Commision in 1955-56, and the prompt amendment of the Pennsylvania version of the UCC after the appearance of
the 1957 UCC Official Text; Braucher, supra, note 1.
3 The full title of this committee is the Special Committee on Retail Installment Sales, Consumer Credit, Small Loans and Usury, and will be
referred to hereinafter as the Special Committee.
4 See Memorandum to UCCC Committee and Staff, Re: The National
Consumer Act, by W. D. Warren, (mimeo, limited distribution, Feb. 7,
1970).
5 Id. at 200.
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of this principle: that the uniformity be both desirable and
practical. A permanent subcommittee of the Executive Committee"i has been assigned the task of developing from time to time
criteria for uniformity. These criteria are stated in "Recommendations as to Character and Considerations of Acts." In the
1969 Handbook, the following positive criteria are listed:
1. Obvious reason and demand for an act on the subject
such that its preparation will be a practical step
toward uniformity of state law.
2. Reasonable probability that the act will be enacted by
a substantial number of jurisdictions.
3. The subject of the act should be such that lack of
uniformity... will tend to mislead, prejudice, inconvenience or otherwise adversely affect the citizens
of the states in their activities or dealings in other
states or with citizens of other states or in moving
7
from state to state.
In addition, there are three negative criteria. The subject
matter should not be:
1. entirely novel,
2. controversial, or
3. of purely local or state concern.
The criteria set out in the Handbook provide a reasonable
statement of the factors governing the need for uniformity.
Presumably, if a proposed law meets these tests then it is fair
game for the commission. Yet there is nothing in the history
of the UCCC to indicate that the Handbook criteria were ever
applied. The commission appears to have undertaken the process
of drafting legislation without even considering the propriety
of acting in this area.
In 1959, the Special Committee on Uniform Retail Installment Sales Finance Act reported that they had drafted a first
tentative draft, had invited extensive comment, and recommended that the subject is "appropriate for Conference action
in the form of a Model Act rather than a Uniform Act."9 However, there is no record of what happened to the 1959 Special
Committee's recommendation to drop the project as a uniform
act. This lack of information seems to suggest the unfortunate
6 This subcommittee
Program.

is

denominated

the

Committee

on

Scope

HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
FORM STATE LAWS 226-27 (1969) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK].

Id. at 227-28.
HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 206 (1959).

and
UNI-
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conclusion that the important question of whether consumer
credit was the proper subject of a uniform act was passed by
default.
In 1961, the Special Committee on Uniform Retail Installment Sales was discharged and a reconstituted Committee on
Cooperation with the American Bar Association Study of Retail
Credit Legislation took its place. In 1963, the Executive Committee heard the report of the Committee on Cooperation and
established its Special Committee on Retail Installment Sales,
Consumer Credit, Small Loans and Usury and gave it instructions to draft legislation in the consumer credit field. 10 It is
perhaps noteworthy that in this committee's 40 page report to
the conference in 1965, there was much discussion of the need
for consumer credit legislation, but no consideration of the important question as to whether such legislation need be, should
be, or had a reasonable prospect of success as uniform legislation. The committee made a very good case for the fact that
the subject matter is timely, nothing more.
Rather belatedly, the committee made a statement as to the
need for uniformity. In the Prefatory Note to the November
1968 Revised Final Draft of the UCCC, the committee included
a short statement entitled "Uniform Legislation Desirable."
The Special Committee believes that consumer credit legislation should be uniform among the states. Uniform laws on the
subject will benefit both the consumer and the consumer credit

industry.
Consumer understanding cf credit transactions and of alterna-

tive sources of consumer credit is a primary essential for the
effective operation of both consumer credit laws and of the forces
of competition in consumer credit extensions. The mobility of
our people makes uniformity of State consumer credit laws a
prerequisite for maximum consumer understanding.

The extent to which segments of the consumer credit industry operate across State lines makes

uniformity of consumer

credit laws desirable to facilitate and to reduce the costs of their
interstate operations, and thus to promote competition and so

ultimately to reduce the costs to the consumer on credit extensions.11
Analysis of this statement reveals its simplicity and selfconclusionary nature. One would perhaps dismiss the above
discussion as a rather academic argument were it not for other
considerations.
A basic obligation of each uniform commissioner is to promote uniformity of state enactment of conference promulgated
'(HANDBOOK,
11 UNIFORM

(1969).

supra note 7, at 134 (1963).
CONSUMER CREDIT CODE OFFICIAL TEXT WITH

References throughout this article are to the

COMMENTS XXI

OFFICIAL TEXT.
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uniform acts. Presidential addresses to the conference repeatedly
include exhortations as to this prime mission of the commissioners in their individual states. "Finally the Commission from
each state must be prepared to defend the uniform act line by
line under questioning by the appropriate state legislative committees. ' 12 Thus, the criteria discussed earlier play a substantial
role in the overall success of the mission of the conference.
Several possible reasons why the National Conference chose
to expend so much time and energy on drafting a uniform act
without determining that it should be uniform come to mind.
There is no doubt that the topic of consumer legislation is timely.
It is challenging. Also, it is human to attempt to repeat success.
In drafting the UCCC, the commissioners could believe that
they were following in the footsteps of the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code who received well-deserved accolades
both for the magnitude of the project and the universal success
of the subsequent enactments. From the report of the Subcommittee on Scope and Purposes is found this revealing statement:
Our discussions also led us to the conclusion that the now
apparent success of the Uniform Commercial Code should lead
us to attempt to unify other large branches of private law ...
Eventually, it is our hope that this [American Bar Foundation
study of consumer credit] will lead to the development of uniform legislation dealing with an additional number of commercial
areas of retail installment sales, usury, relaw problems in the
1
volving credit, etc. "

Since the National Conference has left us no substantive
record why the Consumer Credit Code should be a uniform act,
it is not too late to examine the question on its own merits.
This is so especially in light of the fact that state legislatures
considering the adoption of the UCCC are being requested to
14
honor the code to the extent of enacting the uniform version.
As an initial step towards this inquiry, it is important to
distinguish between the notion of uniformity of laws between
the various states and the notion of unification of law within
a state. It has been repeatedly urged, in the context of the
UCCC, that the consumer credit laws of the several states
present a hodge-podge of statutes, dealing variously with small
loans, retail installment sales of consumer goods, retail installment sales of automobiles, and diverse types of credit granting
12 HANDBOOK,

supra note 7, at 56.

13 Id. at 66-67.
14

The author's personal experience with the UCCC in Connecticut in 1969
convinced him of a strong drive for uniformity. The chief proponent
was a uniform commissioner who resisted all efforts to amend the
uniform version in any respect.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 48

institutions. It is further urged that from this fact one is led to
desire the UCCC because it presents a single act covering the
basics of the functional phenomena associated with consumer
credit. However, the reasons which suggest that commercial
law should be codified in one act are not the same reasons
which suggest that commercial law should be uniform from
state to state. The question of uniformity must be discussed
independently unless it can be shown that the unification of
consumer credit laws is somehow related to the uniformity of
consumer credit laws from state to state. No case has been
made for such an interdependence and no such case can be made.
In a perusal of the fast-growing literature of the UCCC
there has been found only one serious discussion of the need
or desirability of uniformity in the consumer credit field. '5
The article was by Mr. Felsenfeld and included discussions on
the topics of "The Case For Uniformity "' and "A Case Against
Uniformity."1 The analysis is a respectable one, and it is fortunate that he considered the basic question important enough to
give it serious treatment. Although it would be superfluous to
repeat his statement here, a brief summation is necessary in
order to complete this presentation.
Felsenfeld starts with the classic statement of Professor
Dunham, then Executive Director of the National Conference
of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, who articulates five
major reasons for uniformity.! , I agree with Felsenfeld in his
conclusion that of these five reasons for uniformity, only three
of them are persuasive with respect to the uniformity of consumer credit legislation. Felsenfeld gives prime importance to
Professor Dunham's fourth reason, namely: "Uniform laws
through the educative function of law, will tend to promote uniformity in attitude and ethical conduct."'' 5 Felsenfeld translates
this advantage as follows: ". . . the increased likelihood that
the nation will understand and comply with the law." 20 Under
present law, he continues, ".. . there is no valid consumer folklore, or instinctive understanding, of what one's rights, benefits
15 Felsenfeld,

Uniform. Uniformed and Unitary Laws Regulating Consumer Credit, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 209 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Felsenfeld].
if, Id. 221-31.
17 Id. 231-36.
IS Dunham, A History of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 233 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as Dunham]; Felsenfeld, supra note 15, at 222.
19 Felsenfeld, supra note 15, at 222, 236.
20 Id.

at 223.
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and problems are in obtaining credit."'2' Felsenfeld also applies
Professor Dunham's principle that if there is a proper solution
it ought to be a uniform solution. In other words, this argument for uniformity proceeds on the principle that a welldrafted, well-reasoned act ought to be good for any state that
wishes to legislate in the area. Finally, Felsenfeld sees some
slight strengthening of the federal system when states adopt
uniform legislation thus rendering federal legislative incursions
22
into a field of state concern unnecessary.
The argument that uniform consumer credit laws might
tend to create uniform attitudes towards the use of credit and
the rights and advantages which a credit user has is perhaps the
most salient argument in favor of uniform legislation. The problem with that argument is that its assumption, to my knowledge,
is unproven. There are no empirical studies in this area suggesting that people throughout the nation adopt a "folklore" where
laws are uniform. The Federal Income Tax Law, largely selfadministered and quite successful, might demonstrate Felsenfeld's point. On the other hand, the uniformity of regulation
with respect to small loans might not provide an appropriate
example of "consumer folklore," and this example is much more
analogous to the problem under discussion. It might be interesting to see a good sociological investigation of common understandings among borrowers from Household Finance or other
national lending institutions.
Professor Dunham's thesis that a good law should be uni23
form simply because it is good is not of general application.
Where a state problem is prevalent in all states, where state
legislators agree on the evils to be remedied, and where there
is general agreement that the problem is one of finding a workable solution, then this argument has merit, otherwise not. This
argument for uniformity perhaps explains the success of the
Uniform Gift to Minors Act which has been adopted in 50
jurisdictions. 24 The best argument for uniformity with respect
to this Act is that a common problem existed in all states, and
that one well-drafted solution would serve as well as another,
hence, the uniform adoption.
One might wish to use the Uniform Commercial Code as an
21 Id.
22 Obviously,
23
24

this short restatement of Mr. Felsenfeld's case for uniformity
is no substitute for his own articulation.
Dunham, supra note 18, at 237.
HANDBOOK,

(1969).

supra note 7, Chart of Adoptions on Uniform Law, 193
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example of uniform act which was enacted because it was welldrafted, represented a distinct improvement over prior law, and,
therefore, it recommended itself for uniform adoption on the
strength of this alone.2 5 However, there appears to be a basic
distinction between the regulation of consumer credit and the
statement of a law of commercial transactions which is very
germane to this entire discussion of uniformity of consumer
credit laws. The distinction lies in the extent to which there
is a very real difference of opinion, backed by interest groups
of some political influence, between the alternative "good" ways
to control consumer credit.2 This is generally true of regulatory
statutes, as contrasted with statutes which do not have as their
prime or chief thrust the regulation of activity.2- The difference of opinion presented by consumer credit legislation is not
simply a matter of a confrontation between industry and the
consumer. Differing segments of the industry have widely
differing views as to the desirability, for example, of the
28
"free entry" provisions of the proposed UCCC.29
Is it possible that the excellence of a particular product of
the Uniform Commissioners ought to make an argument for uniformity which supersedes the difficulty of getting forty or more
legislatures to adopt the policy approaches found therein? This
is a key question, and perhaps the differing answers to this
question have caused some of the furor over the UCCC. It is
difficult to state a definitive answer to this question. However,
if the commissioners or other proponents wish to answer the
question in the affirmative, they should in turn be ready to
answer a few of the following pertinent queries. If a state has
made respectable strides towards effective consumer protection,
why should it backtrack even in some areas in order to adopt a

This is not to ignore the fact that the interstate character of many commercial transactions also presented a reason for uniformity.
26 For example, there may be a real difference of opinion as to whether
class actions may or may not be brought prior to administrative action.
27 To revert to the example of the UCC, that Act is not basically regulatory. Its purpose is to set forth rules which state the rights and obligations of merchants in consensual transactions based upon their assumed
intentions and reasonable expectations. Those parts of the UCC which
do regulate have the greatest number of state amendments which
depart from uniformity, e.g., § 2-318 on liability of sellers to ultimate
user for defective products and § 9-313 on priorities between holders of
personal property security interests (covered by the UCC) and holders
of real property security interests (not covered by the UCC); see
Reports Nos. 1, 2, and 3 of the Permanent Editorial Board for the
25

Ucc.

28 See text accompanying note 69 infra.
29

Warren, Rate Limitations and Free Entry, 26 Bus.
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Warren].

LAW.

855 Passim
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uniform version? 30 It is, of course, no answer to make the question-begging reply, i.e., "in order to achieve uniform legislation."
Perhaps an even more serious question is: will it strengthen
state legislatures to have them exchange the usual legislative
process of balancing the various interests as local pressure
groups present them for a process of adopting a policy position
which represents either a nationwide consensus or a nationwide
lowest common denominator?
In presenting these questions as serious obstacles to uniformity of consumer credit legislation, it is not necessary to
assume that conditions and practices vary from region to region
or from state to state. To the contrary, even admitting the near
universality of the realities and problems of consumer credit,
the variation from state to state is in the public response. I
am far from convinced that this variation in response is an
undesirable thing. It is part of the democratic tradition. Why
should not a bank lobby or a consumer lobby have its influence
felt in either the halls of the state legislature or in the halls
of Congress?
In conclusion, it seems that any case that can be made for
uniformity is an extremely weak one. Consumer credit transactions do have interstate considerations and it would be of help
to the consumer credit industry to be able to use uniform forms
from state to state. However, when the consumer protection
advocate is presented with a uniform act which represents a
nationwide consensus (if it does even that), these arguments
for uniformity do not balance with those against it. The individual consumer credit transaction is a local one. The matter
of the regulation of consumer credit practices in the seventies
is a question of obtaining an effective voice for the consumer.
This requires convincing legislators that problems exist and that
suggested solutions are appropriate and not damaging to industry. In this view of the problem, a nationally drafted act
serves as a source of ideas for drafted language but not for a
uniform solution. There is no demonstrable reason why the
state legislatures of New York and Arkansas should each adopt
a happy medium.

II. THE COMMUNICATIONS GAP
The timing of the promulgation of the UCCC produced what
is appropriate to term a "communications gap" between the
30

See NEw YORK CITY DEP'T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE UCCC
BY THE CONSUMERS'

ADVISORY COUNCIL

(1969),

which objected to those

features of the UCCC which weakened existing New York law.
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sponsors of the legislation and the present group of consumer
protection advocates. The communications gap is evidenced by
the strong negative reaction which the Code precipitated from
a number of consumer groups coupled with the bewilderment
felt by the sponsors that the consumers would react in such a
fashion to something which was highly touted as "consumer"
legislation.
It is important to remember the drafting timetable of the
UCCC. The National Conference received and honored a request from the Council on State Governments in 1957 to consider the matter of legislation in the area of retail installment
sales, small loans, and usury. In the early sixties, the conference
decided to cooperate with the American Bar Foundation in a
study of consumer credit laws. 31 In 1963, the conference appointed the Special Committee on Retail Installment Sales, Consumer Credit, Small Loans and Usury which was to begin work
on the drafting of uniform legislation. In the report of this
committee in 1965, the basic characteristics of the Special Committee's work is outlined. The Special Committee states that
legislation should not be aimed at restricting the use of credit.
"It should be designed to rid the credit industry of harmful practices of the few which reflect on the industry as a whole and to
encourage or require other practices which will make the credit
industry respond in a more prefect way to the forces of com'32
petition.
In addition to aiding the industry's image, the same report
indicates the committee's desire to protect creditors from judicial attacks on their legal foundation. "Changing judicial attitudes are threatening the legal foundations of the consumer
credit industry. The time-price doctrine, which holds that
finance charges in vendor-credit transactions are not interest,
has been, in effect, repudiated in Arkansas and Nebraska and
'33
somewhat undermined by decisions in other states.
Thus, clearly the purpose of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in drafting and promulgating the UCCC was not to produce a document which protected the consumer. Rather it was a document to protect industry. That feature of the Code which was supposed to garner
31 The results of this study are contained in B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION
32

(1965)

[hereinafter cited as

CURRAN].

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RETAIL INSTALLMENT SALES, CON-

SUMER CREDIT, SMALL LOANS AND

(separately printed).
33 Id. at 6.

USURY TO THE

NCCUSL, 10 (1965)
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consumer support was the prohibitions of "harmful practices of
the few."
The sponsors of the legislation had undoubtedly anticipated
certain negative reactions, such as Lester Dennon's unbending
resistance to many features of the Uniform Code. 34 After all, the
discussions and studies undertaken by the Special Committee
of the Uniform Commissioners had indicated that certain segments of the industry were in favor of, lukewarm to, or unalterably opposed to various features of the UCCC. The Special
Committee, however, did feel that the promulgated version represented a reasonable compromise of conflicting viewpoints.
There was optimistic hope that the uniform version, as a compromise, would meet with success in a number of state legislatures. This hope was based partly upon an assumption that the
consumer groups would be strongly in favor of the legislation.
It therefore followed that the Act would have basic popular
support in the legislative halls which, coupled with the compromise features, would ensure passage in a number of legislatures.
It was in this situation that the UCCC was promulgated.
Actually, it was rushed to completion. If the purpose of the
haste in promulgating the UCCC had been due to the fact that
the drafters were aware of the militant consumer movement,
perhaps the communication gaps would not have occurred. However, the reason for the commissioners' haste lay in the impending federal legislation, particularly truth-in-lending. It was intended by the Uniform Commissioners that the UCCC be ready
for state legislatures so that industry in those states could
comply with state law and not with federal law. In fact, at the
1968 Annual Meeting of the Uniform Commissioners, the unprecedented step was taken of approving the Final Draft of the
UCCC with the Special Committee being given authority, subject to the approval of the Executive Committee, to make
changes in the final draft "to conform the final draft to the
exemption requirements and Regulations of the Federal Reserve
Board pursuant to the Federal Consumer Credit Protection
A ct

....

35

If the Code had been ready in 1965, it is possible that it
would have had some success in a number of legislatures. However, by the time the Code was finally promulgated in 1968-69,
the situation had changed drastically. Consumer interests were
34 Dennon, The Uniform Consumer Credit Bombshell, 22
NANCE L.Q. 125 (1968).
35 UNIFORM CONSUMER

CREDIT CODE,

XVIII (1969).

PERSONAL

FI-
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no longer quiet and receptive to just any legislation which might
improve the consumers' lot. Ralph Nader had entered the scene.
A sizeable group of young attorneys working for the Neighborhood Legal Services Project of the OEO had learned that the
problems of the consumer were not due solely to the "harmful
practices of the few." Consumer spokesmen began to express
the view that the general practices of the industry did not adequately consider consumers' reasonable expectations. A fairly
sizeable group of well-informed, capable, and concerned spokesmen for consumer groups were beginning to demand something
more.
At this stage of the game the communications gap appeared.
When the Uniform Commissioners went to the state legislatures
in an attempt to enact the Code, they found that consumer
objection was quickly building. The sponsors of the legislation
felt that the consumers were talking about objectionable policy
choices which the commissioners felt they had fully discussed
before 1965. The proponents were eager to attempt to get
enough enactments of the UCCC to forestall any more action
by Congress in the consumer credit field. With these two attitudes, it is understandable that the proponents misunderstood
the consumer negativism. They had no awareness of the basic
assumptions of the consumer protection movement as of 1968.
Basically, the communications gap exists because the drafters of the UCCC were talking with and reacting to one group of
consumer advocates at a time when a more activist group of
consumer advocates was beginning to appear on the scene. The
basic assumptions of this present group of consumer advocates
are new. Previously, consumer legislation was actually designed
to abate the excesses thought to exist on the fringes of the
system. Now consumer advocates deny that what is good for
General Motors is good for the consumer. If consumer legislation is to be effective it must make basic changes in the present
system. This the Code does not do. The new consumer advocates are much more skilled in meeting industry objections of
the type which alleged that serious harm would occur to the
credit economy if significant changes were made in the law.
The assumption now made by these advocates is that industry
can learn to live with much more change than they would like
and still make a profit. This new breed of spokesmen is also
much more interested in the social costs of the present system
following such landmark studies as "The Poor Pay More" by Pro36
fessor David Caplovitz.
36 D.

CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY

MORE (1967).
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While it might be unfortunate, it should not have been
altogether unexpected that the completely contrasting set of
purposes and assumptions should have resulted in a difficulty
in reaching a dialogue between those who had worked for years
with the UCCC and those who have opposed it. The countercharges of an "industry sponsored bill" and of an unrealistic
refusal to compromise or face facts did little to promote communication. A notable exception in this process was the effort
of the National Consumer Law Center at Boston College School
of Law. Under the aegis of its Director, Professor William Willier, the center produced the National Consumer Act as an
alternative to the UCCC. Continuing conversations between the
draftsmen of the NCA and proponents of the UCCC contributed
to the present situation where the positions of the consumer
advocates are more realistically evaluated by members of the
industry. This present situation shows more promise of future
narrowing of the communications gap in that certain segments
of the industry and their spokesmen are willing to begin on the
assumption that change is coming and that change is not dangerous per se. This is most evident with respect to the retail
merchants' spokesmen who tend to take an attitude that consumer credit legislation to benefit all must introduce certain reforms of significance which benefit the consumer state by state.
III.

EFFECTIVE RELIEF

The consumer advocate will not support consumer credit
legislation without some assurance that the consumer will have
effective relief from both the abuses in the market place and
disappointments in his reasonable expectations.37 Effective relief
may be public or private, but the requirement basically is that
an aggrieved consumer have a realistic avenue which will recompense him for loss, protect him from further loss, and ensure
that some steps will be taken to prevent the recurrence of the
prohibited or loss-producing activity. Where the economic investment of the consumer in a typical consumer credit transaction is not worth the cost of a lawsuit, the general legal maxim
-that
there is a remedy for every wrong -offers
scant consolation. Experiences with ghetto consumers in free legal service programs have demonstrated to the consumer advocate that
litigation offers little hope for the consumer who earns too
much to qualify for such services and too little to afford his
own legal counsel.
37 E.g., Spanogle, The UCCC -It
May Look Pretty, But Is It Enforceable?, 29 OIno ST. L. J. 624 (1968).
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Neither the consumer nor his lawyer has been an active
participant in the court system in the past. Throughout the years
the basic interest group which has used the courts is the creditor
class.38 Procedures in the courts have been devised and perfected to permit the creditor to develop those elements of the
creditor-debtor relationship which are of concern to him. Thus,
the typical situation is that if a creditor has a negotiable promissory note it is a simple matter for him to file pleadings in an
ordinary court of law in order to obtain a money judgment.
The next step is the usual post-judgment remedies such as
execution on a judgment and garnishment. For decades the
courts have been trained to react in an almost Pavlovian sense
to the creditor's request for a means of collecting debts.
Very often, in light of the above described system, the
debtor has no effective voice. A creditor has a number of small
claims actions and develops an efficient procedure for obtaining judgments. The economics of defending a small claims action
are quite different. The debtor has no staff of attorneys, no
great familiarity with the court system, and, most importantly,
has not developed an effective way to assert his rights in the
courts. Thus, many creditor actions result in default judgments
against the debtor. It is economically unfeasible for a debtor
to secure legal representation in such small claims.
If the foregoing represents a modicum of truth, then a consumer advocate's approach to the UCCC is going to be: What
does the Code do for the consumer to give him a truly effective
remedy? A number of features of the UCCC which were heralded as significant advances in the law of consumer credit
turn out to be illusory or nonexistent changes in the system.
If, for example, one discusses the matter of the use of the
negotiable instrument in consumer credit transactions, the consumer protection advocate is disappointed by the approach of
the UCCC. It is well known that the use of the negotiable instrument or the waiver of defenses clause gives the creditor
a strong position. 39 What is the Code reaction to this problem?
It is true that section 2.403 of the Code nullifies the advantages
of the use of negotiable instruments. However, in alternative B
of section 2.404, the drafters of the UCCC permit assignees to
obstacles consumer lawyers run
into on their way to the courthouse account for this nonaltruism. See
Schrag, Bleak House 1968: A Report on Consumer Test Litigation, 44
N.Y.U.L. REV. 115 (1968) for a graphic account of one lawyer's battle
against the system.
39 See Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole
in the New UCCC, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 272 (1968).
38Perhaps some of the extraordinary
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take an obligation free of defenses under certain circumstances.
The consumer advocate who is really interested in effective
consumer relief wonders why the drafters of the Code permitted
even an alternative section which does this. A consumer is in
a much better position if he is able to assert a defense or claim
which he has against the merchant by way of refusing to make
additional payments.
The UCCC equivocates again on the matter of attorneys'
fees. The consumer credit contract is uniformly a "boiler-plate"
contract, drafted by the creditor and imposed upon the consumer." It typically includes a provision that if the creditor
has to go into court to enforce his rights, then the consumerdebtor will have to pay reasonable attorneys' fees. The consumer protection advocate would be interested in seeing that
the consumer had the same right. There should be an automatic
provision in a consumer credit contract that if a consumer needs
to bring a suit to enforce any right which he has against the
creditor he can collect his attorneys' fees. It is true that section
5.202(8) of the Code provides that "in any case in which it is
found that a creditor has violated this Act, the court may award
reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by the debtor." This section
is far from the desired rule of law allowing automatic collection
of a debtor's attorneys' fees. In other words, section 5.202(8)
is not equivalent to the usual creditors' term that "buyer agrees
if after default this contract is placed in the hands of an attorney, to pay as attorneys' fees the maximum as shall be permitted by law."
The above examples indicate that it is not one of the assumptions of the UCCC to remedy any imbalance in the present
system. Consumer protection advocates have a right to feel
suspicious of the drafters' claim that they have compromised the
interests of consumer and creditor when consumer oriented
remedies are so conspicuously absent from the present draft.
For example, an obvious method of effective relief for a disappointed consumer would be recission of the contract. That is, if
after the consumer has taken delivery of goods he learns that
they are not as promised, are excessively priced, or that his
rights have been violated in some other way, his most effective
remedy would be to return the goods and demand a refund.
It is well known that the present law in this situation favors
the creditor-seller. The drafters of the UCCC were not ready to
40

See Schuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contract II, 35 TEMP.
L.Q. 281 (1962).
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make any drastic changes in the law in this respect. What might
seem obvious to a consumer does not appear at all obvious to a
creditor or at least to a creditor's lawyer. Proponents of the
Code are wont to argue that if a consumer finds himself in a
position where he has been defrauded or has been delivered
shoddy goods, the law provides a remedy. The remedy, however,
is expensive and treacherous. The consumer must go into court,
take the risk of proving all his allegations to a judge, and meanwhile sustain the burden of a cash outlay for the lawsuit. In
the minds of most modern consumer protection advocates this
is not very effective relief for the consumer.
Private remedies are not the only means of insuring the
consumer effective relief. Article 6 of the UCCC provides for an
administrator, who might have been an effective source of consumer relief. However, article 6 has done very little towards
affording the administrator powers commensurate with his task
of protecting consumer interests. The Code itself recognizes that
the effectiveness of the office depends in large part upon the
character of the administrator. However, the Act makes no attempt to respond to this problem. In fact, it suggests that the
superintendent or commissioner of banking might be an appropriate administrator. Were a state to choose this alternative, the
consumer protection advocate might well express skepticism.
It is a recognized principle of administrative law that the industry-appointed or industry-controlled administrator tends to
41
think, feel, and act as an industry spokesman.
Assuming that a strong administrator is appointed, his powers should be adequate to permit him to be effective. All segments of the business community distrust administrative regulation even though it often represents the best method of day-today control. The UCCC unnecessarily hedges the enforcement
powers of the administrator. Section 6.108, for example, gives
the administrator power to issue cease and desist orders, but
subsection 6 provides: "With respect to unconscionable agreements or fraudulent or unconscionable conduct by the respondent, the administrator may not issue an order pursuant to this
section but may bring a civil action for an injunction."
In effect, this subsection denies the administrator the power
to enforce a proscription against unconscionable agreements or

41

E.g., E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULTZ, NADER'S
THE FEDERAL TRADE CommussIoN ch. 3 (1969).
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fraudulent conduct through the speedy, relatively inexpensive
42
administrative process.
The most effective tool for the relief of disappointed and
injured consumers is the class action. Many consumer complaints occur again and again. The class action permits complaining consumers an economically viable method of private
relief. Industry, of course, fears the class action, because of its
effectiveness. Consumer advocates realize this and instinctively
feel that a significant uniform act which ignores this remedy is
really adopting a posture which says that "we are in favor of
protecting the consumer as long as no one gets very serious
about it." It is true that there are substantial policy questions
involved with respect to class action suits. The present battle in
Congress over consumer class action legislation is evidence of
this disagreement. 43 It is not easy to determine in all cases
whether a class action has been brought to vindicate consumer
rights or has been brought by attorneys because of the economics of the fees involved in a successful class action. For years,
industry lawyers have been arguing that if the consumer is
really bilked, the courts will protect him. This argument ought
to cut both ways. If the class action device is misused, courts
should protect defendants in those cases. It seems that any complete consumer credit law should have a well-drafted provision
permitting class actions. It is no answer to say that this is a
question of procedural law and not for the UCCC. The question
of effective relief must be solved by the UCCC if state pro44
cedural law is weak, as it most frequently is in this respect.
In summary, the changes that the Code does make are inadequate and the changes that it fails to make are badly needed.
It is evident that consumer protection advocates will not be
satisfied until the consumer is afforded truly effective remedies.
42

Also, the injunctive powers given the administrator under § 6.111 are
full of hedges. For example, subsection 2 reads as follows:
(2)
In an action brought pursuant to this section the court may grant
relief only if it finds
(a) that the respondent has made unconscionable agreements or
is likely to engage in a course of fradulent or unconscionable

conduct.

(b) that the agreements or conduct of the respondent had caused
or is likely to cause injury to consumers; and
(c) that the respondent has been able to cause or will be able to
cause the injury primarily because the transactions involved

are credit transactions.

Reflection on this language indicates the extreme burden of proof
placed upon an administrator to restrain activity of which consumers

have legitimate compliants.

Compare Eckhart, The People's Remedy: Consumer Class Actions, 6
TRIAL 14 (1969) with McLaren, An Essential Filter, 6 TRiAL 18 (1969).
44 See Dole, Private Enforcement for Consumer Credit Legislation, 26
Bus. LAW. 915 (1971).
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LIMITATIONS ON CREDITOR REMEDIES

As previously indicated, the present legal system, with some
statutory modifications, has been created by the creditor class
for their benefit. Insofar as creditor remedies are concerned, this
has resulted in a system where the creditor-written contract
gives the creditor a number of ways in which he may enforce
the consumer's promise to pay, and the creditor-created legal
collection system supports the basic collection tactics of the
creditor. The typical contract gives the creditor a panoply of
"creditor rights": a security interest in the goods sold and in
other collateral as well; the right to cumulate remedies vis-a-vis
collateral with other collection devices; a legal interest in the
consumer's future earnings; the right to collect attorneys' fees
and other costs; special collection devices such as the power to
confess judgment; and the power to assess penalties for nonpayment. These rights derive from a supposed "freedom of
contract."
The creditor also enjoys an efficient and ruthless collection
machinery provided by the state in the form of judges, court
clerks, and sheriffs. Most jurisdictions provide a relatively
simple process of obtaining a default judgment and a legally
supported collections system. Execution is accomplished through
sheriff's sales of the debtor's property (often to the creditor),
garnishment of wages (which are necessary to the day-to-day
existence of the debtor), and even, in the recent past, imprisonment of the debtor.45 One of the more ironic parts of this story
is in the tale of small claims courts. Originally designed to
assure the layman without a lawyer the opportunity to plead his
case informally and inexpensively, the small claims procedure
has been utilized almost exclusively by creditors. A day in
small claims court consists of the creditor's secretary or collection
agent presenting a sheaf of accounts, for judgment. Under such
circumstances even a sympathetic judge has no time to prevent
46
egregious error.
In addition to these institutional remedies, extra-legal collection agencies provide a ruthless means of enforcement. The
collection agency may repeatedly telephone the debtor, his wife,
45 See J. HANNA

& J. MACLACHLAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CREDITOR'S
RIGHTS 70-73 (5th ed. 1957).
46 Through personal observations of small claims in Connecticut it became
evident that the sheer volume of bill collection processes precluded
examination of the debtor, who was often absent. Notices to debtors
did not reveal that he could informally discuss the matter with the
judge. Such a discussion could result in a reasonable judgment such
as a weekly order of payments rather than garnishment of wages.
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and family in a program of verbal assault designed to elicit payment under duress. Contacting the debtor's employer in order
to induce payment is another device. Written communications,
threatening imaginary legal or other consequences in the event
of continued nonpayment, often on stationery resembling that
of official agencies or lawyers, are not unknown. A number of
creditors perhaps can safely claim to never use such tactics, and
yet they support them every time they hire an unscrupulous
collection agency. Thus, it is grossly inaccurate to describe
these practices as "abuses of the few."
A common assumption among collection agencies is that the
nonpaying debtor is a social and economic pariah unworthy of
any pity or salvation save that he pay his bills. The system permits no exception for failure to pay because of economic reverses
not within the control of the debtor or because of simple overextension of credit due to assiduous merchandising tactics which
are nearly as pressuring as the collection practices. The indirect
economic and family costs in terms of peace of mind and emotional stability are not as yet empirically evaluated.
If consumer credit legislation were well thought out and
were truly designed to give both consumers and creditors their
respective places in the sun, the underlying assumptions of the
above described system would be called into question. Yet,
creditor spokesmen react with a number of factually unsupported statements when any attempt is made to limit the efficacy
of the collection process.4 7 It is primarily alleged that the system
is necessary to assure that debtors pay their debts. It is further
contended that for every incursion of the above enumerated
creditors' bill of rights that there must necessarily be a concomitant increase in the cost of credit. Finally, it is suggested
that consumer success in this area will result in denial of credit
to the least credit worthy debtors, i.e., the ghetto resident.
The assertion that the collection process is necessary in
order to ensure that all debtors will pay is simply unfounded in
fact. The assumption is that all debtors would default if there
were not a ready and effective deterrent. While there is no sure
answer to the question of why debtors honor their debts, the
slight evidence at hand seems to negate a suggestion that they
pay under threat of default judgment, garnishment, loss of job,
or fear of phone calls in the middle of the night. There is evi47

For the purposes of this article, the less sophisticated and obviously
ad hominem arguments such as, "It is socially desirable that people pay
their debts, there is no problem, or, our great American free enterprise
system would collapse," will be ignored.
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dence to suggest that debtors pay simply because they feel they
ought to. In 1963, Nebraska debtors were given a windfall when
the Nebraska Supreme Court invalidated the time-price differential doctrine. 48 The court ruled that all debtors who had purchased automobiles on credit could keep the automobile without
further payments and sue for the return of any money paid inasmuch as the installment contract was usurious under Nebraska
law. 49 All reliable evidence indicates that nearly all debtors continued to pay as though legally compelled.5 0
Other states have taken legislative steps which substantially
alter existing creditor remedies. Texas, for example, has outlawed garnishment of wages, 51 and California has drastically reduced the number of situations where a creditor of a consumer
debtor may exercise both his right to repossess a security interest and his right to a deficiency judgment. 52 It would appear that
if the underlying assumption had some validity, the reduction in
the deterrence would increase the incidence of deviant behavior,
i.e., nonpayment of debts. The absence of any such meaningful
data suggests the falsity of the underlying assumption. Debtors
pay for reasons other than the deterrent effect of efficient collection practices. Perhaps the answer lies in fear of the consequences of a bad credit rating.
It would be absurd to suggest that creditors be stripped of
all collection remedies. There is no evidence that a respectable
legal collection device which treated the debtor as a human
being, with reasons for being unable to pay, would cause social
consequences needing remedial action. Nothing more is necessary in order to permit creditors to perform their function.
The argument that a decrease in effectiveness of creditor
collection devices would increase the cost of credit is, on the
surface, fairly logical, and many unwittingly assume it is true.
However, this argument ignores the distinction between effectiveness and economic efficiency. There is a startling lack of
empirical evidence as to the efficacy of most collection processes.
48 For a discussion of the time-price differential doctrine see generally 14

A.L.R.3d 1065 (1967). Most states have usury laws limiting interest

chargeable for a loan or forbearance of money. However, if a merchant
offers to sell items at a cash price or a credit price, and the buyer
accepts the latter, this is not usurious. The credit price is termed a price

differential by the courts.
49 Elder v. Doerr, 175 Neb. 483, 122 N.W.2d 528 (1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 973 (1963); see also Stanton v. Mattson, 175 Neb. 767, 123 N.W.2d

844 (1963).
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Oct. 23, 1963, at 1, col. 1, indicated that 80

percent of one creditor's customers continued paying on illegal paper.
51 TEXAS ANN. CIV. STAT. § 4099 (VERNoN's 1966).
52 CAL. ANN. CIV. CODE § 1812.4, 1812.5 (WEsT's 1971).
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In order to assert the argument of efficacy with some factual
verity it would be necessary to demonstrate that the costs introduced into the particular system are more than recovered by
what is produced by the system which would not be produced
otherwise. To put the matter in a specific context, assume we
are questioning the economic efficiency of the garnishment
process. We would wish to know how much the creditor paid in
order to reduce his claim to judgment, to serve the writ of
garnishment, and to oversee the process of collecting from the
employer. Assuming we have these figures for a statistically
representative sample, we would then need to know how much
was produced through these garnishments. We would then additionally need to know the results of a control group experiment
which would constitute a group of statistically equivalent debtors who were not subject to the garnishment process. How much
was collected from these debtors? Only if the net proceeds of
the garnishment process exceeded the net proceeds from the
group control would we be satisfied that the garnishment process
was an element in the system which influenced the cost of credit.
Finally, the possibility that consumer protection legislation
might jeopardize the extension of credit to the economically
underprivileged is of admitted concern even to consumer advocates. Ghetto residents are the most in need of credit and would
be most susceptible to loan shark activities if legal avenues of
credit were unavailable. There is, therefore, surface justification
to a charge that strong consumer legislation is middle class
oriented.
It is here submitted that most of the above logic applies
only with respect to rate regulation. It is an argument that reasonably generous rates must be established if we do not wish an
effect which would compel industry to tighten its credit-granting
policies." Further, the argument loses force in relationship to
the limitations on creditor remedies. The preceding discussion
on the economics of the present collection practices would seem
to apply even more forcefully to low income debtors. That is,
the return from harsh collection practices is likely to be minimal
from persons who have no real property, whose income is subject to the whims of the employment market, and whose medical
expenses are greater than other parts of the population.
From many years of discussions in the public arena as to
consumer protection legislation I concluded that much of the in5 Credit extension policies operate partly on hunch and partly on economic
assumptions.
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dustry objection to reform is merely a fear of the unknown.
Established business interests uniformly resist changes in the
status quo. Consumer creditors are no exception. For example,
when there was discussion of legislatively abrogating the holder
in due course doctrine as to consumer paper, industry's major
reaction was one of utter disbelief that the legislature would
knowingly destroy the necessary underpinnings of the great
American credit economy. More recently, industry leaders have
been very nearly convinced, with a few exceptions, that the doctrine does not make that much difference to them anyway. 54 One
wonders whether the same thing may not be true with respect
to garnishment, deficiency judgments, harassing collection practices, and other aspects of the presently existing system.
The proposed UCCC makes no attempt to deal with the
fundamental structural deficiencies of the credit system. It imposes only piecemeal and grudging limitations on the creditor's
right to contract for whatever collection device he chooses.
Probably the best example of this approach is provided by section 5.103 which limits creditor's use of the deficiency judgment
following repossession to transactions where the cash price of
the goods is $1,000 or less. Consumers argue that such restriction
on the use of the deficiency judgment is much too narrow.
Professor Shuchman, in one of the very few, good, consumerrelated empirical studies, has demonstrated the economics of the
repossession, resale, and deficiency judgment process involving
automobiles in one state.55 The study clearly demonstrates the
inefficiency of the system. Yet, section 5.103 of the UCCC provides that the creditor is forced to choose between repossession
and a judgment for the outstanding balance only where the
"cash price" of the goods was $1,000 or less. This section effectively removes the automobile from its coverage. Additionally,
there is the very real likelihood that the effect will be to increase the "cash price" of all goods now selling just below $1,000
to a cash price of $1,001.00.
This discussion has so far confined itself to the economics
and other realities of the creditor's position only. The overriding
concern of the public in a collection system which minimizes
the social costs - economic and otherwise - has received almost
no consideration. Judge Skelly Wright has elsewhere outlined
the social costs in terms of broken homes and bankrupt debtors
See Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 445 (1968).
55 Shuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of Automobile Repossession and Resale, 22 STAN. L. REV. 20 (1969).
54
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which result from garnishment of wages, loss of job, and
eventual reliance on welfare. 5 Even if the doubtful economic
efficiency of the present system is not enough, these social costs
demand a fundamental reexamination of creditor remedies.
V. RATES

The consumer advocate is most on the defensive with respect
to the all-important question of the regulation of rates. Those
who represent that part of the industry which seeks more reasonable rate structures assert that the proposed rate provisions
introduce order where chaos reigns. But the matter is much
more complex than the picture painted by most proponents of
the UCCC. In order to properly understand the proposed rate
structure of the UCCC, it is necessary to isolate various parts
of the present system.
The three general areas in which rates are of interest to the
consumer are small loans, retail installment sales, and open end
credit plans. Most jurisdictions do regulate rates on small
loans. 5T Legislation in this field dates back to the early 20th
century.58
At that time "loan sharking" was a recognized social evil.
The suggested solution, following a study of the matter by the
Russell Sage Foundation,5 9 was the Uniform Small Loan Law
which was enacted in many jurisdictions. 0 Insofar as rates are
concerned, its basic feature was the exemption of licensed lenders from the state usury laws. It provided a graduated scale of
permissible rates for licensed lenders. 61 This feature of rate
regulation has been termed the "public utility" method. Competition does not settle rates; the statutory scale does. There is a
serious question as to the efficacy of the public utility method as
presently applied. Typical rate structures on small loans permit
rates up to 36 percent, hardly a restrictive limit. Moreover, the
licensing of a limited number of small loan creditors creates an
oligarchy of lenders who uniformly charge the statutory maximum. Thus competitive forces play no part in the small loan
62
industry.
56 See generally, Wright, The Courts Have Failed the Poor, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 9, 1969, (Magazine), at 26.
57 CURRAN, supra note 31, at 16-45.

58 Id. at 2.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 16.
61 The UNIFORM SMALL LOAN LAW, § 13(a) (seventh draft), sets a rate
of 3 percent per month on loans up to $100 and 2 percent per month on
the excess. For state variations see CURRAN, supra note 31, at 20.
62 Warren, supra note 29, at 857.
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Retail installment sales differ functionally from small loans.
Sellers are not licensed or supervised as to sales credit and are
generally exempt from usury statutes. It was apparently felt
that consumer credit could not expand using the relatively small
return permitted by the usury limits of most jurisdictions. This
escape from usury legislation was accomplished by judicial
recognition of the fiction of a "time price differential.16 3 If a
merchant sold goods at a credit price which was higher than a
cash price, the difference was deemed not to be interest but a
price differential.6 4 State efforts to limit these "finance charges"
have varied from blanket regulation to no regulation at all. 5
Thus, the effect of the proposed rate schedule in the UCCC will
vary throughout the states.
An increasingly important source of consumer credit is the
open end credit plan. These would include the retail revolving
charge account and the charge card plan whether sponsored by
a bank, an oil company, or nationwide financing institution
such as Diners' Club. Few states have set explicit limits on the
interest which may be charged.6 6 What little legislation there
is set a rate of 1 percent a month.
It is difficult to justify any exception from normal usury
statutes for open end credit plans, and yet industry has uniformly charged rates in excess of statutory limits. Litigation in
at least two states has been successful in subjugating open end
credit to interest laws.6
It is against these areas of legislative activity that any consumer credit legislation proposed as "model" or "uniform" must
be viewed. The provisions in the proposed UCCC relating to
rates based upon the following assumptions appearing in the
Prefatory Note:
First, the successful American way of permitting competition
to determine prices of non-monopolies commodities and services
should also be allowed to apply to the pricing of money and

credit.
Second, usury

laws

imposing

inflexible

price

ceilings

on

money and credit are histcrical vestiges of the erroneous supposition that emperors, kings and governments could effectively
63 14 A.L.R.3d 1065 (1967).
64

This fiction becomes increasingly difficult to maintain as retailers estab-

lish regular relations with finance agencies which determine credit
granting policies and agree to purchase all of the retailer's consumer
credit obligations.
65
CURRAN, supra note 31, at 101.
66 See 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 1401-31 (1969).
67 Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney, 48 Wis.2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970);
Donnelly v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Conn. Ct. Common Pleas, Hartford
County, No. 101213 Col. (December 2, 1970).
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fix all
led to
stand,
higher

prices; the need to escape the rigidity of usury laws has
special laws, which only the expert can find or underfor most types of credit transactions requiring a charge
than the usury rate.68

The Code effectuates these assumptions by establishing free
entry into the credit market subject to "financial responsibility,
character and fitness."' 9 This is a change from the present requirement of "convenience and advantage" that has been used
by administrators of small loan acts to limit the outlets of
lenders. 70 Ceilings on the price of credit are set low enough to
prevent over-reaching by creditors, yet high enough to permit
competition to have an effect. The limits proposed by the Code
apply both to licensed lenders and credit sellers and would permit rates of 36 percent on $300 or less, 21 percent on amounts
from $300 to $1,000, and 15 percent on any excess. Alternatively,
18 percent may be charged on the entire amount. 7 ' The maximum rate for revolving charge accounts is pegged at 2 percent
per month on amounts up to $500 and 11/2 percent on the re72
mainder.
The practical politics of gaining support for such legislation
are immensely complicated by the widespread lack of knowledge
about (a) the present rate structure, (b) the economics of consumer credit, (c) the relationship between legally set rates and
actual charges, and (d) the effect of a free entry policy on the
credit market. This general ignorance fosters ambivalence on the
part of both the champions and opponents of the UCCC. Consumer advocates are reluctant to accept on faith the Code's
argument that free entry will permit competition to lower rates.
There is little or no evidence to substantiate this claim. On the
contrary, past experience indicates that interest rates quickly
rise to the legal maximum. Yet, some change is clearly needed.
What should consumer groups do? Since their present indecision
is based on lack of knowledge, all they really can do is request
some hard data on the economics of credit.
Industry must be required to demonstrate more convincingly that the free entry principle will work. It does not seem
to be enough to say that the idea is "worth a try."

CREDIT CODE XIX (1969).
) UNIFORM CONSUMER CRDIT CODE § 3.503(2).
T0 Warren, supra note 29, at 875.
71 UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 2.201, 3.508 (see § 3.201 setting 18
percent per year on the unpaid balance as the maximum rate for other
than supervised loans).
72 UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.207.

68 UNIFORM CONSUMER
6
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CONCLUSION

Hopefully for consumer advocates, the battle over the UCCC
will be replaced by a more realistic struggle for balanced consumer credit legislation. The legislative activity in 1969 clearly
indicated that consumer credit legislation cannot be uniform.
Generally, interim legislative study commissioners were entrusted with the duty of reconciling the UCCC with consumer
position papers. In this sense the act is being treated more as
a starting point than as the usual uniform act. The dialogue
continues with a new trust. It is to be hoped that the Uniform
Commissioners have given up their vain search for uniformity
in this area. Given the fate of the UCCC in state legislatures
thus far, the only explanation of continued adherence to the
principle of uniformity is a stubborn refusal to recognize the
inevitable.

LEGISLATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE
UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE

A 1971 PERSPECTIVE*
By L.

RICHARD FREESE, JR.**
INTRODUCTION

plethora of commentary has been offered on the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) since its promulgation by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) in August 1968.1 I hesitate to add to that
commentary: the risk is that it will only be a reformulation of
thoughts succinctly stated before. Nevertheless, the invitation
of the Denver Law Journal to comment on the UCCC is irresistible. I have succumbed to the assignment in the hope that
my own experience with the UCCC will reflect a current
overview for a new audience and that this article will allow
publication of a view different from that of Professor Littlefield's. I have intended to phrase my observations for all
who are concerned with this legislation and not just for the
legal profession.
A

I.

UNIFORMITY

The raising of the issue of whether or not it was appropriate for the National Conference to promulgate the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code as a "uniform" act provokes several
preliminary thoughts. The National Conference draftsmen are
highly practical men, many of whom are legislators and all
of whom are keenly interested in political and legislative
processes. They knew that uncompromising uniformity is not
possible in the passage of state legislation. To dwell on the
See editors note p. 1 supra for introduction to this article and a parallel
discussion by Neil 0. Littlefield.
** Partner, Davis, Graham & Stubbs, Denver, Colorado; B.A. 1959, Princeton
University, LL.B. 1962, Harvard University.
1 Recent articles include the transcribed remarks of 21 distinguished speakers at an American Bar Association National Institute on "Consumer
Credit in the Seventies," sponsored by the ABA Section of Corporation,
Bank and Business Law, 26 Bus. LAWYER 753 (1971); Braucher,
Consumer Credit Reform: Rates, Profits and Competition, 43 TEMp. L. Q.
313 (1970), where in note 1 is listed a number of prominent articles
published in 1968 and 1969 on the UCCC; and Eovaldi, Private Consumer
Substantive and ProceduralRemedies Under State Law, 15 ANTIRruST
BULL. 255 (1970). See also Symposium, Consumer Credit, 8 B. C. IND. &
CoM. L. REv. 387 (1968); Symposium, Consumer Credit Reform, 33 LAW
*

& CONTEMP. PROB. 639

(1968);

44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1 (1969).

Symposium Consumer Credit Reform,
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reasons wny the National Confe.rence chose to promulgate the
UCCC as a "uniform" act is probably wasteful at this juncture. 2 Our focus now should be to determine whether uniform state regulation of consumer credit practices is viable.
Thus, my thoughts will be directed to considerations which
have come to the fore in the nearly 3 years of legislative experience with the UCCC.
I believe that the National Conference made an attractive
decision- from a political, economic, and sociological point of
view - when it promulgated the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
as a uniform act.
A first factor in this judgment is that the regulation of
consumer credit seems highly appropriate for "umbrella" treatment or, rather, treatment in one piece of state legislation,
and not by the approach of the past of regulating consumer
credit in a piecemeal fashion through several separate state
statutes directed to each "type" of credit-extending institution and by piecemeal "consumer protection" statutes, such as
garnishment limitation statutes and statutes limiting the holder
in due course privilege.3 We must recognize the existence of
the anticompetitive overtones of the existing segmented regulation of the credit industry; 4 of the "captive administrator"
problem; 5 of the uncoordinated, sometimes inconsistent statutes
in the credit area; 6 and of the ability of selected credit institutions to kill piecemeal legislation of the "consumer protection" variety. Given the presence of these four concerns, the
National Conference's decision to promulgate umbrella regulation was eminently correct if one is concerned with viable
consumer protection in the consumer credit field. Moreover,
as a lawyer, I am exhausted from trying to decipher existing
state laws in this area. It is nearly impossible to advise credit
institutions on how they are to behave under this patchwork
of laws. 7 For example, this unpredictability becomes a serious handicap to credit institutions in their dealings among
themselves. They are unable to negotiate realistically in the
2 The draftsmen of the UCCC set forth their thinking in their Prefatory

Note, "Uniform Legislation Desirable" (1969 Official Text).
CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION (1965); Benfield, Money, Mortgages and Migraine-the Usury Headache, 19 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 819 (1968), and infra note 17.
4 Eovaldi, supra note 1, at 261-68.
5 See p. 42 infra.
6 See Benfield, supra note 3.
7 Credit institutions are often left to guess what the courts may do in interpreting the legal effects of consumer credit dealings.

3

See B.
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purchase and assignment of debt paper. I see no justification
for this continued impairment of the free flow of commerce.
A second factor is that several compelling reasons for
establishing uniformity throughout the United States in the
regulation of consumer credit extension have emerged during
legislative review of the UCCC.8 First, the populace of the
United States is transient. Transient consumers need to know
the ground rules for credit extension. Shopping for credit becomes illusory for those consumers who change jurisdictions
frequently unless they are provided with a familiar legal
framework within which they can seek credit. A consumer's
bargaining ability is not enhanced when only the creditor
knows the legal variables within which a debt may be created
and collected. A second, related reason is that consumers
should know what are ,the ground rules when they shop for
credit in states other than their own. 10 Third, there are many
benefits to both consumers and creditors in uniform regulation
of the creditors' practices and procedures. Cost efficiencies are
achieved by uniform training of credit personnel, by uniform
forms used in credit transactions, and by uniform standards of
conduct in dealing with consumers." These concerns touch all
creditors, regardless of size. Credit extension is not an insular
affair. Every creditor is dependent upon the network of interrelationships with his bank, his national trade association, his
supplier, the manufacturer of his products, or even a national
financial institution which finances his unpaid accounts and
receivables or his lendable funds. Those areas where national
uniformity may tend to increase creditors' efficiencies necessarily should redound to the benefit of the public in permitting
credit extension at lower finance charge level.
These three reasons are the basis for the Congress' conclusion that uniform disclosure of credit terms is imperative.
The report of the Federal Reserve Board to Congress in January 1971 on the progress of the Federal Truth in Lending Act
concludes that uniform disclosures made by creditors pursuant to that Act are indeed beginning to work. 1 2 Consumers
8

Before legislative experience with the UCCC had occurred, Carl Felsenfeld examined arguments for and against promulgation of the UCCC

as a uniform act in Uniform, Uniformed and Unitary Laws Regulating
Consumer Credit, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 221-36 (1968).
"Id. at 223-26.
10 Id. at 226.
11 Id.
12 BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 92d Cong., 1st
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON TRUTH IN LENDING FOR THE YEAR

Sess.,
1970,

at 7-13 (1971); See also Feldman, FTC Enforcement of the Truth in
Lending Act - One Year Later, 26 Bus. LAWYER 835 (1971).
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are becoming more alert to the terms and conditions of credit
extension and are using such knowledge to shop for the best
credit terms.
I know that the reader is tempted to ask: What does this
have to do with the Uniform Consumer Credit Code? I submit that it has a great deal to do with the Code. The Code's
disclosure provisions were made substantially identical to the
disclosure provisions of the Federal Truth in Lending Act, not
only because inconsistent state disclosure provisions are rendered invalid by the Act, but also because the Code is designed to return enforcement of consumer credit disclosure
laws to a state administrator rather than to leave it at the
federal level under the nine federal agencies designated for
such enforcement under the Act. 13 There is much more to
the story than that, however. The Federal Truth in Lending
Act does not invalidate consistent and additional disclosure requirements. 14 Thus a state legislature may impose further disclosures upon the creditor which would require him to make
the delicate judgment of whether or not those additional disclosures are inconsistent with the Federal Truth in Lending
and Regulation Z disclosure requirements and, if not, how they
can be fitted into the federal disclosure scheme in a meaningful way.1 5 Any counsel for credit institutions knows that
making these judgments is a nearly impossible task in many
instances. If legislators can only avoid the temptation to
amend or add to the Code's disclosure provisions, disaster will
be avoided. The Code, as drafted, accepts the burden of state
enforcement without sacrificing the obvious benefits of uniform disclosure.
Uniformity is also significant in the area of the holder
in due course privilege. Those who buy debt paper need to
know what exposure they may have for claims or defenses
which the buyer may have against the seller. The case law
today is changing in this area. 16 Many financial institutions
find that they have negotiated a purchase price for such
Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA) § 123, 15 U.S.C. § 1622
(1970), permits exemption for state-regulated transactions where such
regulation is substantially similar and there is adequate provision for
enforcement. See, Prefatory Note to UCCC (1969 official text) and
UCCC § 1.102, Comment. Inconsistent state disclosure requirements are
invalid under the CCPA § 111 (e), 15 U.S.C. § 1610(a); and administrative enforcement is provided in the CCPA § 108, 15 U.S.C. § 1607.
14 CCPA § 111(a) 15 U.S.C. § 1610(a), and § 226.6(b) and (c) of Regulation
13

Z thereunder.
15

16

§ 226.6(a),

(b) and (c) of Regulation

Z.

James, Holders in Due Course and Other Prohibitions, 26 Bus.
881 (1971).

LAWYER
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paper based upon reliance on the holder in due course privilege, only to have a court subsequently hold that, because of
the close relationship of the seller and the holder, the holder
is not a holder in due course because he did not purchase the
paper in "good faith."'" Also, consumer debt paper is often
17

Id.
In commercial transactions, case-by-case determination of the
legal effects of the transactions is disastrous. Thus predictability, through
fixed rules, becomes almost as important as what the rules actually are.
This is not to imply that § 2.403 and either Alternatives A or B of § 2.204
of the UCCC necessarily are socially beneficial rules. Many financiers
have argued that they will no longer be able to buy consumer debt paper
at an attractive enough price to the dealer - because they must protect
themselves from exposure by requiring higher compensatory accounts,
escrows and the like - to permit sellers to make direct credit extensions
and negotiate the resulting debt paper. The holder in due course privilege
has, however, been severely restricted or eliminated in Massachusetts,
Texas, Oklahoma, Utah, California, and elsewhere and, although no special
studies have been made, the evidence is strong that there have been no
appreciable negative effects on the ongoing pace of creation and negotiation of consumer installment debt paper. Sections 2.403 and 2.404 may,
of course, tend to shift some credit extension to direct lending from
installment credit selling, and thus the lender, by virtue of stricter standards of credit-worthiness, may well narrow credit availability to the
"marginal" debtor. Financiers may also after a period of experience with
the new rules, find that they may be able to make prices and conditions
of their purchases of debt paper more attractive, especially with respect
to those sellers whose products are shown over a period of time to be
reliable or who demonstrate that they are adequate to hold the financier
harmless when strike or nuisance suits are commenced. Regardless of the
evidence that no appreciable negative effects ensue on the free flow of
credit extension, it is a close question whether the financier should be
set up as a policeman of his dealers' trade practices. Two arguments are
normally advanced: (1) the financier is in a better position to know of
and control those practices, and (2) where the dealer has disappeared,
the financier can spread the loss over a wider group and the burden does
not fall exclusively on the injured buyer.
As to (1), in some instances, the buyer may be in a much better
position to appraise the value and reliability of the product he has bought
than the financier, who may not know or be able to know such matters
where a large variety of products are sold by the dealer. A special problem arises in the credit card area where an issuer, especially a bank, is
one of a large number of banks issuing the same card, whose card customers may use the card for purchases from a retailer who was signed
up by a competing bank and with whom the issuer has no direct relationship; it is naive to assume that this issuer can effectively police that
merchant. Attempts to set up a joint policing mechanism among the
issuer banks suggest anti-trust problems. Perhaps bank card arrangements can be established so ag to place the responsibility on the bank
who signed up the merchant whose practices are the source of the liability (barring recoupment from the merchant). Clearly, however, the
institution of §§ 2.403 and 2.404 restrictions create widespread, perhaps
nearly insoluable, problems.
As to (2), although persuasive that it seems very inequitable that
an injured buyer alone should bear the less caused by the unlawful trade
practices of a seller simply because he presumably was the happenstance victim, why should that loss be absorbed by a financier who must
reflect it as a penalty upon his owners, employees, and other customers.
If a seller is harming the public, then the resultant loss should truly be
spread over the public fisc, perhaps by some type of government consumer insurance arrangement which would permit the government to
recompense the buyer for his loss and then police the seller so as both
to make the government whole and to terminate the harmful practice.
Finally, if the financier is to be an effective policeman, he must know
exactly the extent of his maximum liability. To leave him exposed to
unlimited consequential damages is an unneeded "in terrorem" weapon
which will simply eliminate all transference of installment paper rather
than introduce the intended policing mechanism.
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bought by financial institutions from sellers in other states.
Uniformity will facilitate such transactions.
The Code's limitations on the use of collateral, 8 its restrictions on balloon payments, 19 its ban of confessions of
21
judgment, 20 and its restrictions on the deficiency judgments
are indicated for uniform treatment by virtue of all three
reasons under the second factor i.e., the transient consumer,
the interstate credit shopper, and creditors' efficiencies. Such
areas as rebates on prepayment 22 and change of terms in revolving credit accounts 23 probably are less important to the
first and second reasons but are of substantial significance
with respect to the third.
Because an umbrella bill was indicated and because a significant portion of the topics to be covered by the bill were
properly the subject of uniform, national treatment, the National Conference had to promulgate a uniform act. Admittedly, there are areas covered by the Code where uniformity
may have only tangential value. It would have been inappropriate, however, for the conference to have designated those
few areas where uniformity might not have been appropriate as optional areas for enactment. To do so would have
undermined the urgency of passage of comprehensive, internally consistent, consumer credit regulation. Of course, to the
extent that we can identify those areas where uniformity is
not necessarily appropriate, state legislatures may, arguably,
amend. That task is a delicate one, however, and may be an
elusive one to a busy legislature.
The regulation of garnishment practices may be an area
where uniformity would have de minimis value. It is imperative, of course, that creditors be able to collect their debts
where debtors refuse to comply with payment obligations.
Nevertheless, the garnishment vehicle is only one of several
historical devices for debt collection, and the extent of its uniform use throughout the United States is relatively unimportant as long as the basic ability to collect is preserved
2 4
by other available devices.
UCCC §§ 2.407-.409.
UCCC §§ 2.405, 3.402.
UCCC §§ 2.415, 3.407.
21 UCCC § 5.103.
22 UCCC §§ 2.210, 3.210.
is
19
20

23 UCCC §§ 2.416, 3.408.
24

See discussion p. 43 infra.
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One related issue inevitably is raised: Why not impose
uniform regulation through Congressional mandate? Present
events suggest that the state regulation is still preferable.2 5
Congress has shown no inclination to act in a coordinated
fashion to enact umbrella regulation; rather, it is piecemealing and fragmenting the area, both substantively and as to
enforcement. First was the Consumer Credit Protection Act
in 1968, which included the Federal Truth in Lending Act,
directed principally to disclosure of credit terms, including
credit advertising, with nine federal agencies enforcing its
terms, 26 and also included new rules as to garnishments. 27 In
1970 Congress enacted a ban on unsolicited credit cards, 28 a
limitation on the consumer's liability for a lost or stolen credit
card, 29 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 30 Perhaps the National Commission on Consumer Finance31 can unify this area,
but the direction of the Commission is as yet unclear. At this
point it appears that prospects for umbrella regulation by
32
Congress are bleak.
Perhaps even more important, federal enforcement seems
inappropriate and impractical. Complaints in the area of consumer credit, for the most part, are small, local, and individualized. The consumer is wandering in an enforcement maze
when he must turn to the federal bureaucracy whose agents
2. Malcom, Consumer Credit-ProbingsInto the Future, 26 Bus. LAWYER 899

(1971).
Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665.
27 Id. § § 1671-1677.
28Id. § 1642.
29 Id. § § 1643-1644.
30Id. § 1681.
31 The National Commission on Consumer Finance was created by Title IV
of the Consumer Credit Protection Act P.L. 90-321 § § 401-07, as amended
P.L. 91-344 on July 20, 1970).
32 The President's Consumer Message of February 24, 1971, contains no
recommendations relating to credit practices. On February 7, 1971, Senator
Proxmire released his "Fair Credit Billing Act" (S. 652) which continues
the piecemealing trend by proposing, as an amendment to the Federal
Truth in Lending Act, a series of new restrictions on credit practices, including a requirement that creditors investigate and answer inquiries
about billing errors within 30 days or forfeit the amount in dispute; forbidding a creditor to threaten a consumer with an adverse credit rating
while a billing dispute is being investigated; a requirement that creditors
who operate revolving credit plans must mail out monthly statements at
least 21 days prior to the time when the consumer must make a payment
to avoid a finance charge; prohibition of use of the previous balance
method of computing finance charges in revolving charge accounts;
prohibition of a minimum finance charge; and permission of retailers to
offer a cash discount. Rep. Murphy's H.R. 243 would require statements
in revolving credit plans to be mailed in time to permit payment prior
to imposition of a finance charge. And Rep. Jacob's H.R. 821 would impose a national interest charge ceiling of 6 percent per year on any loan
or credit transaction.
26
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seldom are known or available. Informal disposition of small
consumer credit complaints may be an unreachable goal for
a federal enforcement agency, whose rules necessarily are
attuned to concerns of national, or at least regional, concerns
rather than local and minor concerns.3 3 The consumer, however, must know to whom to turn and how to get a response,
with the ability to complain to his legislative representative
should agency performance be lax. The more localized the
enforcement, the more likely the efficacious result.
Finally, should the rate ceilings in consumer credit regulation be uniform? 34 The Code draftsmen offer the "competition" theory. This theory, briefly stated, is that, through the
Code's provisions (disclosure, free entry, fair credit practices)
shopping for credit will be maximized; competition for credit
terms will be sharpened; creditor efficiencies will be stimulated; and thus, the lowest finance charges will be offered, in
most cases below the rate ceilings suggested by the National
Conference, but with sufficient flexibility to permit the creditor to raise those charges in the case of high-risk debtors
making credit available to those who are credit-worthy, regardless of their income level. 35 Skeptics say that, in light of the
existence of oligopolistic and segmented credit markets, it is
naive to assume that there will ever be viable finance charge
competition. 6 These skeptics often suggest that rate regulation should be based on a "public utility" theory, namely,
that legislatures should examine periodically the costs which
each type of credit incurs and then set a rate which permits
a reasonable return to that institution over and above those
costs. 3 7 If the public utility theory is adopted, uniform rates
for all creditors will not occur. Under the competition theory
In his consumer legislation recommendations of February 24, 1971, the
President strongly indicated that federal courts and agencies must expend
their energies in areas of broad national concern and that effective state
and local relief vehicles must assume the major responsibility in resolving consumer disputes. The revitalized FTC is showing how a federal
agency can create new standards of credit practices on a national basis by
promulgation of Trade Regulation Rules: See the FTC's proposed rule,
released on January 21, 1971, relating to preservation of a buyer's claims
and defenses in consumer installment sales; and its proposed rule, subject to hearings this March giving buyers -three days to cancel door-todoor sales of goods or services costing mcre than $10.
34 See part V infra.
33

:35 UCCC § 2.201, Comment.

36 Fritz, 26 Bus.

LAWYER 864-66, 873-74 (1971) ; see Fritz, Would the Uniform Consumer Credit Code Help the Consumer?, 25 Bus. LAWYER 511
(1970).
37 This argument has been repeatedly suggested in almost every legislative
committee study cf the UCCC. See Warren, Rate Limitations and Free
Entry, 26 Bus. LAWYER 855 (1971).
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rate ceilings should be uniformly high so as not restrict availability of credit through price-fixing, but exact uniformity of
these ceilings may not be necessary.

II.

THE "POLARIZATION OF ATTITUDES" PROBLEM

The National Conference surely intended its promulgation
of the UCCC in August 1968 to be a unifying force in credit
regulation, pulling together all segments of the credit industry
and inducing significant public support. The initial effect in
1968-69 was just the opposite.38 In retrospect, the picture in
broad terms was as follows:
One reaction was the various consumer groups' attack on
the Code in 1968 and 1969. The Consumer Federation of
America and the National Consumer Law Center had both
just gotten off the drawing boards about that time, and various new state consumer groups and Legal Services groups
were just becoming aware, through extensive exposure in
the ghetto and elsewhere, of the areas of possible abuse in
credit extension practices which needed legislative attention.
Naturally, most of the consumer organizations which are
visible today did not have a hand in the formulation of the
August 1968 and earlier drafts because they were not then in
existence. This does not, of course, mean that their current
observations were not advanced during the drafting process.
Most of them were carefully reviewed by the draftsmen. The
reaction of these new groups in 1968 and 1969 suggests, perhaps, a disappointment that they had not been directly involved in the drafting of the Code and a determination to
add some of their own language before widespread adoption
of the Code occurred. Fortunately, sophistication has evolved
within the loose amalgam of "consumer groups" in the last
two years, and responsible voices are being heard which are
leading to an understanding of the creditors' concerns and to
sensible proposals for amendment to the Code. 39 The current
38 Braucher, supra note 1, at 322.

For a composite of early reactions by
consumer representatives, see "Consumer Viewpoints: Critique of the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code," Consumer Research Foundation

(Berkeley, 1969).
39 The most significant development in these regards is the issuance by the
National Consumer Law Center and the Department of Consumer Affairs
of the City of New York on December 17, 1970, of a series of amendments
to the UCCC (Publication # A192-150). This issuance coincides with the
Center's rethinking, if not withdrawal, of its April 1970 draft of a "National Consumer Act" which was ill-received by the credit industry:
See Moo, New Consumer Credit Legislation: Which Approach - the
UCCC or the NCA?, 2 URBAN LAWYER 439-59 (1970). An early example
of constructive thinking is James and Fragomen, ,The Uniform Consumer
Credit Code: Inadequate Remedies Under Articles V and VI, 57 GEO. L.
J. 923 (1969); Kass, Consumer's View, 26 Bus. LAwYER 847 (1971).
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legislative sessions have seen selected amendments to the Code
offered by the National Consumer Law Center and others
which indicate a considerable lessening of the polarization
dividing "consumer groups" and "creditors' groups" which occurred in 1968-69.40
Professor Littlefield has observed elsewhere that the National Conference "battled industry" to produce its August 1968
draft.41 I agree. In light of this "battle" the conference should
not have been stunned by the opposition of many creditor
groups. Thus, in 1969 the virulent opposition of the American
Banking Association 42 was echoed by other credit groups,
except retailing. 43 Within the credit industry since 1969, however, responsible spokesmen have emerged and a significant
44
cross-section of credit institutions now supports the UCCC.
Fear of change is being overcome and the educational efforts
of the conference are making tangible breakthroughs with
industry.
In short, I see signs that the 1968-69 polarization is on the
wane. We would all like to see the decade of the 70's be a
decade of the consumer, rather than "consumerism." "Consumerism" has been a divisive and polarizing force at the expense of the consumer. Responsible industry is learning, however, that there are thoughtful proponents of reform in the
consumer credit area and that the intention of these proponents
40

Note 37 supra. See also the Code bill in Connecticut as it was presented
to the Connecticut Legislature by an interim study committee; Colorado
H.B. 1076 (UCCC bill) as amended in the House on March 11, 1971.

41 Littlefield, Consumerism: A Review and Preview, DENVER L. J., Special

Magazine Issue 12 (1971).
42

On July 3, 1968, a staff member of the American Bankers Association

prepared a strong statement opposing the UCCC which was circulated in
late 1968 or early 1969 to state banking associations and, almost without
exception, led those associations into opposition to the UCCC in the 1969
legislative sessions. In a statement prepared for presentation at hearings
on the UCCC before the Massachusetts Legislature on January 29, 1969,
Senator Paul Douglas sharply reacted to this opposition. A notable
exception was banking support in Oklahoma and Utah in 1969 (the only
two states where the UCCC passed in 1969).
43 State consumer finance associations, the American Industrial Bankers
Association (AIBA) and state motor vehicles dealers' associations all
opposed the UCCC in 1969. See, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Consumer Affairs of the House Committee on Banking and Currency,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., Part I, at 112 (1969); Denonn, The Consumer Credit
Code -Bombshell, 22 PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. 125 (1968); Harper, The
Uniform Consumer Credit Code: A Critical Analysis, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV.
53 (1969).
44
Many banks and banking associations now support the UCCC, including
state associations in Connecticut, Indiana (where the UCCC was passed
and signed by the Governor on March 5, 1971), and Wyoming (where
the UCCC was passed and signed by the Governor on February 28, 1971).
The AIBA and most consumer finance companies have reversed their

earlier opposition.
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is to work toward a more sensitive legal mechanism for the
benefit of the public.
III.

EFFECTIVE RELIEF

We should start with a very brief review of the National
Conference's decisions on private relief for violations of the
many provisions of the Code. The basic private relief section
is 5.202, a comprehensive section which sets up various private
recovery rights with respect to violations of most of the provisions of the Code. There are some additional private relief
provisions within the substantive Code sections, such as the
rescission right in the referral sales ban. 45 A highly significant decision, for our purposes here, is that the Code draftsmen did not include a specific provision enabling private class
actions for any violation of the Code's provisions but rather
left the issue of whether or not such class actions should be
maintained to existing state law outside the confines of the
Code.4 6 Of course, the Code establishes sophisticated administrative relief for violations, including cease and desist orders,
temporary restraining orders, preliminary and permanent injunctions, and recoupment of excess charges for all debtors
who have paid such excessive charges. 47 This scheme of private
relief has been attacked by some as not sufficiently effective4
We will examine the validity of that criticism.
In April 1969 the United States Supreme Court held that
small class claims could not be aggregated under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23 to reach the requisite $10,000 amount in
controversy for federal court jurisdiction. 4 This opinion, for
all practical purposes, excluded consumer class actions from
the federal court system. 50 Subsequent attempts in Congress
to reestablish federal court jurisdiction over small consumer
claims through federal class actions has created a nationwide

45

UCCC § 2.411. Another example is in the home solicitation sales pro-

visions, UCCC §§ 2.501-2.505. See also UCCC §§ 5.107, 5.108, 5.203, 5.204.
46 See UCCC § 6.115, Comment 1.
47 UCCC §§ 6.108-.113.
48
Spanogle, Why Does the Proposed Uniform Consumer CreditCode Eschew
Private Enforcement, 23 Bus. LAWYER 1039 (1968); Spanogle, The UCCC
May Look Pretty, But Is It Enforceable?, 29 Omo ST. L.J. 624 (1968).
49 Snyder v. Harris,394 U.S. 332 (1969).
50 Seldom, if ever, will any one consumer claim reach $10,000 in amount.
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dialogue on the appropriateness of the class action as a vehicle
for effective consumer relief.5'
The proponents of extensive use of the class action vehicle
in the consumer area argue that without this vehicle the typical consumer complaint, small in size, cannot be effectively
pursued through the courts because the costs of such pursuit
would exceed the size of the claim. 2 In other words, no consumer can afford to pay a lawyer to champion his small complaint, and thus he must be permitted to pursue his claim, and
the claims of all others similarly situated, by aggregation of
those claims in a "class" action so that the total judgment will
be sufficiently large to pay the class lawyer an adequate fee
out of that judgment, thus spreading the fee over the total
class claims, while each class claimant will still receive recompense commensurate with the harm. Some critics of the Code
are now saying that the omission of the class action device
within its confines overlooks the vital interrelationship between the Code's substantive provisions and such effective
53
relief.
This emphasis on the class action vehicle is misplaced.
The inclusion of the class action vehicle within the confines of
the Code would not provide more effective relief, if such is
51 Although none were passed, Congress had before it in 1970 a number

of bills which would have reversed in whole or in part Snyder v. Harris.
The administration proposed limited access to the federal courts in
selected enumerated instances and after successful prosecution of the
FTC or Department of Justice (original S. 3201, before amendment in
Senate Committee). Other bills would have permitted federal consumer
class actions, regardless of the size of any one claim. See S. 2246, S. 3092,
S. 1222 (administration bill), H.R. 262, H.R. 5630 and H.R. 14589 91st
Cong. 2d Sess. See Eckhardt, Consumer Class Actions, 45 NOTRE DAME
LAwYER 663 (1970). A recent general article is Travers and Landers, The
Consumer Class Action, 18 KANSAS L. REV. 811 (1970). Already the same
bills are appearing before Congress in 1971; the President's Consumer
Message again makes the same recommendation for a limited reversal of
Snyder v. Harris; Sen. Magnuson has offered the bill which came out
of the Senate Commerce Committee last year (S. 984); Rep. Ogden, in
H.R. 1078 91st Cong. 2d Sess. would permit federal class action damage
relief for violation of § 5 of the FTC Act; and the irrepressible Rep.
Eckhardt has just offered a new wonderland bill which includes every
conceivable class action vehicle.
Class Action, 10
52 See generally A Symposium, Federal Rules 23 -The
B. C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 493 (1969); and particularly, the article therein
by Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, Id.
at 501-54. It is not, however, at all clear that consumer class actions are
not maintainable under the class action rules of the states. See, Dole,
Consumer Class Actions Under Recent Consumer Credit Legislation, 44
N.Y.U.L. REV. 80 (1969). Compare Darra v. Yellow Cab, 67 Cal. 2d 695,
433 P. 2d 732 (1967), with Hall v. Coburn, 26 N.Y. 2d 396, 259 N.E. 2d
720 (1970), (although New York and California have essentially the same
class action rule, Darra permitted a consumer-type class action to be
maintained, whereas Hall did not). See also Holstein v. Montgomery
Ward, CCH Poverty Law Rep. 1 9652 (Cook County Cir. Ct., Illinois,
No. 68, ch. 275 (1969).
53 See Spanogle, supra note 48, at 1045.
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needed. 54 Even from a 1971 perspective, I believe that the
National Conference's decision to omit specific class action enablement was correct.
Accepting for purposes of discussion that a problem does
exist in consumer claims where the cost of litigation to enforce those claims may exceed the recovery sought, the solution calls for the creation of (1) a low cost procedure for enforcing the claim, (2) a quick resolution of the claim, and (3)
an effective recovery, should the claim be deemed to be valid.
The class action vehicle fails to meet all three criteria. A class
action is an enormous monolith, complex in every respect.55
Proponents of the class action device insist that it can be effectively wielded by the courts to reach ready dispositions of
small claims and that the failure of the class action vehicle to
produce such results is caused by the defendant's determination to test every edge of the privilege to maintain an action
as a class action. 56 In my experience, this is unfair. Because
the mere filing of a class action normally exposes the defendant
to massive liabilities, a class action defendant should be permitted to raise every conceivable consideration relative to the
propriety of the maintenance of the action as a class action.
The safeguards established in Federal Rule 23 must be carefully observed if basic fairness and due process are to be
achieved. The court should, inter alia, be sure that a substantial commonality of law or fact exists, that the class action is
5
the most effective remedy, and that it is truly manageable.
54

See note 47 supra.

See note 52 supra, and especially the article in the Boston College Symposium, Weithers, Amended Rule 23: A Defendant's Point of View B. C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 493, 515-26; see also Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits - The TwentyThird Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5-12 (1971).
56 See note 52 supra.
57 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3); 39 F.R.D. 98, 102-04 (1966).
In a survey
in five large cities for a 6-month period ending on October 31, 1970, the
FTC found (see its release dated November 25, 1970) the following 6
major categories (comprising 48 percent of the total) of consumer complaints, in order of number: (1) failure to deliver merchandise that has
been paid for; (2) Truth in Lending violations; (3) defective work or
services; (4) inferior merchandise; (5) false advertising; and (6) refusal to grant refunds without prior notice that such claims would not
be honored. Except for possibly (2) these are fragmented, individualized
complaints dealing with broken merchandise, bad service, or complaint
adjustment problems. (The FTC survey's findings were also those of a
recent Better Business Bureau study). These individual disputes between
one consumer and one seller lack the commonality requirement and, in
any event, would be hopelessly unmanageable in that the court necessarily would have to try each complaint as a separate cause. See, Hackett
v. General Host (E.D. Pa., July 30, 1970) denying maintenance of a class
action for unmanageability where damages for an alleged class of 11/2
million purchasers of bread in the Philadelphia area were sought based
on an alleged price-fixing conspiracy among the defendants.
55

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 48

Assurances must be given that the representatives of the class
are adequate and that the judgment, when entered, comports
with the best interests of the class. 8 In order to assure fairness to the defendants, the courts and the parties have necessarily had to expend considerable time and energy, thus failing to satisfy the need for swift and inexpensive dispositions
of the alleged claims.
Defendants have insisted, with considerable justification,
that the class action vehicle is being misused by plaintiffs'
representatives, who have no thought of the legitimate complaints of the class but rather are interested in either monetary reward and/or harassment of large business units whose
customer group is sufficiently large so that the judgment
rendered will make that recompense dramatically satisfying.
Thus, characteristically, consumer class actions have been
directed against relatively large defendants, in which violations of technical and highly complex provisions of regulatory statutes are often alleged, such as provisions of the Federal Truth in Lending Act. 59 They have not been, and perhaps
cannot be directed against major identifiable areas of consume.r complaints, such as those involving fly-by-nights or
highly individualized sales practices."
Without commenting further on these arguments, it is
quite clear that it all boils down to a failure of the class action
vehicle to meet the problem. Specifically, the class action has
not provided a low-cost procedure for either party in reaching a resolution of disputes. Recoveries have been reached,
if at all, at a snail's pace. Quick resolution is unknown. Even
if the substantive claim is finally determined in favor of the
proponents, recovery is cumbersome. Class membership is
58

See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2); 39 F.R.D. 98, 104-05 (1966). There may be
many consumers who do not wish to pursue technical claims against
business units with whom they are pleased to continue to deal.
5., Hearings before the Consumer Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce
Committee on S. 2246, S. 3092 and S. 3201, 92ND CONG., 2D SEss., at 522-23
(1970) revealed that, except for one case, all class actions brought for
violation of the Federal Truth in Lending Act by that date had been filed
against major corporations such as Westinghouse, Sun Oil, Sinclair Oil,
Diner's Club, American Express, Mobil Oil, and Gimbel Bros., based
upon allegedly highly technical infractions. This should be compared
with the generally accepted conclusicn that there has been little compliance with the act in the ghetto. A particularly unwise use of the class
action vehicle is in the recovery of statutory penalties: See, Dole,
Private Enforcement of Consumer Credit Legislation, 26 Bus. LAwYER,
915 (1971).
60 See note 57 supra. Typical frauds are ithe highly localized, hard-core
frauds such as bait and switch and phony referral plans. See Braucher,
Administrative Enforcement Including Licensing, 26 Bus. LAwYER 907
(1971).
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often difficult to define. The costs of calculating the small
amount to which each member of the class is entitled can be
more costly than the amount of the total judgment.'' Often,
ferreting out actual claims in such small amounts is impossible
because of the scant retention of records by either party.
Finally, there are brooding questions, after the class is completed, of whether res judicata has been achieved and whether
constitutional due process has been satisfied through adequacy
2

of notice."

If the class action mechanism is not suitable for resolving
consumer complaints is the search for effective private relief
vehicles futile? I think not. There are viable alternatives
which have not yet been tested adequately and which merit
serious consideration. Among the alternatives are (1) compulsory arbitration, (2) creation of consumer courts or small
claims courts directed to consumer problems, and (3) additional administrative enforcement.
The third alternative is the best. The Code draftsmen
apparently knew this and created, within the confines of the
Code, flexible administrative enforcement devices which went
beyond those now existing in most of the credit regulation
laws of the states. Generally unknown in the small loan laws
and retail installment sales acts are the administrative powers
of cease and desist, temporary and permanent injunctions, and
The cost of administrative enassurances of discontinuance.
minor
when spread over the public
is
relatively
forcement
and that cost should be considered a price which we all must
pay for consumer protection in the credit field. Significantly,
the fee structure of the Code actually shifts most, if not all,
of this administrative cost to the credit industry.'64 In the past,
regulatory acts have relied principally on administrative license
revocation, a cumbersome bludgeon which was seldom used
because it sweeps too broadly by eliminating the ongoing value
of the licensee.';:' The more flexible administrative relief permitted in Article 6 of the Code permits the administrator to
(Lumbard, C. J.,
dissenting opinion).
62 See 39 F.R.D. 98, 106-07 (1966), see also Comment, Constitutional and
Statutory Requirements of Notice under Rule 23(c) (2), 10 B.C. IND. &
1 See Eisen v. Carlisle, 391 F.2d 555, 571 (2d Cir. 1968)

CoM. L.

REV.

571 (1969).

,;3 Compare the provisions of the UCCC § § 6.104-6.113 with the enforcement
provisions of the present small lean laws, the motor vehicle installment
sales laws, and personal property installment sales laws. E.g., COLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 73-3-1 etseq.; §§ 13-16-1 etseq.:§ 121-2-1 et seq. (1963).
64 See UCCC § 6.203.
-5 See Braucher, supra note 60, at 911.
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tailor the nature of the relief to the heinousness of the offense.
With expertise which the private counsel will not have, the
administrator should be able to pursue a quicker resolution,
either through the cease and desist procedures, or assurances
for discontinuance, or injunctions and restitution."i The administrator can pursue the fly-by-nights or the insubstantial
creditor without concern for monetary reward.
We should not be unaware of the concern expressed by
many that regulatory agencies often become "captives" of the
industry which they regulate. This is a valid concern. The
captive administrator must be made a thing of the past. In
eliminating the "captive" administrator, however, there is a
danger that the administrator will be captured by a new pressure group, such as consumers' league. The proper goal is
for an administrator who attends equally to the legitimate
concerns of the consuming public and of the industry which
he regulates. In the credit area, the Code takes a substantial
step forward in achieving this goal. The Code essentially
eliminates the present segmented regulation of the several
types of credit industries and places them under one administrator. Competition for the administrator's attention will tend
toward equitable treatment of all. Moreover, the Code provides for a watchdog Council of Consumer Advisors. ';7 Equally
significant is the fact that consumer groups and public awareness of the need for effective administrative enforcement are
overcoing the lethargy which has permitted the administrator to he a captive of the industry regulated. ' These new
tensions necessarily tend to render the captive administrator
an historical and fading vestige.
01 greater concern today than the captive administrator
problem is the fact that an administrator necessarily has a
limited budget and must also act with a wider public interest
that

necessarily may

leave out, now and

then, the concerns

of an individual who has a substantive claim for relief. Also,
the administrator may often not be able to act as swiftly as
We would like in the resolution of small consumer complaints.
Sec UCCC §§ 6.108-.113.

UCCC, Part 3,Article 6.
In addition to national groups such as the Consumer Federation of
America and the National Consumer Law Center, local Legal Services
uits. state and local consumers leagues, and FTC-sponsored consumer
protection committees now exist in some cities (those in Boston,
Chicago, Detioit. Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and San Francisco were
formed in 1970).
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Thus we should pursue, probably on a test basis now, additional private relief mechanisms, such as arbitration or consumer courts.""
Voluntary arbitration, of course, is already available and
hopefully will grow as business responsibility is heightened.'"
The problem, arguably, will never be fully solved, however,
until consumer complaints must be arbitrated. Arbitration has
many elements of attractiveness. It is quick because it can
be held informally, because it can be easily heard, because it
does not require professional legal involvement, thus eliminating a significant cost factor, and because it normally is not
subject to appeal. Consumer courts could be created with the
same features. Both the consumer and the creditor would
seem to benefit from such a mechanism, which would promptly
resolve the individual complaint at a low cost. The public
could absorb the costs of the arbitrator or the consumer
court and they could be made available locally. What must
be avoided in these vehicles, at all costs, is the creation of
new procedural monsters, similar to what has evolved in
the workmen's compensation area, which would establish the
problem all over again by forcing up costs so that they exceed
the recovery.
IV.

LIMITATIONS ON CREDITORS' RIGHTS AND REMEDIES

The Uniform Consumer Credit Code speaks to many issues
in the area of creditors' rights and remedies. The discussion
here will be directed to the manner in which the Code's new
limitations on existing creditors' rights and remedies relate
to an overall regulatory scheme.
February 26. 1971, a private, non-profit group called the National
Institute for Consumer Justice was formed, with the President's blessing, to study the adequacy of procedures for resolution of private disputes arising out of commercial transactions, to be headed by former
Harvard Law Professor Robert Braucher, who has just left Harvard
and the chairmanship of the National Commission on Consumer Finance
to become an Associate Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court.
A radical new approach now being discussed which will be tackled no
doubt by the Institute is that the government would pay all loss from
consumer complaints upon mere filing of a claim, with stiff penalties
for filing of false claims; all prosecution of industry for harming the
consumer would be done by the government, and private enforcement
would be unnecessary.
Another way to provide for ability in the consumer to pursue his
individual claim is for the court to assess, as additional damages, the
consumer's attorney's fees (should the consumer win), This can, of
course, also be legislatively provided.
7'The American Arbitration Association is giving high priority to the
increased use of voluntary arbitration in the area of resolution of
consumer disputes.
WOn
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The common law and statutory maze which exists today
as to creditors' rights and remedies has been described by
some to be inviolate and indispensable in protecting creditors
The Code proposes
against defaulting or malicious debtors.'
to limit or even eliminate some of these "traditional" rights
and remedies.12 Thus, the Code necessarily raises the question
of how far legislatures should go in limiting these "traditional"
rights and remedies.
To those who feel that the status quo is inviolate, it must
be acknowledged that the shape of creditors' rights and remedies has been continually under revision. The small loan
laws of 50 years ago placed new statutory limitations on
lenders7 3 and, more recently, the motor vehicle retail installment sales laws and the personal property installment sales
laws have imposed new limitations on retail credit sales. 4 In
the last few years, several states have enacted in piecemeal
fashion many of the limitations found in the Uniform Con75
sumer Credit Code.
In many and probably most states, however, the UCCC
would impose an extensive new set of limitations on creditors'
rights and remedies. These new limitations would have a very
significant effect. At the time when the creditor makes his
decision to extend credit, he will be forced to rely heavily,
if not totally, on his initial judgment as to the credit-worthiness of the debtor and to decrease his accustomed reliance on
his collection rights and remedies. This shift in reliance, at
first blush, seems reasonable. Rephrased, it means that these
new limitations will require the creditor to sharpen his judgment of the debtor's credit-worthiness at the outset rather
than allow him to be a "lazy" creditor and to extend credit
to the "marginal" debtor, who truly should not have received
credit at all, on the basis of his ability to obtain payment
through legal process. One obvious problem with this effect
is that of protecting the creditor from an unforeseen change
of the debtor's credit-worthy condition.
See note 43 supra.
See, e.g., UCCC Part 4, Article 2; Part 4, Article 3; and Part 1, Article 5.
73 The Uniform Small Loan Laws created by the Russell Sage Foundation.
74 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-16-1 et seq. and §§ 121-2-1 et seq.
(1963).
71

72

enacted cooling-off periods in home solicitation
sales see, Hogan, Cooling-Off Legislation, 26 Bus. LAWYER, 875 (1971).
Maryland (MD. STAT. ANN. Art. 83 § 147), Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. Tit.
9, § 2455) and Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 244 § 12C), and
most recently, New York, have abolished the holder in due course doctrine in consumer credit transactions.

75 Nineteen states have
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There mUbL, of course, be placed in the law adequate
vehicles for providing an ability in the creditor to collect an
unpaid debt. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code appears to
be a healthy legislative contribution toward retaining that
ability while tightening up on creditors' rights and remedies
in a sufficient way both to eliminate known abuses and to
require better initial judgments as to credit-worthiness.
There has not yet been enough experience with these delicate balances in the UCCC to know whether more extensive
limitations would cripple the creditor's ability to extend
credit.7" Some critics of the UCCC seem sure that most creditors' remedies could safely be eliminated, and these critics
have suggested, as a rationale, that all such remedies can be
misused. Their view seems to be that a creditor should simply
suffer a total loss if he has made the wrong judgment of
credit-worthiness at the time of the extension of credit, except
where there is a subsequent event (such as loss of employment) which could not be foreseen. I do not share this view.
I know of no behavioral imperative that credit-worthy debtors
will necessarily repay their debts without effective legal
coercion as the alternative to non-payment.
I agree, of course, that some traditional rights and
have been abused. The Code attacks those abuses.
not, however, attack hypothetical abuses. If newly
or overlooked abuses do exist, Code amendments are
A prerequisite to sound legislative rule-making,
should be proof that such abuses exist.
V.

remedies
It does
apparent
in order.
however,

REGULATION OF RATES

With respect to regulation of rates in the consumer credit
area, the National Conference, taking a daring and perhaps
revolutionary step, proposed institution of a "competition"
theory of rate control and rejected the "public utility" approach of the past. 77 It would seem quite enticing to me, to
accept this competition theory rather than face the constant
machinations of credit oligopolies knocking on my door for rate
increases every time the inflationary spiral increased the costs
of credit extension, particularly in the explosive area of how
much the average man pays for the irresistible urge he has
76 UCCC Prefatory Note, '"Basic Assumptions" (1969 official text).
77 Id; see also, UCCC § 2.201, Comment; Warren, Rate Limitations and
Free Entry (and remarks of a panel), 26 Bus. LAWYER 855 (1971);
Malcolm, Consumer Credit-ProbingsInto the Future, 26 Bus. LAWYER
899; THE CONFERENCE ON PERSONAL FINANCE LAW, THE REALITIES OF
MAXIMUM

CEILINGS ON INTEREST AND FINANCE CHARGES

(1970).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 48

to buy things on credit. As a matter of practice, however,
we have seen that it is very hard for the legislators to overcome the traditional reliance on the public utility theory.
The National Conference's decision to embrace the competition theory flowed from the congressional commitment to
maximization of credit shopping through uniform disclosure
of credit terms in the enactment of the Federal Truth in
Lending Act.7s The Code, however, carried the Federal Truth
in Lending Act theory forward by opening the doors to new
competition for credit terms through elimination of the legal
bases for existing oligopolies in certain credit markets.7 Thus,
the UCCC incorporated certain devices to insure that its competition theory would work. The Code puts all creditors under
its rate ceilings and permits any creditor, if he chooses, to
operate, in any one or more types of credit extension, such
as the high-risk loan, the credit card sale, the motor vehicle
installment sale, or the sale of small items of merchandise on
credit."' Competitive climate is heightened by new fair credit
Competition effectuates maximization of effipractice rules.
ciencies in the creditor's operations and requires him to respond to his competitors' lower finance charges.
As noted above, skeptics have asserted that there is a
natural segmentation of credit markets according to types of
credit extension and thus that rate competition among those
types cannot be achieved. ' They proclaim that rate competition has never worked in the past.83 I believe that this is
untrue. There is evidence that, in the marketing of retail
products on credit, rate competition has long been keen, par84
ticularly in big ticket items, such as in motor vehicle sales.
It is true that in the small loan area (approximately 8 percent
of the credit market) credit prices have often risen to the
ceilings, but this is probably because those ceilings are often
unrealistically low in light of inflationary costs and because
the small loan market is basically one which deals with high
risk debtors who, in order to retain credit at all, either must
pay the highest lawful rate or go to those who operate out- See Committee reports to the Federal Truth in Lending Act.

See UCCC § 2.201 Comment 1(3); Warren, supra note 77.
Id. See UCCC § 3.512.
UCCC Prefatory Note, "Basic Assumptions" (1969 official text).
'12 See notes 36 and 37 supra.
s:1Id.
1'-Johnson, Rate Competition, 26 Bus. LAWYER 777, 782-84 (1971).
79
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side the law.- The experiences in Utah, during the 2 years
in which the Uniform Consumer Credit Code has been the
law there, suggest that the competition theory has a chance."The old public utility theory, at least in the area of retail
sales credit, is a doubtful approach at best. The 50 state legislatures could, of course, periodically try to make an agonized
determination of what the costs of credit extension for each
credit group were and then specify an additional reasonable
return on investment by setting a finance charge rate which
would cover both those costs and the return. s - Latest studies
in the revolving sales credit area indicate that at least 2 per
cent a month on the outstanding balance would be needed.s
Legislatures, however, have not found it easy to act as a public
utility commission in the credit area, for there is a widespread
misunderstanding that the costs of credit extension are much
less than what they really are and thus legisalors receive
pressure, based on this misinformation, to impose credit rate
ceilings well below what even the public utility theory would
determine. In the State of Washington, a public referendum
in November 1968 imposed a 1 per cent per month rate ceiling
on revolving charge accounts, and disastrous effects have
In the retail sales
resulted to the economy of that state.'
",'Id. Where there is competition and reasonable rate ceilings, the actual
rates in the small lending market will fall below the ceilings. Inter alia
such is the case today in Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah.
See

STUCKI,

UTAH CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT (1970).

No study has been

made of the Okahoma experiences-Oklahoma also adopted the UCCC
in 1969-but informal discussions with Oklahomans indicate that competition is producing the expected effects.
Benfield, Usury Laws and Consumer Credit, 26 Bus. LAWYER 787, 788-89
(1971). Professor Benfield observes that there are practical problems
which make it impossible to set rates on a public utility basis: (1) a
creditor need not serve all comers and thus can always exclude from
the market any person who does not qualify at whatever statutory rate
is established: and (2) the expense structure of the credit industry is
quite different from that of a public utility, including a wide variation
of administrative costs and bad debt losses according to the character of
the customers, the size of the credit extended, and the interplay of the
money market between the controlled market (fixed by usury ceilings),
and the uncontrolled market (over 60 percent of the total market).
Professor Benfield was focusing on the cash lending market, but he
could have added that. in credit selling, there is no feasible way to fix
credit charges by setting rate ceilings, for the seller can always hide
additional charges in inflated cash prices as long as the legislatures do
not fix cash prices also (which they show no signs of doing).
>'NATIONAL RETAIL MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION,
OF DEPARTMENT STORE CREDIT, 24-26 (1969).

ECONOMIC

CHARACTERISTICS

In a study made by the Graduate School of Business Administration of
the University of Washington at Seattle, published in late 1970, entitled
"The Impact of a Consumer Credit Interest Limitation Law. Washington
State: Initiative 245." the effects of the one percent per month rate were
found to include a marked decrease in availability of consumer credit,
increased cash prices to cover deficits incurred in extending credit. higher
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area, to the extent by which the allowable finance charge does
not match the costs of credit extension, those costs must
become part of the cost of the goods sold to all buyers, both
credit buyers and cash buyers, and thus, in a broad sense, the
cash buyer will subsidize the credit buyer by paying, in part,
the cost of the credit buyer's credit." It has always seemed
a mystery to me how a legislature could openly impose this
kind of inequity when the majority of consumers are cash
buyers.'
Lamentably, the public's misunderstanding of the costs of
credit is so deeply set that creditors are beginning to learn
that their own presentation of the facts relative to those costs
are rejected out of hand as mere protestations of the selfinterested. Thus, it is incumbent upon responsible consumer
representatives to take a leadership role and to inform the
public that unrealistically low rates in consumer credit are
detrimental to the public.9 2 Unless consumer representatives
sponsor this understanding immediately, rather than succumb
to the passion of the times, we are faced not only with a legislative stalemate in the consumer credit area but also a breakdown of the consumer credit industry.
In summary, why do we not gamble on the National Conference's rate competition theory. We have everything to lose
from the public utility theory and everything to gain for the
consumer by the competition theory.
Turning to subsidiary issues, some observers have contended that there can be no maximization of credit shopping as
long as the creditor presents one basic credit form to his customers on a "take it or leave it" basis. In response, it should
be noted that the cost savings of uniformity in the processing
of complex accounts, particularly revolving charge accounts
where a number of small items are purchased under one condown payments, shortened maturities, increased requirement of credit
insurance, and increased product-related fees (formerly given free). A
similar problem in Arkansas is studied in Lynch, Consumer Credit at
Ten PercentSimple: The Arkansas Case, 1968 U. ILL. LAW F. 592 (Winter
1968).
0 Id. See also note 88 supra.
91 Cash buyers are most often those whose income is small, i.e., the poor.
There is no doubt that responsible consumer representatives understand
the dire effects of low rates. The National Consumer Law Center has
carefully omitted offering any amendments to UCCC relative to
rates. Many consumer spokesmen are forthrightly attempting to correct
this misunderstanding, but as yet they have not achieved an acceptance
of their view by organized consumer groups, a necessary prerequisite to
political acceptance of realistic rates. See, Caplovitz, Breakdowns in the
Consumer Credit Marketplace, 26 Bus. LAWYER 795 (1971).
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tract, are substantial. These savings should tend toward the
lowest possible finance charge rate because of heightened efficiency. Elimination of these efficiencies will either make credit
extension in small purchases impossible or undesirable because
of substantially higher costs of credit extension. What is really
needed is strong competition among creditors so that, if a
creditor's forms do not present the best competitive rate, he
will simply lose customers, as he should, until he revises his
standard form to meet his competition. 3
Finally, to those who have argued that restrictively low
rate ceilings should be set in order to cause creditors to deny
credit to the "marginal" debtor, my thought is that this argument for "low" rates is misguided. Even though the effect of
"low" rates may indeed be to restrict the availability of credit
to those less able to pay, the additional side effects are drastically undesirable. Many poor people are sufficiently creditworthy to receive credit in small amounts and yet, where
rates are so low as to eliminate high-risk debtors, they will
be denied any legitimate outlet for their modest needs.9 4 How
else can a welfare mother buy a $50 coat except in installments? The alternative to legitimate credit is credit outside
the law - where $5 is extended for one week at a repayment
of $6 and nonpayment is treated by violence.93 The Washington state situation has called our attention to other disastrous consequences. 6 In short, the marginal credit problem
must be tackled with more subtle weaponry. The UCCC has
chosen to do so by stricter limitations on creditors' rights and
remedies.97 This appears to be the sound approach.
VI.

CONCLUSION

From a 1971 perspective, the efforts of the National Conference in promulgating the UCCC are remarkable. UnforSlawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARv. L. REV. 529 (1971).
94 Part IV supra discusses how the creditor will be required by the UCCC's
93 Cf.

"consumer protection" provisions to focus his credit extension decision

on the credit-worthiness of the credit applicant, thereby tending to
eliminate the "marginal debtor." A "marginal debtor" is one who overbuys on credit. A poor person need not necessarily be a marginal debtor,
as long as he buys on credit commensurate with his ability to pay. The
UCCC "consumer protection" provisions hopefully will require the creditor to make a thorough investigation and an accurate prognostication of
that ability but it should not be the place of statutory rate ceilings to
eliminate availability of credit to the extent of that ability.
95 UCCC Prefatory Note, "Basic Assumptions" (1969 official text). See
also Shay, A Portrait of the Consumer Credit Market, 26 Bus. LAWYER
761 (1971).
96 See note 89 supra.
9'7 These limitations are principally found in UCCC Parts 4 of Articles 2 and
3 and Part 1 of Article 5.
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tunately, the UCCC's legislative potential is often not apparent,
for its themes are complex and subtle, and it deals with one
of the most politically delicate issues of the day. To be involved in the resolution of these issues is an exhilarating,
albeit exasperating, affair.

TRANSLATING THE FAIR CREDIT

REPORTING ACT
By
In

RICHARD
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this extremely timely article Richard M. Koon examines

the newest federal consumer protection legislation to emerge on
the legal scene. The use of consumer credit information has assumed gigantic proportions in recent years creating a situation in
which the individual consumer is virtually powerless to protect
his credit status. Since our society is so largely dependent on
credit transactions, an individual's credit rating may actually be
more valuable to him than other "property" more carefully protected by the law. Within the framework of thc obvious importance of credit transactions, Mr. Koon shows the workings of the
Fair Credit Reporting Act and its effect on consumers, lenders
and "credit reporting agencies."
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SCOPE AND APPLICATION

T

HE Fair Credit Reporting Act' became effective nationwide on April 25, 1971. This Act, which is Title VI of
The Consumer Credit Protection Act (containing, among other
things, the Truth In Lending Act, as Title I), was signed by
the President on October 26, 1970, culminating almost 5 years
of congressional inquiry and testimony concerning America's
credit reporting industry and the use of its reports by
businesses.
The avowed purpose of the Act is to insure that information concerning consumer credit, personnel, insurance and re1 Act of October 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 601, 84 Stat. 1127, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1681 (1971).
[The Act, as it appears in U.S.C.A. differs, though insignificantly, from
the Act as published in Statutes at Large. On the assumption that
U.S.C.A. is mcre accessible, all citations conform to that source. See
appendix B for the text of the Act. Statutes at Large should be consulted
where the official text is desired. See appendix A for a table of parallel
citations. - Ed.]

TRANSLATING FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT

lated matter is disseminated by credit reporting agencies in
a manner "which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with
regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper
utilization of such information ....
In an effort to accomplish this purpose, the Act imposes
restrictions on the contents and dissemination of credit reports and requires that consumers be given notice of and
access to the information on file against them at credit reporting agencies. Further, the Act provides that a consumer may
prepare a statement rebutting any information in his credit
file at any credit reporting agency as to which there is a legitimate dispute.
The Act covers only credit reports on "individuals" - as
opposed to reports dealing with such entities as partnerships,
corporations, trusts and estates. :' Some authorities feel that a
credit report compiled solely for use in a strictly commercial
transaction would not be covered by the Act even though
covering an "individual. '4 Examples would be credit reports
compiled in connection with an individual seeking credit to
pu.rchase a business, or to purchase inventory and other goods
for use in his business, or to purchase a large apartment house.
However, it is submitted that the language of the Act leaves
the matter sufficiently in doubt5 so that all reports bearing
on the credit of an individual must be considered as being
within the scope of the Act without regard to the purpose for
which the report is sought. It is to be hoped that this matter
2 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (b) (1971).

3 The Act is concerned broadly with credit and general reputation information on "consumers." The term "consumer" is defined through a process
of elimination by reference to 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681a (a), (b), to exclude
corporations, partnerships, trusts, estates and the like.
4 See COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, FAIR CREDIT REPORTING, S.
REP. No. 517, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969), wherein Senator Proxmire
states that "the bill does not cover business credit reports or business

insurance reports."
5 The Act's restrictions primarily deal with the furnishing, contents and
use of "consumer reports." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681a (d) (1971) provides generally that a consumer report is any communication bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness, character, or general reputation used or expected to be used in whole or in part as a factor in establishing the
consumer's eligibility for "(3) other purposes authorized under section
1681b...." Among the purposes authorized under § 1681b is that found
under (3) (E) thereof stating "a legitimate business need for the information in connection with a business transaction involving the consumer."
The reference from § 1681a to § 1681b is likely a creature of inattentive
draftsmanship rather than design, but now, having become a part of the
law of the land, it must be reckoned with. It is at least arguable that a
"consumer report" includes a report issued "in connection with a business transaction involving the consumer."
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will be clarified through regulations or interpretations issued
under the Act in the future."
For the purpose of determining what must be done to
insure compliance with the Act, businesses may be broken
down into two categories: (1) users of credit reports, and (2)
consumers reporting agencies (issuers of consumer reports). It
is much-to the advantage of any persons or entities extending
credit, dealing in insurance or considering a person for employment to avoid consumer reporting agency classification for
the reason that the Act places many more restrictions and
duties upon these agencies than upon mere users of credit
information.7 In general, a "consumer reporting agency" is
defined by the Act as an entity which regularly furnishes
"consumer reports" to third parties.'
A "user" of credit reports may be defined as any entity making a determination
as to an individual's eligibility for credit, insurance, employment, or other business consideration based upon the applicant's credit worthiness or general character and reputation.!,
II.

AVOIDING

"CONSUMER

REPORTING

AGENCY"

STATUS

Since it is to the user's advantage to avoid consumer
reporting agency status, it is important to examine just how
this may be accomplished.
A "consumer reporting agency" is defined by section
1681a(f) of the Act as including any entity which "regularly
engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or
evaluating consumer credit information or other information
on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports
to third parties"'" whether for fee or in a cooperative venture
where interstate commerce is used.
Unfortunately, the Act does not direct or even authorize formulation of
regulations to assist in itsimplementation as did § 105 of the Truth In
Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970). Griffith L. Garwood, an attorney
with the Federal Reserve Board's Division of Supervision and Regulation
cf the Truth In Lending Act. stated, in an address to the American
Bankers Association's 30th National Installment Credit Conference in
Miami Beach, Florida, that the Fair Credit Reporting Act's application
to banking activities was so uncertain that information was being prepared for the Board's examining staff and other banking agencies to
aid in the Acts interpretation. Garwood said it was his belief that this
information, when completed, would be distributed to banks as a quide
for developing procedures and an insight as to how the agencies view
the Act.
7 Compare the discussion in Part III with that in Part IV.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1681a (f) (1971).
Id. § 1681a (d).
id. § 1681a.
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A. Information for Internal Use and Not 'or Dissezination

Thus, one of the keys to avoiding agency status is whether
or not the information is being handled for the "purpose of
furnishing consumer reports to third parties." If the information is being assembled or evaluated for the business' own use
and not for transmittal to third parties, the business does not
fall within the definition of a "consumer reporting agency."
A business may request, for its own use, information from
other businesses or banks concerning their dealings with a
particular customer. As long as the business limits the use
of the information garnered from others to its own application
and does not disseminate it to third parties, it will not become a "consumer reporting agency." Such dissemination on a
very infrequent basis might be permissible as long as it avoids
the "regularly engages in" requirement. The act of seeking
credit information from other businesses and Lanks might
seem to constitute "assembling or evaluating" consumer credit
information; however, as long as the information is strictly
for the business' own use, such assembling or evaluating cannot be said to be for the purpose of furnishing consumer
reports "to third parties."
B. Information Not Classified as a "Consumer Report"
Similarly, if the material being assembled and or furnished
by the business does not come within the Act's definition of a
''consumer report" the business would not be considered a
"consumer reporting agency." According to the Act, a "consumer report" is a communication, written, oral, or otherwise
by a "consumer reporting agency"" bearing on a consumer's
"credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character,
general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living"
which is "used or expected to be used or collected in whole or
in part for the purpose of serving as a factor for":'
(1) establishing the consumer's eligibility for credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes; i

'I Herein

lies the Act's resurrection of the age-old que.ion involving the
chicken and the egg. A "consumer reporting agency" may be loosely
defined as an entity which furnishes "consumer reports" to third parties.
enough; but a "consumer report" is something supplied by a
Simple
"consumer reporting agency". And so we go back to the beginning. It
seems necessary to quietly ignore the phrase "consumer reporting
agency" in the definition of a "consumer report" and to simply conclude
that if a communication otherwise meets the Act's definition of a
consumer report, it is unimportant who has furnished it.
12 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681a (d) (1971).
13 Id. §1681a (d) (1).
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employment purposes;1 4

(3) determining the consumer's eligibility for certain licenses granted by a governmental instrumentality;'" or
(4) meeting any othe.r "legitimate business needs" in connection with a "business transaction" involving the
consumer.";
The term "consumer report" does not include:
(1) any report containing information solely as to transactions or experiences between the consumer and the
reporter;
(2) any authorization, approval, or denial of a specific
extension of credit directly or indirectly by the issuer
of a credit card or similar device; or
(3) any report in which a person conveys to a third party
his decision with respect to a specific extension of
credit directly or indirectly to a consumer if such third
party requested such credit extension and he advises
the consumer of the name and address of the person
to whom the request was made and the person reporting makes the disclosures to the consumer required
under section 1681m of the Act.'"
In this particular instance it is more important to analyze
the exclusions than the inclusions.
1. Information Solely as to Transactions Between Reporter
and Consumer
Perhaps the most important of the exclusions is the first
one listed dealing with information solely as to transactions
between the reporter and the consumer. For example, a
report by business A to a credit reporting agency or to another business covering only A's experience with the consumer
would not be a "consumer report," and the dissemination of
this information to a third party, even on a regular basis,
would not make A a "consumer reporting agency." This should
be contrasted with the situation where business A has received
information from another bank or business regarding the credit
worthiness of consumer X and A then passes this information
''Id.§ 1681a (d) (2).
I:d. § 1681b (3) (D).
Id.§ 1681b (3) (E).
Id. § 1681a (d). A further example of a report which would not be a
"con11mcr rVpot' is a real estate appraisal. This presumably does not
bear on thc "credit worthiness" of the consumer, even though as a
practical matter the greater the appraised value over the amount of
the loan sought. the greater the chances of its approval.
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on to a third party separately or along with information regarding its own experiences. This "passing on" of information
dealing with experiences of other companies with consumer
X would cause business A to be held to the requirements of
a "consumer reporting agency," unless the passing of information was done very infrequently. Similarly, were a business
to whom A gave a report on its dealings with consumer X to
pass that information along to yet a third party, this transfer
would result in the information being characterized as a consumer report, and the institution so passing along A's c.redit
information might, depending upon the frequency of such
actions, fall within the classification of a "consumer reporting
agency."
2. Specific Extension of Credit by Issuer of Credit Card
One example of the "specific credit extension" exclusion
would be the communications between a -retail merchant and
a bank concerning authorization or approval for an extension
of credit to a consumer on a particular Master Charge or Bank
Americard purchase. The bank's reply to such an inquiry
would not be construed as a "consumer report."
3. Specific Extensions
"Third Party"

of Credit When

Requested

by

a

A somewhat related exclusion is provided for a communication between a retail merchant and a bank or other lender
concerning authorization or approval for an extension of credit
to a consumer on a particular purchase where a c.redit card
is not involved."s This occurs, where the merchant ,wants
the bank to simply buy the financing from the merchant or
extend financing in the first instance on a closed-end transaction. There are, however, two important conditions of notification attached with regard to this third exclusion. An example
might be if an automobile dealer contacted a bank to see if
the bank would be willing to finance the purchase of an automobile by consumer X. The bank's reply to the automobile
dealer would not be construed to be a "consumer report" and
the bank would not be considered a "consumer reporting
18 But for this specific exclusion in the Act, such a communication (whether

oral or written) whereby the lender conveys to the third party its acceptance or rejection of the specific credit extension sought by the third
party on behalf of a potential borrower, would subject the lender to a
"consumer reporting agency" status (unless the report was based solely
on the application or the Bank's own experience with the potential
borrower as discussed in Part II., B., 1).
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long as (1) the automobile dealer advised conthe name and address of the bank; and (2) the
declined to extend the credit (or otherwise incost therefor), gave consumer X the information
section 1681m of the Act. 9

The difficulty lenders will experience in trying to police
"third parties" to insure compliance with requirement (1) is
evident. The closer the relationship between the lender and
third party, the greater will be the effort required in this
regard by the lender. If the adverse action notification is
furnished, a failure to meet requirement (1) would seem of
little consequence. It will in any event be necessary for lenders to make certain they have obtained the consumer's exact
name and address from the "third party" so that the requisite
notification may be given. A nonviable alternative suggested
by some people is to have the "third party" give the notification to the consumer as the lender's agent, with a copy to
20
the lender.

19 See the discussion of the § 1681m requirements in Part III, B. A recent
trade publication put out for use by bankers states emphatically that
third party, or in our example, the automobile dealer, has the responsibility for giving the consumer the § 1681m notification. The publication goes on to report that many banks have decided to send a rejection
notice to the dealer carrying the required information with a carbon
copy to the consumer, retaining another copy for their files. The publication says that yet other banks are hesitant to follow this policy as they
feel they will become consumer reporting agencies by virtue of having
sent the duplicate notice to the consumer. It is submitted that this entire
approach is contrary to the terms of the Act, if not good sense. Section
1681a (d) (C) dealing with exclusions from the definition of "consumer
reports" sets up as one of the conditions to the specific credit transaction
exclusion the requirement that "the third party advises the consumer
of the name and address of the person to whom the request was made
and such person makes the disclosures to the consumer required under
§ 1681m... ." It seems clear that the reference to "such person" is back
to "the person" rather than to "the third party". Since "the person"
refers to the financial institution contracted by the dealer, it is obvious
that the requirement to make the § 1681m disclosure falls upon that
same institution.
20 However, at least one Denver area bank is refusing to tell its dealers, in
the third party situation, the reason for the bank's decision to reject
the credit application made by the dealer on behalf of his customer.
This same bank is however, conveying its reasons to the customer, as
required by §§ 1681a(d) (C) and 1681m. Apparently, the reason for the
bank's refusal to so advise the inquiring dealer is that it somehow believes it will become subject to consumer reporting agency status by so
doing. Not only does this create a rather sticky situation between the
bank and the inquiring dealer, but it also seems to lose sight of the
purpose of § 1681a(d) (C) which is of course to allow such communication between a lending institution and a third party without the lending
institution being considered a consumer reporting agency.
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III.

EFFECT OF THE ACT ON

USERS OF CREDIT INFORMATION

The Act will affect the personnel and procedures em2
ployed by users of credit information in four main areas: '
(1) the procedures followed in sharing credit information
22
with representatives of "outside" organizations;
(2) the form used in notifying customers of the rejection
of their credit, insurance, or employment application,
or of an increase in the charge for obtaining the
1:
same, and the necessity for giving such notification;
(3) the necessity for disclosing to customers the nature
of the credit information in the user's credit files in
limited instances;24
2(4) pre-notification of investigative consumer repo.rts.
A. Prohibition Against Dissemination of "Outside" Credit
Information
In order to avoid classification as a consumer reporting
agency, the personnel of business entities attempting to effect
such an avoidance must be given strict instructions to prevent
any "passing on" of credit information from one "outside"
source to another. This problem was discussed in more detail
in Part II., B.,l; however, in summary, business A may pass on
to user B information concerning A's experience with consumer X. A may not pass on to B information concerning
consumer X which A obtained from business C. Nor may A
pass on to any other entity information contained in a credit
report obtained on consumer X. Except for the "specific transaction" exclusions discussed earlier, the only credit information which business A may pass on to another entity concerning consumer X is that based upon A's own experiences
with the consumer.
Unfortunately, many institutions are taking the restrictions
against dissemination of credit information to mean that they
may no longer rate consumers when requested for information.
21 Of course, credit report users will feel the effects of the Act in certain
other areas, such as with the contents of the credit reports they receive
from credit reporting agencies, with regard to the reluctance of other
users to share credit information (both founded and unfounded) and
with regard to requests from consumer reporting agencies that the user
certify the purpose for which information is being sought in connection
with a request of the agency for a credit report.
2.,15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681a (d), (f) (1971).
23 Id. § 1681m.
24 Id. § 1681m (b).
25 Id. § 1681d.
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One of the theories advanced in support of this refusal argues
that by saying a consumer is "good," "slow," or "unsatisfactory," a business is giving an opinion as to the consumer's
worthiness and is therefore acting as a consumer reporting
agency. Such an argument is ultra-conservative and cannot
be backed up by reference to the Act, as long as the rating
deals only with the consumer's payment history with the reporting business. Obviously, a business must avoid making an
overall opinion as to a consumer's credit worthiness based on
everything in its files, which might well include credit reports,
ratings from othe.r businesses, and the like. However, as long
as the reporting business' response is specifically limited to
a rating of the consumer's performance with that business
only, consumer reporting agency status will not attach.
There are certain customer relations reasons which might
justify refusal to rate consumers; however, they should be
weighed against the effect such a refusal by all businesses
will have upon the practices of the credit industry as a whole.
One such reason is simply that rating consumers has gradually
become a very time-consuming headache, and many businesses
are all too happy to have found an excuse for eliminating
the procedure. Still another reason offered, and one which
has at least some relationship to the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, is that since consumers now have much better access
to their credit files, businesses no longer wish to express
opinions which might get back to their customers and ultimately result in some customer dissatisfaction.
B. Notification of Adverse Action with Regard to Credit, Insurance or Employment Application
The Act requires that rather specific information be furnished in each instance where a credit or insurance application
is rejected, or the cost of the same increased,20 on the basis
of "credit information" obtained from an "outside" source
providing the applicant was an "individual" and the "primary
purpose" for the credit o.r insurance was "personal, family or
:2;
It likely will be quite difficult in any given situation to prove that adverse
credit information resulted in the cost of the credit being increased, e.g.,
through a stepup in the normal discount rate or an increase in the normal
interest rate. This is particularly true in today's money market where
both the discount rate and the interest rate fluctuate rapidly. A rather
novel suggestion has been made that the charge for credit has been
increased any time a lender determines that a customer is eligible for a
loan only if the amortization period is lengthened to reduce the monthly
payments. It is argued that the charge has been increased for obtaining the
credit because the total interest paid for borrowing tHe particular amount
of money will be greater when the money is paid back over a longer
period of time.
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household."- 7 This same requirement is imposed for certain
employment rejections. It is important to note, however, that
such adverse action based on other than "credit information"
or based solely on the lender's past expe-riences with the borrower, and in no way dependent upon credit information from
outsiders, is not covered by this requirement. Further, if the
loan or insurance was for use in a strictly commercial transaction, special notice of adverse action would not be required
' ' 'even though the applicant might be an "individual. 1
The precise language which should be used in the notification varies depending upon whether the credit information
upon which the decision was wholly or partially based came
from (1) a consumer reporting agency 2 - or (2) information
obtained directly by the lender's personnel from outside
sources other than a consumer reporting agency, :"' such as
information requests sent out to area banks and merchants.
1. Adverse Action Based on a Report From a Consumer
Reporting Agency
In the event of a turn-down, increase in charges on a loan
or insurance application, or rejection of an employment application based on a consumer report by a consumer reporting
agency, it is suggested that the language below should be
used following the introductory paragraph (in which the
applicant is regretfully advised of the action taken):
This action was influenced by information in a consumer
report, made at our request, by XYZ Credit Co .........................
[address] a ........................

[national]

[local]

company specializ-

ing in the compilation of credit information.
It is then incumbent upon the applicant to examine his
files at the named credit agency if he wishes any additional
information. The user in this instance is not required by the
Act to give the applicant any further information concerning
the contents of the credit report it has secured.
While the Act does not cover this point, apparently the
user acts at his peril in determining whether a particular
source of credit information is a consumer reporting agency,
thus, requiring the user to divulge the name and address of
the institution, or merely a non-agency outside source - as
discussed in Part III., B., 2. below - in which case such information need not be given. Certainly many consumer report15 U.S.C.A. § 1681m (a) (1971).
2S Id.
29 Id.
30Id. § 1681m (b).
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ing agencies will be readily identifiable, and an accurate determination may be made as to others by simply examining the
type of information they have furnished. For example, if a
particular source has furnished information concerning credit
transactions of the consumer with entities other than those
strictly with the reporting institution, that institution is a consumer reporting agency, and the rejecting user must give the
consumer the name and address of such source. The problem
is further compounded by the fact that some entities may be
consumer reporting agencies without knowing it.
A users may receive some measure of protection by adopting the following procedures:
(1) writing a letter to all of its primary credit correspondents requesting written notification as to whether or
not they are operating as consumer reporting agencies
and
(2) requesting written notification of a credit correspondent's status as a part of the form letter sent with each
request for information on any consumer.
Aid could also be brought to this rather difficult area in
the form of improvement in the current legislation which
would (1) require anyone answering a request for credit information to disclose whether or not they are consumer reporting agencies and (2) provide that a user of credit information
is not subject to penalty for failure to comply with section
1681m(a) of the Act when the credit informant indicated it
was not a consumer reporting agency and the credit user had
no reason to believe otherwise.
2. Adverse Action Based on Credit Information from Outside Source Other Than Consumer Reporting Agency
If adverse action on a credit application is based upon
credit information which the business obtained on its own
from outside sources other than a consumer reporting agency,
the business has a responsibility in addition to merely notifying the applicant of this fact. At the time it notifies the customer of the adverse action taken, it must advise him of his
right to make a written request, within 60 days for a disclosure of the nature of the information upon which the
action was based.; '
31

Id.
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It is important to note that no such notification need be
made to insurance or employment applicants when the rejection or increase in cost is based upon credit information from
sources other than a consumer reporting agency. 32 Thus, as
nonsensical as it may seem, the notification requirements discussed in relation to reports by a credit reporting agency
apply whenever the subject of the application is credit, insurance, or employment, whereas the notification requirements
discussed here apply only when the application is for credit.
The following language is proposed for use when the adverse action is based upon credit information obtained from
outside sources other than consumer reporting agencies:
This action was influenced by information contained in
credit reports made available to us at our request. Upon written
request, received within 60 days from the date of this letter,
additional information will be provided to you as to the nature
of the reports we received and upon which our decision was
based.
3. Exceptions to Notice Requirement
There are three general situations where it will not be
33
necessary to give the "rejection notification" described above.
a. Commercial Transactions.
No notification is required in connection with a loan or
insurance application where the primary purpose is "commercial" rather than "personal, family or household. 3 4 Examples might be a loan for the purchase of an apartment house,
office building or other commercial establishment, or a loan
for improvement of the same. Further examples would include
purchase of merchandise for resale or for use in a business.
While no rules, regulations, or interpretations have yet been
promulgated under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Truth
in Lending Act keys certain of its provisions to a similar requirement that the credit transaction be for "personal, family
or household" uses,35 and it may be assumed that regulations
and rulings interpreting the provision in that Act will be
useful guidelines to possible interpretation under the Fair
Credit Reporting Act.
32

Id.

33

Id. § 1681m.
Id. § 1681m (a).

34
3

See § 103 (h)of the Truth In Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1602 (h) (1970);
§ 226.2 (k) of Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2 (k); and § 226.3 (a) of
Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.3 (a).
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b. Adverse Action Based Solely on the Business' Past
Experiences.
Adverse action strictly on the basis of the business' past
experiences with the customer or information contained in the
application, even though some of that information obviously
deals with the applicant's credit standing, does not require
use of the special notification," ; To take advantage of this
exception it will be necessary that businesses first examine
the application and their own files for past dealings with the
applicant befo.re ordering a consumer report from an agency
or otherwise seeking outside credit information. If a credit
report is obtained, as has often been done in the past, purely
as a routine matter, it will be difficult if not impossible to
convincingly assert that the information in such a report did
not play a part in the adverse decision.
c. Adverse Action Not Based on "Credit Information."
Adverse action strictly on the basis of facts which would
not be classified as "credit information" does not require a
special rejection notification. :T1 Examples might be a loan application turned down as a result of such things as the inadequacy of the lot size, failure of the rooms to meet FHA or
VA specifications, undesirable location of the property, inadequacy of the collateral (regardless of the person's credit picture), or related reasons.
4. Special Problems
A number of special problems are created and then left
unresolved by the Act with regard to which of several parties
involved in a particular transaction should assume responsibility for giving notification.
For example, when a prospective homeowner makes application with a lender for an FHA loan, the lending institution
frequently acts as little more than a compiler of credit information which is used to complete the necessary government forms
which are then sent on to the FHA authorities. Included with
these materials will typically be a credit report secured from
a consumer reporting agency. It is then left up to the FHA
to grant or deny the application. In the event the application
is rejected, the question arises as to who should give the rejection notice, the lending institution or the FHA, and what
:6 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681m (a), (b) (1971).
37 Id. § 1681m (b).
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form the notice should take. The lending institution did not
make the decision to reject the loan, so why should they
furnish notice to the consumer? On the other hand, the consumer did not apply for a loan from the FHA (which of
course does not furnish the funds even had the loan been
accepted, but rather only guarantees repayment), and the
credit would actually have been extended by the lending institution. Another concern is the possibility that the lender
might be nothing more than the "third party" as discussed in
Part II., B., 3. dealing with the specific transaction exclusion.
In that case the lender would not be required to advise the
consumer of rejection of his application, but rather must advise
the consumer that application has been made with the FHA.
The potential for a similar, although distinguishable, situation arises each time a prospective home purchaser makes an
application for a loan through a mortgage broker. In such
instances, the broker typically has the consumer fill out an
application form, secures a credit report on the consumer and
an appraisal on the real property involved. These materials
are then. sent to one or more money sources, such as insurance
companies, in an effort to place the loan. It is not clear
whether a rejection notification, in the event one is forthcoming, should be sent by the broker or by the money source
to whom the consumer's application was forwarded. There is
reason to feel that the responsibility for the rejection notification should fall upon the mortgage broker since it has the
more direct contact with the consumer. On the other hand,
perhaps this is another situation where the broker is merely
acting as a third party in which case the insurance company
must give notice of the rejection, and the mortgage broker
must simply advise the consumer that his application was forwarded to the particular insurance company involved. This
problem is compounded by the fact that it is not unusual for
a particular application to be rejected by one or more money
sources before the loan is finally placed by the broker. In such
cases, the question comes up as to whether or not the consumer is entitled to any notice of rejection since his loan was
ultimately placed.
Yet another problem may arise in either of the situations
discussed above. In both instances credit information obtained
from outside sources, usually credit bureaus, is being "passed
on" to third parties. It is this passing on, as discussed above
in Part II., A., which, at least if done on a regular basis, will
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result in the "passer" being classified as a consumer reporting
agency. Again the specific transaction exclusion discussed in
Part II., B., 3. may allow the lender or the broker to avoid
such classification; however, it is effective only when the two
conditions specified are met: the third party advised the
applicant of the name of the institution to whom the application was sent, and the latter institution gave the consumer
notice of the rejection. The most rational way to avoid this
problem would seem to be to characterize the broker or lending institution as the agent for the entity to whom the informa38
tion is passed.
Similarly, what happens when a real estate agent calls
the mortgage lender and gives certain background information
on a prospective purchaser and asks whether or not the lender
would be able to make the necessary loan? If the lender declines on the basis of credit information in its files or on the
basis of a very hasty and preliminary credit check, is this a
case for application of the specific transaction exclusion so
that the real estate company, in the posture of a third party,
is required to advise the potential purchaser of the inquiry,
and the lending institution is -required to give the consumer
notice of rejection?
5. Observations
It is not at all clear why the Act requires notification to
a consumer when he is rejected for insurance, employment,
or the charge for obtaining the insurance is increased when
such action was based upon information in a consumer report
from a consumer reporting agency but does not require such
notification when the action was based upon credit information
obtained from sources other than a consumer reporting agency.
The absence of a rational basis for making this distinction
again suggests the possibility of inattentive legislative draftsmanship. Another puzzlement is the fact that when a consumer reporting agency is involved the customer is not given
notice of his right to receive a clear and accurate disclosure,
upon request, of the nature, substance, sources, and recipients
of information in his credit file. It is true that this right is
given by the Act3" without regard to whether or not any adverse action has been taken; however, it is very naive to
38 A request has already been made of the federal agencies having enforce-

ment responsibilities under the Act with respect to banking institutions
for a clarification of the guidelines on this point.
3915 U.S.C.A. §§1681g, 1681h (1971).
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assume that consumers will be aware of this. Certainly it
would seem that this should be brought to their attention
whenever adverse action, as discussed above, has been taken.
C. Scope of Consumer's Right to Access of Files of Credit
Report Users.
Although there seems to be some misunderstanding among
merchants and bankers on this point, the Fair Credit Reporting Act does not give consumers an unlimited right of access
to their c.redit files wherever they may be found. In fact,
the consumer's right in this area is quite limited.
First of all, the Act does not give consumers a right to
view the physical material in their credit files in any circumstance. The Act does, as discussed in Part IV., C., require
credit reporting agencies, upon request by a consumer, to
"clearly and accurately" disclose the "nature and substance"
of the information in their files on the consumer including
the source of the information and certain other facts. 4 ' Businesses which are able to avoid the consumer reporting agency
classification may maintain the secrecy of their credit files
except under the limited circumstances discussed in Part III.,
B., 2. dealing with adverse action on a consumer's credit application. Even in that limited instance the burden is upon the
consumer to make written request for the information no
later than 60 days after notification of the adverse action. In
compliance with such a timely request a credit report user
need only disclose to the consumer the "nature of the information" upon which the adverse action was based. 41 Direct access
to credit files is not required. While the language of the Act
is somewhat vague, at least one favorable advisory opinion
has been noted in which the staff attorneys of the Federal
Trade Commission approved rather generalized responses along
42
the lines of the following:
Information received from a local bank shows that you have
overdrawn your checking account numerous times within the
past few months.
Information received from certain area .................... (department stores, banks, etc.) has shown that your payments are consistently late.
Inquiry made of a local ........................ (department store, finance
company, etc.) indicated that your account with them had been
40Id.
Id. § 1681m (b).
42 This was a "hearsay" situation and should only serve as a guide as counsel.

41

not
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placed with a collection agency as a result of your failure to
make payment as required.

D. Investigative Consumer Reports -

Pre-Notification

An "investigative consumer report" is defined by section
1681a(e) of the Act as a consumer report or portion thereof
containing information on a consumer's "character, general
reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living [when]
obtained through personal interviews with neighbors, friends,
or associates of the consumer reported on or with others
with whom he is acquainted or who may have knowledge concerning any such items of information." Specifically
excluded from this category is factual information on a consumer's credit record obtained directly from a creditor of the
consumer or from a consumer reporting agency which in turn
obtained the information directly from a creditor of the consumer or the consumer himself. The features that distinguish
an investigative consumer report are the type of information
compiled and the fact that this information is derived through
personal interviews with friends, neighbors, or associates of the
consumer, rather than garnered from other creditors or the
consumer himself.
Anytime a business wishes to procure an investigative consumer report for any purpose (except employment as discussed
below), it must, within 3 days after the date on which the
report is first requested, disclose to the consumer that such
a report may be made and will or may include information
as to his character, general reputation, personal characteristics,
and mode of living.4 ' This disclosure must also advise the
consumer of his right to request, within a reasonable period
of time, a complete and accurate disclosure of the nature and
scope of the requested investigation. This notice must be in
writing and must be mailed or otherwise delivered to the
consumer. In the event the consumer makes such a written
request, the information must be furnished to him within 5
days after receipt of his request.4 4
An exception to this pre-notification requirement is provided when the report is to be used for employment for which
the consumer has not specifically applied. ' A common example of this would be when a consumer was considered for advancement within the organization for which he was then
1315 U.S.C.A. § 1681d (a)
44Id. § 1681d (b).
45Id. § 1681d (a) (2).

(1) (1971).
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employed. Keep in mind that this pre-notification is not required in all "consumer reports" but only in the event the
lender will or may seek an "investigative" report.
If the business requests investigative consumer reports
with any frequency, it should give consideration to satisfying
the pre-notification requirement through the use of language
inserted in one of the loan application forms or in a similar
form routinely completed and signed by applicants. The following language is suggested for inclusion in such application
forms:
A routine inquiry may be made during the next few days
in connection with this loan application. This inquiry typically
concerns information on an applicant's character, general reputation, personal characteristics and mode of living and may entail personal interviews with your neighbors, friends, or associates. Upon written request, additional information as to the
nature and scope of such a report, if one is made, will be
provided.

In the event an application is received by mail and no
personal contact with the consumer is anticipated pre-notification can be handled in the first series of acknowledgment correspondence from the lender to the applicant. A sample introductory paragraph sufficient for this purpose follows:
We appreciate your recent application for (issuance of a
Master Charge Credit Card, a home improvement loan, a motor
vehicle installment loan, employment, etc.) and are expediting
it as you read this. As a part of our normal procedure for processing applications, a routine inquiry may be made during the
next few days. This inquiry typically concerns information on
an applicant's character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of living and may entail personal interviews
with your neighbors, friends, or associates. Upon written request, additional information as to the nature and scope of such
a report, if one is made, will be provided.
IV. EFFECT OF THE ACT ON CONSUMER REPORTING AGENCIES

As mentioned earlier, the Fair Credit Reporting Act imposes many more restrictions upon consumer reporting agencies than upon mere users of credit information. A detailed
discussion of the restrictions and requirement imposed upon
these agencies is not included since most businesses will insure
that their activities are sufficiently limited to avoid that classification. On the other hand, since credit users will deal with
consumer reporting agencies in requesting credit information,
a general understanding of the application of the new Act to
these institutions is provided.
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A. Permissible Purposes for Which Reports May Be Furnished
The Act specifies the purposes for which a consumer
reporting agency may furnish a consumer report. 4 Except
for these listed purposes a credit reporting agency may not
issue a credit report unless in response to a court order or in
47
accordance with the written instructions of the consumer.
The Act also requires the agency to maintain "reasonable procedures" designed to insure compliance with this restriction. 48
In general, the agency's compliance procedures will include
requirements that prospective users of the information identify
themselves, that they certify the purposes for which the information is sought, and that it will be used for no other purpose. The agency must make a reasonable effort to verify
the identity and certified uses of any new prospective user
prior to furnishing a report. If the agency has reasonable
grounds for believing the consumer report will not be used
for one of the prescribed purposes, it must refuse to furnish
the report.
B. Information in Credit File
1. Obsolete Information
A consumer reporting agency may not issue a report containing any information relating to accounts placed for collection or charged to profit and loss, paid tax liens, suits, judgments, or any other adverse items which antedate the report
by more than 7 years.4 1 Further, records of arrest, indictment, or conviction of crime which, from date of disposition,
release or parole, antedate the report by more than 7 years
46 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681b (1971).

The permissible purposes are:
in connection with an extension of credit to, or review or
collection of an account of the consumer on whom the information is to be furnished; or
(B) for employment purposes; or
(C) in connection with the underwriting of insurance involving
the consumer; or
(D) in connecticn with a determination of the consumer's eligibility for certain government licenses or other benefits; or
(E) to a person who otherwise has a "legitimate business need
for the information in connection with a business transaction involving the consumer.
Pending the issuance of regulations or judicial determination, the
exact limits of the fifth category as listed above and as discussed in
Part I. are uncertain.
It is interesting to note that § 1681f states that:
NotwithStariding the provisions of § 1681b. a consumer reporting
agency may furnish identifying information respecting any consumer, limited to his name, address, former addresses, places of
employment, or former places of employment, to a governmental
agency.
S715 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681b (1), (2) (1971).
IsId.§ 1681e.
49 Id. §1681c (a).
(A)
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may not be included. 50 Neither will bankruptcies be included
where the date of adjudication was more than 14 years prior
to issuance of the report. These restrictions against including
such outdated information in a credit report are not applicable
when the report is issued in connection with a credit transaction which may reasonably involve a principal amount of
$50,000 or more, the underwriting of insurance where the face
amount may reasonably be $50,000 or more, or employment of
an individual at an annual salary of $20,000 or more. 51
2. Public Record Information
In addition to satisfying the obsolecence requirements,
a consumer reporting agency which furnishes a consumer
report for employment purposes (as opposed to credit or other
purposes) containing information on the consumer which is a
matter of public record (such as arrests, indictments, convictions, suits, tax liens, and outstanding judgments) likely to have
an adverse effect upon the person's ability to obtain employment must maintain strict procedures to insure that such public
record information is complete and up to date as of the time
of issuance of the report. 52 If the credit reporting agency
does not maintain such procedures it must, at the time the
information is reported, notify the consumer of the name and
address of the user to whom the report is being transmitted
and further notify him of the fact that such public record
53
information is contained therein.
There seems to be no rational basis for limiting the need
for updating public record information to instances of employment applications.

This 7-year limitation placed upon reports of criminal arrests, indictment
and conviction, will work a particular hardship with regard to the employment practices of banks. 12 U.S.C. § 1829 (1964) provides that without written consent of the FIC, no person who has been convicted of any
criminal offense involving dishonesty or breach of trust shall serve as a
director, officer, or employee of a bank whose deposits are FDIC insured.
It will now be much more difficult for banks to learn whether any of
their prospective employees have a record of any such convictions more
than 7 years in the past, unless the job for which they are being considered carries with it an annual salary of $20,000 or more. Even in that
latter instance, it is quite possible that credit reporting agencies will
simply refuse to keep records of such information to avoid its accidental
dissemination in the wrong situation.
51 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681c (b) (1971).
52 Id. § 1681k (2).
53 Id. § 1681k (1).
54

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL.. 48

3. Verification of Information in Investigative Consumer
Report
On those occasions when a consumer reporting agency is
preparing an investigative consumer report for inclusion in
a consumer -report it must verify all adverse information (other
than information which is matter of public record) received
54
more than 3 months prior to the date of the report.
C. Consumer's Right of Access to and Correction of His Credit
File
Upon the request of any consumer a consumer reporting
agency must "clearly and accurately" disclose to the consumer
the nature and substance of all information in its files on the
consumer, the source of the information (except as to sources
of information used solely in preparing an investigative consumer report), and the name of the recipient of any consumer
report which the agency has furnished either for employment
pu.rposes within the last 2 years or for any purpose within
"5 The
the 6-month period immediately preceding the request.
requirement regarding disclosure of sources of information
and recipients does not apply to information received or consume.r reports furnished prior to April 25, 1971, except to the
extent the matter inv-Aved may have been retained in the
56
agency's files on the date of the request.
A consumer wishing to so examine his credit file may do
so in person57 or by telephone (if he has made a prior written
request with proper identification) 58 during normal business
hours and upon reasonable notice. 59 The agency is required
Id. § 16811. It is not clear whether the verification requirement can be
satisfied by simply contacting the sources through which the information
was acquired originally cr whether the reporting agency must take some
action to confirm the earlier reports on a firsthand basis. Considerations
of practicality suggest the latter.
Id. § 1681g (a). The necessity for consumer reporting agencies to keep
complete, clear, and accurate records is very evident. For example, a
record must be kept of every telephone inquiry in response to which
information is furnished on a consumer so that, when required, the
agency will be able to disclose to the consumer a complete list of all
recipients of reports on him.
" Id. § 1681g (b). This provision will permit consumer reporting agencies
to remove certain information from their files prior to April 25 to allow
the agencies to honor previous commitments that information was given
on a confidential basis. If the infcrmation is expunged from the file
before the effective date of the Act, the agency need not disclose the
sources or recipients thereof.
--7 Id. § 1681h (b) (1).
5S Id. § 1681h (b) (2).
,Id. § 1681h (a). If the consumer merely wants to review his credit file
and is not responding to a section 1681m notice, "the consumer reporting
agency may impose a reasonable charge on the consumer for making
disclosure to such consumer .... " Id. § 1681j.
54
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to provide a trained person to explain to the consumer the
information which must be furnished to him."" A consumer
may be accompanied by one other person of his choosing. 61
If the consumer directly advises the agency of any question he has as to the completeness and accuracy of any item
contained in his file, the agency must within a reasonable
period of time investigate the matter unless it has reasonable
grounds to believe the dispute is frivolous or irrelevant. 2
If upon reinvestigation the material is found to be inaccurate
or can no longer be verified, the agency must promptly delete
it.63
If upon reinvestigation the dispute is still not resolved,
a consumer may file a brief statement setting forth the nature
of the dispute.6 4 Unless the agency has reasonable grounds to
believe that the statement is frivolous or irrelevant, it must,
in any subsequent consumer report containing the disputed
information, clearly note the dispute and provide either the
consumer's statement or a "clear and accurate codification
or summary thereof. '65 In addition, at the request of the consumer, the agency must give a similar notice to any "users"
specifically designated by the consumer, who have received
a consumer report for employment purposes within the past
2 years or for any other purpose within the last 6 months.66
The agency must "clearly and conspicuously" disclose to the
consumer his right to make such a request.
V.

.- ENALTIES AND ENFORCEMENT

Section 1681h(e) of the Act "7 provides that no consumer
may bring suit against a consumer reporting agency, user, or
60 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681h (c).
61 Id. § 1681h (b). The agency may, however, require the consumer to
furnish a written statement granting permission to the agency to discuss
the consumer's file in the presence of such other person.
(2Id. § 1681i (a). It is provided that the presence of contradictory information in the consumer's file does not in and of itself constitute reasonable grounds for believing the dispute is frivolous or irrelevant.
63 Id.

64 Id. § 1681i (b).
65 Id. § 1681i (c).
66Id. § 1681i (d).
67 It is interesting to speculate what change this provision of the Act will
have on state libel laws. With certain exceptions, the publication either
negligently or wilfully and with malice, to a third person of any defamatory material concerning an individual would generally be actionable if it proved damaging to the libelee. It would appear that § 1681h
(e) changes the law so that regardless of whether or not the libelee has
been damaged, he will have no action against the publisher of the defamatory statement, unless he can show malice or wilful intent to injure,
if the publication upon which he relies was made by or to a consumer
reporting agency or the user of credit repcrts, and if the fact of the
libel came to the libelee's attention as a result of disclosures being made
to him pursuant to the requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
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any person who furnishes information to an agency, based on
information disclosed pursuant to the creditor's access provisions
discussed above except as to "false information furnished with
malice or willful attempt to injure" the consumer.
This provision does not, however, prevent an action by a
consumer against an agency or use.r which "negligently" ' 8
or "willfully"'" fails to comply with any requirement imposed
by the Act. In an action based on "willful noncompliance,"
the consumer may recover actual damages and attorneys' fees
as well as punitive damages,7 1 whereas in an action based upon
negligent noncompliance, no punitive damages are recoverable. 71 A 2-year statute of limitations is provided for bringing
such actions although the date upon which the 2 years begins
72
to run will vary with the circumstances.
Criminal penalties are provided for any person who "knowingly and willfully obtains information from a consumer reporting agency under false pretenses." 73 The same penalties are
provided for "[Ia]ny officer or employee of a consumer reporting agency who knowingy and willfully provides information
concerning an individual from the agency's files to a person
not authorized to receive that information. .... -. 4
While the Federal Trade Commission has primary enforcement responsibility, 75 other agencies are charged with enforcement of the Act with respect to certain institutions such as
banks, savings and loan associations, common carriers, and
70
others.
" Id. § 1681o.
09;
Id. § 1681n.
70

Id. § 1681m.

7'Id.

§ 1681o.

Id. § 168 1p. Section 1681p provides that the action may be brought
7"within two years from the date on which the liability arises,
except that where a defendant has materially and wilfully misrepresented any information required under this title to be disclosed to an individual and the information so misrepresented is
material to the establishment of the defendant's liability to that
individual under this title, the action may be brought at any
time within two years after discovery by the individual of the
misrepresentation.
Any discussion of the liability of a credit report user for failure to
make the notification required by § 1681m of the Act, must take into
consideration subpart (c) thereof which provides that there shall be no
liability for violation if the user shows by a "preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the alleged violation he maintained reasonable
procedures to assure the compliance ..
, Id. § 1681q (emphasis added).
74 Id. § 1681r (emphasis added).
75Id. § 1681s (a).
7, Id. § 1681s (b),
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VI. SUMMARY

It remains to be seen whether or not the Act will successfully serve its purpose.77 With the current clamor to do away
with the negative option sales gimmicks7- in frequent use in
today's marketplace, it is difficult to understand why that
same technique was employed in the Act. If the purpose of
the Act is really to apprise the consumer of the nature of
any derogatory information on file against him, why not
require the business rejecting his application to provide a
narrative summary, or complete a checklist, giving the consumer specifics as to the reason for the lender's decision.
Apparently, this approach is too straightforward. Instead,
the consumer is told that if he wants to go to the bother of
making a written request, and if he does so within 60 days of
receipt of the rejection notification, he may learn the "nature"
of the information on file against him. The likelihood of
such a written request being made is remote at best.
The situation is worse when the credit rejection is based
upon information obtained from a credit reporting agency. In
such a case the consumer is given no indication whatsoever
that he has the right to review the materials in the agency's
files. The law provides the consumer with such a right without regard to whether or not he has made a recent credit
application or has recently been denied an extension of credit,
but the law does not require anyone to advise the consumer
of that right. Even saying that the consumer will be the last to
know optimistically presupposes that he will ever know.
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15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1681.

Congressional

findings and statement of purpose

(a) The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The banking system is dependent upon fair and accurate credit
reporting. Inaccurate credit reports directly impair the efficiency of the
banking system, and unfair credit reporting methods undermine the
public confidence which is essential to the continued functioning of the
banking system.
(2) An elaborate mechanism has been developed for investigating
and evaluating the credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity,
character, and general reputation of consumers.
(3) Consumer reporting agencies have assumed a vital role in assembling and evaluating consumer credit and other information on consumers.
(4) There is a need to insure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect
for the consumer's right to privacy.
(b) It is the purpose of this subchapter to require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of
commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard
to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such
information in accordance with the requirements of this subchapter.
Pub.L. 90-321, Title VI, § 602, as added Pub.L. 91-508, Title VI, § 601,
Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1128.
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§ 1681a.

Definitions; rules of construction

(a) Definitions and rules of construction set forth in this section are
applicable for the purposes of this subchapter.
(b) The term "person" means any individual, partnership, corporation, trust, estate, cooperative, association, government, or governmental
subdivision or agency, or other entity.
(c) The term "consumer" means an individual.
(d) The term "consumer report" means any written, oral, or other
communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity,
character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living
which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for
the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer's eligibility for (1) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes, or (2) employment purposes, or (3) other
purposes authorized under section 1681b of this title. The term does not
include (A) any report containing information solely as to transactions
or experiences between the consumer and the person making the report;
(B) any authorization or approval of a specific extension of credit
directly or indirectly by the issuer of a credit card or similar device; or
(C) any report in which a person who has been requested by a third
party to make a specific extension of credit directly or indirectly to a
consumer conveys his decision with respect to such request, if the third
party advises the consumer of the name and address of the person to
whom the request was made and such person makes the disclosures to
the consumer required under section 1681m of this title.
(e) The term "investigative consumer report" means a consumer report or portion thereof in which information on a consumer's character,
general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living is obtained
through personal interviews with neighbors, friends, or associates of the
consumer reported on or with others with whom he is acquainted or who
may have knowledge concerning any such items of information. However, such information shall not include specific factual information on a
consumer's credit record obtained directly from a creditor of the consumer or from a consumer reporting agency when such information was
obtained directly from a creditor of the consumer or from the consumer.
(f) The term "consumer reporting agency" means any person which,
for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly
engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating
consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the
purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses
any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports.
(g) The term "file", when used in connection with information on
any consumer, means all of the information on that consumer recorded
and retained by a consumer reporting agency regardless of how the information is stored.
(h) The term "employment purposes" when used in connection with a
consumer report means a report used for the purpose of evaluating a consumer for employment, promoticn, reassignment or retention as an employee.
(i) The term "medical information'* means information or records obtained, with the consent of the individual to whom it relates, from licensed
physicians or medical practitioners, hospitals, clinics, cr other medical or
medically related facilities.
Pub.L. 90-321, Title VI, § 603, as added Pub.L. 91-508, Title VI, § 601,
Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1128.
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Permissible purposes of consumer reports

A consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report under
the following circumstances and no other:
(1)
such an
(2)
whom it

In response to the order of a court having jurisdiction to issue
order.
In accordance with the written instructions of the consumer to
relates.

To a person which it has reason to believe(A) intends to use the information in connection with a credit
transaction involving the consumer on whom the information is
to be furnished and involving the extension of credit to, or review
or collection of an account of, the consumer; or
(3)

(B)

intends to use the information for employment purposes;

or
(C) intends to use the information in connection with the underwriting of insurance involving the consumer; or
(D) intends to use the information in connection with a determination of the consumer's eligibility for a license or other benefit
granted by a governmental instrumentality required by law to consider an applicant's financial responsibility or status; or
(E) otherwise has a legitimate business need for the information in connection with a business transaction involving the consumer.
Pub.L. 90-321, Title VI, § 604, as added Pub.L. 91-508, Title VI, § 601,
Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1129.
§ 1681c. Reporting of obsolete information prohibited
(a) Except as authorized under subsection (b) of this section, no consumer reporting agency may make any consumer report containing any
of the following items of information:
(1) Bankruptcies which, from date of adjudication of the most recent
bankruptcy, antedate the report by more than fourteen years.
(2) Suits and judgments which, from date of entry, antedate the
report by more than seven years or until the governing statute of limitations has expired, whichever is the longer period.
(3) Paid tax liens which, from date of payment, antedate the report
by more than seven years.
(4) Accounts placed for collection or charged to profit and loss
which antedate the report by more than seven years.
(5) Records of arrest, indictment, or conviction of crime which, from
date of disposition, release, or parole, antedate the report by more than
seven years.
(6) Any other adverse item of information which antedates
report by more than seven years.

the

(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section, are not applicable in the case of any consumer credit report to be used in connection
with(1) a credit transaction involving, or which may reasonably be
expected to involve a principal amount of $50,000 or more;
(2) the underwriting of life insurance involving, or which may
reasonably be expected to involve, a face amount of $50,000 or more;
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(3) the employment of any individual at an annual salary which
equals, or which may reasonably be expected to equal $20,000, or
more.
Pub.L. 90-321, Title VI, § 605, as added Pub.L. 91-508, Title VI, § 601,
Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1129.
§ 1681d. Disclosure of investigative consumer reports
(a) A person may not procure or cause to be prepared an investigative consumer report on any consumer unless(1) it is clearly and accurately disclosed to the consumer that
an investigative consumer report including information as to his
character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of
living, whichever are applicable, may be made, and such disclosure
(A) is made in a writing mailed, or otherwise delivered, to the consumer, not later than three days after the date on which the report
was first requested, and (B) includes a statement informing the
consumer of his right to request the additional disclosures provided
for under subsection (b) of this section; or
(2) the report is to be used for employment purposes for which
the consumer has not specifically applied.
(b) Any person who procures or causes to be prepared an investigative consumer report on any consumer shall, upon written request
made by the consumer within a reasonable period of time after the receipt by him of the disclosure required by subsection (a) (1) of this
section, shall make a complete and accurate disclosure of the nature and
scope of the investigation requested. This disclosure shall be made in
writing mailed, or otherwise delivered, to the consumer not later than
five days after the date on which the request for such disclosure was
received from the consumer or such report was first requested, whichever is the later.
(c) No person may be held liable for any violation of subsection (a)
or (b) of this section if he shows by a preponderance of the evidence
that at the time of the violation he maintained reasonable procedures
to assure compliance with subsection (a) or (b) of this section.
Pub.L. 90-321, Title VI, § 606, as added Pub.L. 91-508, Title VI, § 601,
Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1130.
§ 1681e. Compliance procedures
(a) Every consumer reporting agency shall maintain reasonable procedures designed to avoid violations of section 1681c of this title and to
limit the furnishing of consumer reports to the purposes listed under
section 1681b of this title. These procedures shall require that prospective users of the information identify themselves, certify the purposes for
which the information is sought, and certify that the information will be
used for no other purpose. Every consumer reporting agency shall make
a reasonable effort to verify the identity of a new prospective user and
the uses certified by such prospective user prior to furnishing such user
a consumer report. No consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report to any person if it has reasonable grounds for believing
that the consumer report will not be used for a purpose listed in section
1681b of this title.
(b) Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer
report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible
accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the
report relates.
Pub.L. 90-321, Title VI, § 607, as added Pub.L. 91-508, Title VI, § 601,
Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1130.
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Disclosures to governmental agencies

Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1681b of this title, a consumer reporting agency may furnish identifying information respecting
any consumer, limited to his name, address, former addresses, places of
employment, or former places of employment, to a governmental agency.
Pub.L. 90-321, Title VI, § 608, as added Pub.L. 91-508, Title VI, § 601,
Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1131.
§ 1681g.

Disclosures to consumers

(a) Every consumer reporting agency shall, upon request and
proper identification of any consumer, clearly and accurately disclose to
the consumer:
(1) The nature and substance of all information (except medical information) in its files on the consumer at the time of the request.
(2) The sources of the information; except that the sources of information acquired solely for use in preparing an investigative consumer
report and actually used for no other purpose need not be disclosed:
Provided, That in the event an action is brought under this subchapter,
such sources shall be available to the plaintiff under appropriate discovery procedures in the court in which the action is brought.
(3) The recipients of any consumer report on the consumer which
it has furnished(A) for employment purposes within the two-year period preceding the request, and
(B) for any other purpose within the six-month period preceding the request.
(b) The requirements of subsection (a) of this section respecting
the disclosure of sources of information and the recipients of consumer
reports do not apply to information received or consumer reports furnished prior to the effective date of this subchapter except to the extent
that the matter involved is contained in the files of the consumer reporting agency on that date.
Pub.L. 90-321, Title VI, § 609, as added Pub.L. 91-508, Title VI, § 601,
Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1131.
§ 1681h. Conditions of disclosure to consumers- Times and notice
(a) A consumer reporting agency shall make the disclosures required under section 1681g of this title during normal business hours
and on reasonable notice.
Identification of consumer
(b) The disclosures required under section 1681g of this title shall
be made to the consumer(1) in person if he appears in person and furnishes proper identification; or
(2) by telephone if he has made a written request, with proper
identification, for telephone disclosure and the toll charge, if any,
for the telephone call is prepaid by or charged directly to the consumer.
Trained personnel
(c) Any consumer reporting agency shall provide trained personnel
to explain to the consumer any information furnished to him pursuant
to section 1681g of this title.
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Persons accompanying consumer
(d) The consumer shall be permitted to be accompanied by one
other person of his choosing, who shall furnish reasonable identification.
A consumer reporting agency may require the consumer to furnish a
written statement granting permission to the consumer reporting agency
to discuss the consumer's file in such person's presence.
Limitation of liability
(e) Except as provided in sections 1681n and 1681o of this title, no
consumer may bring any action or proceeding in the nature of defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence with respect to the reporting of
information against any consumer reporting agency, any user of information, or any person who furnishes information to a consumer reporting agency, based on information disclosed pursuant to section 1681g,
1681h, or 1681m of this title, except as to false information furnished
with malice or willful intent to injure such consumer.
Pub.L. 90-321, Title VI, § 610, as added Pub.L. 91-508, Title VI, § 601,
Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1131.
§ 1681i. Procedure in case of disputed accuracy investigation

Dispute; re-

(a) If the completeness or accuracy of any item of information contained in his file is disputed by a consumer, and such dispute is directly
conveyed to the consumer reporting agency by the consumer, the consumer reporting agency shall within a reasonable period of time reinvestigate and record the current status of that information unless it
has reasonable grounds to believe that the dispute by the consumer is
frivolous or irrelevant. If after such reinvestigation such information
is found to be inaccurate or can no longer be verified, the consumer reporting agency shall promptly delete such information. The presence of
contradictory information in the consumer's file does not in and of itself
constitute reasonable grounds for believing the dispute is frivolous or
irrelevant.
Statement of dispute
(b) If the reinvestigation does not resolve the dispute, the consumer
may file a brief statement setting forth the nature of the dispute. The
consumer reporting agency may limit such statements to not more than
one hundred words if it provides the consumer with assistance in writing a clear summary of the dispute.
Notification of consumer dispute in subsequent consumer reports
(c) Whenever a statement of a dispute is filed, unless there is reasonable grounds to believe that it is frivolous or irrelevant, the consumer reporting agency shall, in any subsequent consumer report containing the information in question, clearly note that it is disputed by
the consumer and provide either the consumer's statement or a clear
and accurate codification or summary thereof.
Notification of deletion of disputed information
(d) Following any deletion of information which is found to be inaccurate or whose accuracy can no longer be verified or any notation as
to disputed information, the consumer reporting agency shall, at the
request of the consumer, furnish notification that the item has been
deleted or the statement, codification or summary pursuant to subsection (b) or (c) of this section to any person specifically designated
by the consumer who has within two years prior thereto received a
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consumer report for employment purposes, or within six months prior
thereto received a consumer report for any other purpose, which contained the deleted or disputed information. The consumer reporting
agency shall clearly and conspicuously disclose to the consumer his
rights to make such a request. Such disclosure shall be made at or
prior to the time the information is deleted or the consumer's statement
regarding the disputed information is received.
Pub.L. 90-321, Title VI, § 611, as added Pub.L. 91-508, Title VI, § 601,
Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1132.
§ 1681j.

Charge for disclosures

A consumer reporting agency shall make all disclosures pursuant to
section 1681g of this title and furnish all consumer reports pursuant to
section 1681i(d) of this title without charge to the consumer if, within
thirty days after receipt by such consumer of a notification pursuant to
section 1681m of this title or notification from a debt collection agency
affiliated with such consumer reporting agency stating that the consumer's credit rating may be or has been adversely affected, the consumer makes a request tinder section 1681g or 1681i(d) of this title.
Otherwise, the consumer reporting agency may impose a reasonable
charge on the consumer for making disclosure to such consumer pursuant to section 1681g of this title, the charge for which shall be indicated to the consumer prior to making disclosure; and for furnishing
notifications, statements, summaries, or codifications to person designated by the consumer pursuant to section 1681i(d) of this title, the
charge for which shall be indicated to the consumer prior to furnishing
such information and shall not exceed the charge that the consumer
reporting agency would impose on each designated recipient for a consumer report except that no charge may be made for notifying such
persons of the deletion of information which is found to be inaccurate
or which can no longer be verified.
Pub.L. 90-321, Title VI, § 612, as added Pub.L. 91-508, Title VI,, § 601,
Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1132.
§ 1681k.

Public record information for employment purposes

A consumer reporting agency which furnishes a consumer report for
employment purposes and which for that purpose compiles and reports
items of information on consumers which are matters of public record
and are likely to have an adverse effect upon a consumer's ability to
obtain employment shall(1) at the time such public record information is reported to
the user of such consumer report, notify the consumer of the fact
that public record information is being reported by the consumer
reporting agency, together with the name and address of the person
to whom such information is being reported; or
(2) maintain strict procedures designated to insure that whenever public record information which is likely to have an adverse
effect on a consumer's ability to obtain employment is reported
it is complete and up to date. For purposes of this paragraph,
items of public record relating to arrests, indictments, convictions,
suits, tax liens. and outstanding judgments shall be considered up
to date if the current public record status of the item at the time
of the report is reported.
Pub.L. 90-321, Title VI, § 613, as added Pub.L. 91-508, Title, VI, § 601,
Oct. 26. 1970, 84 Stat. 1133.
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§ 16811.

Restrictions on investigative consumer reports

Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares an investigative
consumer report, no adverse information in the consumer report (other
than information which is a matter of public record) may be included
in a subsequent consumer report unless such adverse information has
been verified in the process of making such subsequent consumer report,
or the adverse information was received within the three-month period
preceding the date the subsequent report is furnished.
Pub.L. 90-321, Title VI § 614, as added, Pub.L. 91-508, Title VI, § 601,
Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1133.
§ 1681m. Requirements on users of consumer reports action based on reports of consumer reporting agencies

Adverse

(a) Whenever credit or insurance for personal, family, or household purposes, or employment involving a consumer is denied or the
charge for such credit or insurance is increased either wholly or partly
because of information contained in a consumer report from a consumer
reporting agency, the user of the consumer report shall so advise the
consumer against whom such adverse action has been taken and supply
the name and address of the consumer reporting agency making the
report.
Adverse action based on reports of persons other than consumer
reporting agencies
(b) Whenever credit for personal, family, or household purposes
involving a consumer is denied or the charge for such credit is increased
either wholly or partly because of information obtained from a person
other than a consumer reporting agency bearing upon the consumer's
credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general
reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living, the user of such
information shall, within a reasonable period of time, upon the consumer's written request for the reasons for such adverse action received
within sixty days after learning of such adverse action, disclose the
nature of the information to the consumer. The user of such information shall clearly and accurately disclose to the consumer his right to
make such written request at the time such adverse action is communicated to the consumer.
Reasonable procedures to assure compliance
(c) No person shall be held liable for any violation of this section
if he shows by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the
alleged violation he maintained reasonable procedures to assure compliance with the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section.
Pub.L. 90-321, Title VI, § 615, as added Pub.L. 91-508, Title VI, § 601,
Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1133.
§ 1681n.

Civil liability for willful noncompliance

Any consumer reporting agency or user of information which willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an
amount equal to the sum of(1) any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result
of failure;
(2)

such amount of punitive damages as the court may allow;
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(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce any liability
under this section, the costs of the action together with reasonable
attorney's fees as determined by the court.
Pub.L. 90-321, Title VI, § 616, as added Pub.L. 91-508, Title VI, § 601,
Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1134.
§ 1681o.

Civil liability for negligent noncompliance

Any consumer reporting agency or user of information which is
negligent in failing to comply with any requirement imposed under this
subchapter with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in
an amount equal to the sum of(1) any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result
of the failure;
(2) in the case of any successful action to enforce any liability
under this section, the costs of the action together with reasonable
attorney's fees as determined by the court.
Pub.L. 90-321, Title VI, § 617, as added Pub.L. 91-508, Title VI, § 601,
Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1134.
§ 1681p.

Jurisdiction of courts; limitation of actions

An action to enforce any liability created under this subchapter may
be brought in any appropriate United States district court without regard to the amount in controversy or in any other court of competent
jurisdiction, within two years from the date on which the liability
arises, except that where a defendant has materially and willfully misrepresented any information required under this subchapter to be disclosed to an individual and the information so misrepresented is material to the establishment of the defendant's liability to that individual
under this subchapter, the action may be brought at any time within
two years after discovery by the individual of the misrepresentation.
Pub.L. 90-321, Title VI, § 618, as added Pub.L. 91-508, Title VI, § 601,
Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1134.
§ 1681q.

Obtaining information under false pretenses

Any person who knowingly and willfully obtains information on a
consumer from a consumer reporting agency under false pretenses shall
be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or
both.
Pub.L. 90-321, Title VI, § 619, as added Pub.L. 91-508, Title VI, § 601,
Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1134.
§ 1681r.

Unauthorized disclosures by officers or employees

Any officer or employee of a consumer reporting agency who
knowingly and willfully provides information concerning an individual
from the agency's files to a person not authorized to receive that information shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more
than one year. or both.
Pub.L. 90-321, Title VI, § 620, as added Pub.L. 91-508, Title VI, § 601,
Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1134.
§ 1681s.
powers

Administrative enforcement-Federal

Trade Commission:

(a) Compliance with the requirements imposed under this subchapter shall be enforced under the Federal Trade Commission Act by
the Federal Trade Commission with respect to consumer reporting
agencies and all other persons subject thereto, except to the extent
that enforcement of the requirements imposed under this subchapter

TRANSLATING FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT
is specifically committed to some other government agency under subsection (b) hereof. For the purpose of the exercise by the Federal
Trade Commission of its functions and powers under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, a violation of any requirement or prohibition imposed
under this subchapter shall constitute an unfair or deceptive act or
practice in commerce in violation of section 45(a) of this title and shall
be subject to enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission under section 45(b) of this title with respect to any consumer reporting agency
or person subject to enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission
pursuant to this subsection, irrespective of whether that person is engaged in commerce or meets any other jurisdictional tests in the Federal
Trade Commission Act. The Federal Trade Commission shall have such
procedural, investigative, and enforcement powers, including the power
to issue procedural rules in enforcing compliance with the requirements imposed under this subchapter and to require the filing of reports,
the production of documents, and the appearance of witnesses as though
the applicable terms and conditions of the Federal Trade Commission
Act were part of this subchapter. Any person violating any of the provisions of this subchapter shall be subject to the penalties and entitled
to the privileges and immunities provided in the Federal Trade Commission Act as though the applicable terms and provisions thereof were
part of this subchapter.

Other administrative bodies
(b) Compliance with the requirements imposed under this subchapter with respect to consumer reporting agencies and persons who
use consumer reports from such agencies shall be enforced under(1)

section 1818 of Title 12, in the case of:
(A) national banks, by the Comptroller of the Currency;

(B) member banks of the Federal Reserve System (other
than national banks), by the Federal Reserve Board; and
(C) banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (other than members of the Federal Reserve System), by the
Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
(2) section 1464(d) of Title 12, section 1730 of Title 12, and sections 1426(i) and 1437 of Title 12, by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (acting directly or through the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation), in the case of any institution subject to
any of those provisions;
(3) the Federal Credit Union Act, by the Administrator of the
National Credit Union Administration with respect to any Federal
credit union;
(4) the Acts to regulate commerce, by the Interstate Commerce
Commission with respect to any common carrier subject to those
Acts;
(5) the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, by the Civil Aeronautics
Board with respect to any air carrier or foreign air carrier subject
to that Act; and
(6) the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921 (except as provided in
section 226 of Title 7), by the Secretary of Agriculture with respect
to any activities subject to that Act.
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Enforcement under other authority
(c) For the purpose of the exercise by any agency referred to in
subsection (b) of this section of its powers under any Act referred to in
that subsection, a violation of any requirement imposed under this subchapter shall be deemed to be a violation of a requirement imposed
under that Act. In addition to its powers under any provision of law
specifically referred to in subsection (b) of this section, each of the
agencies referred to in that subsection may exercise, for the purpose of
enforcing compliance with any requirement imposed under this subchapter any other authority conferred on it by law.
Pub.L. 90-321, Title VI, § 621, as added Pub.L. 91-508, Title VI, § 601,
Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1134.
§ 1681t.

Relation to State laws

This subchapter does not annul, alter, affect, or exempt any person
subject to the provisions of this subchapter from complying with the
laws of any State with respect to the collection, distribution, or use of
any information on consumers, except to the extent that those laws are
inconsistent with any provision of this subchapter, and then only to the
extent of the inconsistency.
Pub.L. 90-321, Title VI, § 622, as added Pub.L. 91-508, Title VI, § 601,
Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1136.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF WYMAN V. JAMES:
THE BURGER COURT, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
AND THE PRIVACY OF THE HOME
INTRODUCTION

T

HE legal community, and to a surprising extent the American public, await each decision of the Burger Court with
fear or hopeful expectancy, depending upon individual ideological stance. Will the recent personnel changes spell the end
of the personal liberties which the Warren Court so courageously forged from the unyielding metal of precedent? Will
the right of the state to protect society be freed from the
albatross of "defendant's rights" which the Warren Court
created? The emotional tone of these questions is intentional,
illustrating the primary obstacle to rational analysis of the
decisions being handed down. Each is examined for consonance
with personal philosophy and condemned or applauded on that
basis alone. It is the thesis of this note, and its format, that
no such personal reaction can make any claim to validity
unless it is supported by a sound analysis of the legal background against which a given case appears.
The case to be discussed is Wyman v. James.' It concerned
the widespread practice of caseworker visits to the homes of
welfare recipients. The general area of law involved is the
fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable search
and seizure as applied to administrative action. Pursuant to
the thesis stated above, the history of the area is analyzed at
some length before the principal case is even considered. It
is hoped that Wyman will stand in clear relief against this
background.
One word of caution, since the Burger Court is indeed new
and is applying its constitutional concepts to a body of precedent which may well reflect a very different view, any decision should be looked upon only as an intermediate statement.
The Supreme Court has traditionally moved by evolution rather
than sudden departure. These early cases are of value more
for what they presage than for what they establish.
I.

CASE ANALYSIS

The fourth amendment itself must be the starting point of
any discussion of search and seizure law:
1 400 U.S. 309

(1971).
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

Early cases faced with applying this prohibition relied
heavily on its history to give it meaning. The amendment was
largely a reaction to the hated general warrants issued prior
to the Revolution which authorized unrestricted searches for
evidence of crime." Although no such limitation appears in
the language, it was assumed that the protection applied only
to searches for such evidence, and not to administrative inspections. Even cases extending coverage to proceedings not
strictly criminal were careful to state that the action in preparation for which the search was made must be criminal in
essence or effect. Boyd v. United States3 is the hallmark here.
The fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable search
and seizure was held applicable to a forfeiture proceeding.
The inclusion was accomplished not by extending the boundaries of the amendment, but rather by bringing within the
established area of its protection a form of action spiritually
akin to those criminal actions to which it had traditionally been
applied. Although seemingly expansive, the case served to
reaffirm the criminal/civil distinction in search and seizure
4
cases.
The Court also found a close connection between the
fourth and fifth amendments.
[T]he "unreasonable searches and seizures" condemned by the
Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose
of compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which
in criminal cases is condemned by the Fifth Amendment; and
compelling a man "in a criminal case to be a witness against
himself," which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws
light on the question as to what is an "unreasonable search5
and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

This guideline of reasonableness, coupled with the assumption that the fourth amendment applied only to cases criminal
in essence, left administrative searches virLually ungoverned.
If the purpose or possible result of the search is a legitimate
criterion for judging its conformity with constitutional stand"See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-26 (1886).
3 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
The Boyd case is perhaps unjustifiably maligned in later references back
to its holding. The opinion itself rings with protective sentiment, and a
passage therefrom is quoted at the conclusion of this comment as the
most appropriate attitude for modern courts. However, the case does
preserve a boundary of fourth amendment coverage, and it is to that
concept that later references are made.
116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
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ards, only the most severe administrative penalty will suffice
to trigger the fourth amendment. Indeed, it must amount to
a criminal punishment.
For many years after Boyd the Court did not consider the
criminal/civil border of the fourth amendment. There was,
however, a steady flow of criminal cases involving search and
seizure doctrine. The opinions evidenced increasing concern
with the right of citizens to privacy in their homes. Such a
right was seen as "basic to a free society."" Absent extreme
circumstances, it could not lawfully be abridged without interposing the independent judgment of a magistrate between the
zeal of the law enforcement officer and the privacy of the
individual. 7
6Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
T

The effort here is to portray the "feel" of the opinions rather than the
specific points of law for which they stand. In aid of that effort, rather
lengthy portions of several cases representative of the period are reproduced here.
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925):
The protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to all
equally, - to those justly suspected or accused, as well as to
the innocent. The search of a private dwelling without a warrant is in itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our laws. Id.
at 32.
Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a
search of that place without a warrant. And such searches are
held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing
probable cause. Id. at 33.
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948):
We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a
search warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave
emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police. This was done not
to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for
illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind might
weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the
law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust
to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime
and the arrest of criminals. Power is a heady thing; and history
shows that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted.
And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the
desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the
home. We cannot be true to that constitutional requirement
and excuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional
mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that course
imperative. Id. at 455-56.
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949):
The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion
by the police - which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment
-is
basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in "the
concept of ordered liberty" and as such enforceable against
the States through the Due Process Clause. The knock at the
door, whether by day or by night, as a prelude to a search,
without authority of law but solely on the authority of the
police, did not need the commentary of recent history to be
condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights
enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples. Id. at 27-28.
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The language of these cases was pitched in broad terms
which focused on the intrusiveness rather than the purpose
of the search. True, all the searches considered were designed
to uncover evidence of crime. But the wording of the opinions,
and the spirit behind them, expressed a solicitude for personal
privacy which made the purpose or result of the intrusion seem
secondary. It was the intrusion itself which was offensive
to the fourth amendment.
This trend had developed sufficiently by 1949 to lead the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to assume that
the protection of the fourth amendment was not conditioned
on the purpose of the search. In District of Columbia v.
Little," Judge Prettyman reversed the defendant's criminal conviction for failure to allow a health inspector access to his
home. He expressly rejected the criminal/civil distinction in
phrases that echoed the protective attitude of the criminal cases
mentioned above.
When the Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches, it,
of course, by implication, permits reasonable searches. But
reasonableness without a warrant is adjudged solely by the
extremity of the circumstances of the moment and not by any
general characteristic of the officer or his mission. If an
officer is pursuing a felon who runs into a house and hides,
the officer may follow and arrest him. But this is because
under the exigencies of circumstance the law of pursuit supersedes the rule as to search. There is no doctrine that search
for garbage is reasonable while search for arms, stolen goods
or gambling equipment is not. Moreover, except for the most
urgent of necessities, the question of reasonableness is for a
magistrate and not for the enforcement officer.9
The basic premise of the prohibition against searches
was not protection against self-incrimination; it was the commonlaw right of a man to privacy in his home, a right which is one
of the indispensable ultimate essentials of our concept of civilization. .

.

. It was not related to crime or to suspicion of crime.

... To say that a man suspected of crime has a right to protection against search of his home without a warrant, but that a
man not suspected of crime has no such protection, is a fantastic
absurdity.10
We emphasize that no matter who the officer is or what
his mission, a government official cannot invade a private
home, unless (1) a magistrate has authorized him to do so or
(2) an immediate major crisis in the performance of duty
affords neither time nor opportunity to apply to a magistrate.
This right of privacy is not conditioned upon the objective,
s 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
11Id. at 16.

1l Id. at 16-17.
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the prerogative or the stature of the intruding officer. His
uniform, badge, rank, and the bureau from which he operates
are immaterial. It is immaterial whether he is motivated by
the highest public purpose or by the lowest personal spite. 1

This language is clearly consistent with the principle of
protection of personal privacy from official intrusion established in the criminal cases upon which Judge Prettyman
relied. Just as clearly, it represents the application of that
principle to a context foreign to its birth. The apparent conclusion in Little was that the protection was so fundamental
to our society as to transcend the purpose of the official intrusion. It was a general tenet of the citizen's relationship to
his government, rather than a mere limit on officers of criminal
law enforcement.
On appeal, the Supreme Court did not consider the constitutional issue.' 2 They affirmed the decision on the ground that
Little's conduct was not covered by the statute under which
he was charged. It was not until 1959 in Frank v. Maryland"
that the Court squarely confronted the problem of administrative searches.
A Baltimore health inspector, acting pursuant to statutory
authority and with probable cause to suspect violation of the
health code, requested and was denied permission to inspect
defendant's house for evidence of rodent infestation. Refusal
to allow inspection was a misdemeanor under Maryland law.
The Supreme Court declined to follow the direction taken in
Little. Rather than regarding all official intrusions as unreassonable unless supported in the particular instance by a warrant or extenuating facts, they undertook a balancing of the
interests involved to determine the reasonableness in general
14
of this type of intrusion.
In arriving at a balance, the Court considered four factors.
First, the history of the fourth amendment indicates that it
was primarily concerned with searches for evidence of crime.
Boyd was cited for the proposition that the self-incrimination
clause of the fifth amendment is the usual measure of unreasonableness under the fourth. Although this historical alliance
was not an unyielding limit on the fourth amendment, it did
indicate that the rights invaded here were, at best, on the
11 Id. at 17.
12 District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
3 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
14 Id. "Application of the broad restraints of due process compels inquiry
into the nature of the demand being made upon individual freedom in
a particular context and the justification of social need on which the
demand rests." Id. at 363.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 48

"periphery" of the area protected. Second, the inspections
contemplated by the statute in question were hedged about
with safeguards. The inspector must have valid grounds to
suspect that a nuisance exists; inspection must be made in
the day time; the inspector cannot force entry if permission
to inspect is denied. These requirements tended to minimize
the intrusion involved. Third, the power to inspect in connection with enforcement of health codes had a long history
in Maryland. Two hundred years of acceptance by a free
people would make any practice seem reasonable. Fourth, the
importance of efficient health code enforcement has grown
apace with the mushrooming cities and their inevitable slums.
To deprive local goverment of the power to inspect would
cripple enforcement efforts.
These considerations tipped the balance in favor of the
constitutionality of warrantless health inspections. The outcome was predetermined by the approach. The factors considered are, for the most part, those which make the warrant
procedure a permissible exception, embodied in the fourth
amendment, to the general prohibition against governmental
intrusion, i.e., e.g., society has a paramount interest in preventing and punishing crime and therefore searches necessary to
the vindication of that interest are reasonable. But the Constitution not only allows this exception, it piovides certain controls on its exercise. Those who would use it must demonstrate, by showing probable cause in support of a warrant,
that this particular search will truly serve the interest which
is the basis of the exception.
Case law has created several exceptions to the exception. 15
For example, a warrantless search is reasonable if made in7
cident to a valid arrest," ; in hot pursuit of a criminal,' under
15 These exceptions prove troublesome to consistent analysis throughout the
paper. They are undeniably searches which can be made without a warrant. No claim is made that they are absolutely reconcilable with the
fourth amendment. However, it is felt that these exceptions to the warrant requirement are of a different magnitude than the broad power
given in Frank to search without considering the need for a warrant.
Each recognizes the right of privacy of the person searched but allows
a warrantless intrusion either because the exigencies of the situation
demand it or because in that situation the right of privacy no longer
exists, No such claim can be made for the Frank holding.
14 E.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). This exception is perhaps
the most troublesome of all. Without undertaking an elaborate analysis,
it would seem that cne's right to privacy is something of a nullity once
he has been validly arrested. In Chimel the Court greatly narrowed the
permissible scope of a search ma-ie incident to arrest. Officers can search
the area within the reach of the person arrested to protect themselves
and to prevent destruction of evidence. No further search is allowed.
Thus, privacy is invaded only to the extent to which it is lost by virtue
of the arrest.
17 E.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).

IMPLICATIONS OF WYMAN V. JAMES

valid consent,1 8 to prevent loss of evidence," to protect the
life of the officer,'2"' etc. It might appear that Frank has
merely added another to this list - administrative searches.
But notice that the holding in Frank is on another level altogether. The exceptions to the warrant requirement listed above
are just that - searches which, but for the special circumstances in that particular case, would have required a warrant.
Frank created not another exception to the warrant requirement, but an exception coequal with the warrant requirement.
To wit: An official invasion of personal privacy is unreasonable unless (1) it is supported by a warrant or justified by
one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement or, (2) it is
an administrative search. Stated differently, a criminal search,
if reasonable in particular, is reasonable in general, and therefore reasonable as a whole. An administrative search is reasonable.
The Court apparently felt justified in this holding by
the safeguards which the statute imposed upon the search.
They closely resemble those which are supplied by a warrant.
A warrant will issue only on a showing of probable cause;
the inspector must have reasonable grounds to suspect that
a nuisance exists. But here is the crucial difference, in a
search requiring a warrant, an impartial magistrate must
review the facts adduced in support of the proposed search to
guard against the possibility that improper considerations will
play a part in the decision; in an administrative search, the
inspector on the street decides. The fo.rmer is the only effective way to prevent misuse of power. Manifestly, the fourth
amendment was to guard against, rather than to punish for,
violations of personal privacy. Even accepting the Court's
definition of reasonable, Frank withholds from potential victims of unreasonable administrative searches their only real
protection.
Justice Douglas, writing for a group of four dissenters,
proposed a more flexible solution. He favored requiring a
warrant, but adjusting the standard of probable cause to fit
the situation. The facto.rs justifying an administrative investigation are clearly distinguishable from those which sup-

is E.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Amos v. United States,
225 U.S.313 (1921).
19 E.g., Schmerber v.California, 384 U.S.757 (1966).
20 E.g., Terry v.Ohio,392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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port a criminal search. Probable cause for the issuance of an
administrative warrant should therefore be tailored to reflect
these differences.
Experience may show the need for periodic inspections of
certain facilities without a further showing of cause to believe
that substandard conditions dangerous to the public are being
maintained. The passage of a certain period without inspection might of itself be sufficient in a given situation to justify
the issuance of a warrant. The test of "probable cause"
required by the Fourth Amendment 2can take into account the
nature of the search that is sought. 1
The Douglas approach provides a mutual accommodation
which attempts to serve both the interest of the people and
that of the state. A warrant is required, thus protecting personal privacy, but the special level of probable cause allows a
warrant to be simply obtained given administrative regularity.
Both majority and dissenting opinions balance interests, but
the effort of the latter is to adjust so as to bring the balance
to equilibrium. The majority weighs, judges one more weighty,
and gives it vent over the other.
The philosophy of the Frank majority was followed
the next year in Eaton v. Price.22 A state court decision-' was affirmed by an equally divided Court, Mr. Justice
Stewart taking no part in the case. Mr. Justice Brennan wrote
an extraordinary opinion "'4 for the same group which had dissented in Frank. The opinion pointed out that the facts in
Eaton were living proof of the dangers inherent in the Frank
doctrine. A housing inspector, without a warrant or even
proper credentials, had demanded access to Earl Taylor's
house. 2 He failed to offer any justification for the inspection
at the time and in court relying instead on his naked statutory
authority to enter any dwelling he chose. The probable cause
in Frank was glaringly absent.2 6 For all that appeared in the
reccrd, the inspector could have been acting on purely personal
considerations.
!1 359 U.S. 360, 383 (1959).
22 364 U.S. 263 (1960).
2: Eaton v. Price, 168 Ohio St. 123, 151 N.E.2d 523 (1958).
:4 In cases involving an evenly divided Court, no opinion or voting breakdown is usually given.
25 The opinion quoted at length the conversations between Mr. Taylor and
the inspector. Mr. Taylor's folksy defense of his right to preserve his
home inviolate was enough to bring visions of the Fathers to judicial
heads,
6 Both facts sufficient to constitute probable cause and statutory language
that would require it were missing in this case, so also were the other
safeguards found in Frank.
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Justice Brennan looked to Little as the proper treatment
of administrative investigations and renewed the insistence
on a warrant supported by an adjusted standard of probable
cause. With this factual demonstration that the protections
supposed to exist in Frank were wholly illusory, further adherence to that case could not be comprehended.
After Frank and Eaton the law of administrative searches
lay dormant for almost a decade."7 However, the period was
far from unimportant. "' Justices Whittaker and Frankfurter,
the authors of the concurring and majority opinions in Frank,
left the Court and were replaced by Justices White and
Fortas."1 This change in personnel, and in personality, was
telling when next the Court considered the constitutionality
of warrantless inspections. In 1967 the minority view in Frank

27 While it is true that the Supreme Court took no action in this area, the

California Supreme Court handed down a case in 1967 which deserves
consideration, if only in a footnote. Parrish v. Civil Service Comm'n, 66
Cal. App. 2d 260, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623, 425 P.2d 223 (1967), involved the infamous midnight welfare raid. Plaintiff, an employee of the welfare
agency, was dismissed for insubordination after he refused to participate
in a planned raid known as "Operation Weekend." The object was to
swoop down on the homes of welfare recipients during sleeping hours to
see if unauthorized males were occupying fatherly positions in supposedly
fatherless families. The plaintiff's contention was that these raids were
illegal, and that he could not be dismissed for refusing to take part. The
California court agreed. They assumed that Frank had created an exception to the warrant requirement based on "a distinction between searches
directed to the procurement of evidence of crime and searches aimed
toward the advancement of the general welfare by means other than
criminal prosecutions (footnote omitted)." Id. at 264, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 627,
425 P.2d at 227. But Frank was distinguished on four grounds which are
especially interesting when compared to the holding in Eaton and that
in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), discussed later in the text (see
text p. 103 infra). First, the court found that these midnight raids were
more nearly criminal searches than that in Frank since the latter could
only result in punishment if the nuisance discovered by the search was
not abated after issuance of a court order. Welfare raids could uncover
evidence of fraud which without more forms the basis of a criminal
prosecution. Second, the loss of benefits which was the consequence of
discovered fraud is a forfeiture, criminal in nature, and therefore not
within the Frank exception. Third, the statutory requirement of valid
grounds to suspect a violation was not present here - houses were raided
indiscriminately. Fourth, the procedural safeguards were also absent.
The third and fourth of these considerations had been equally true
in Eaton. The first and second are discussed, with exactly the opposite
conclusion, in Wyman. The California court, obviously no fan of the
Frank doctrine, used all four in combination to escape its effect. In all
probability, the severity of this case would have driven even the Frank
majority past the limit of their doctrine.
c In addition to the personnel changes described in the text, this period
saw the decision of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). That
now famous case elevated the right of privacy to constitutional status not
dependent on any invasion of purely fourth amendment rights. The
continuing advancement of privacy in the judicial scale of values could
not help but carry over into search and seizure law.
2!1 To be true to chronology. Justice Frankfurter was replaced by Justice
Goldberg in 1962 and Justice Goldberg, in turn, by Justice Fortas in 1965.
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carried the day in the companion cases of Camara v. Municipal
Court30 and See v. Seattle.3 1
In Camara, appellant had repeatedly refused to permit a
housing inspector, acting pursuant to statutory authority but
without a warrant, to enter his home. He was charged with
violating the inspection statute, and unsuccessfully sought a
writ of prohibition in the state courts. The District Court of
Appeals of California ,32 in conformity with Frank, "held that
[the municipal statute authorizing inspection] does not violate
fourth amendment rights because it 'is part of a regulatory
scheme which is essentially civil rather than criminal in
nature, inasmuch as this section creates a right of inspection
which is limited in scope and may not be exercised under unreasonable conditions.' '":3 The Supreme Court reversed.
Mr. Justice White's opinion reflects a basic departure from
the Frank approach.
Though there has been general agreement as to the fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment, translation of the
abstract prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures" into workable guidelines for the decision of particular
cases is a difficult task which has for many years divided the
members of this Court. Nevertheless, one governing principle,
justified by history and by current experience, has consistently
been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of
cases, a search of private property without proper consent is
"unreasonable" unless it has been authorized by a valid search
34
warrant.
The outcome is predictable. Prime importance is to be placed
on the warrant requirement rather than on some far-reaching
judicial notion of the reasonableness of a whole class of
searches.
The Court proceeded to reexamine the factors which had
persuaded the Frank majority. The first is the most important.
Frank had held that because of the close historical connection
between the fou.rth and fifth amendments, the rights affected
by administrative inspections were only "peripheral." Since
the object was not to uncover evidence of crime, the interest
of "self-protection" embodied in the two amendments was not
involved, but only the "less intense" right to be secure from
intrusion into personal privacy. Justice White agreed that
inspections represent a less hostile intrusion; nevertheless, he
30 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
31 Id. at 541.
32

33
34

Camara v. Municipal Court, 237 Cal. App. 2d 128, 46 Cal. Rptr. 585 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1965).
387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
Id. at 528-29.
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could not subscribe to the view that only "peripheral" rights
were affected. Every citizen has a real interest in limiting
the occasions upon which official intrusion is permissible.
"It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his
private property are fully protected by the fourth amendment
only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior." 5
Compare the view of the fourth amendment taken here
to those found in past cases. We have seen an evolution in
judicial attitude. Throughout, the fourth has been acknowledged to have a dual purpose: (1) to protect fifth amendment
rights against self-incrimination from being compromised
through violation of fourth amendment rights, and (2) to protect the rights of the individual to be free of unwarranted
official invasion of privacy. But the relative weight given each
of these factors has varied. In Boyd, the first was considered
the limit of the second. In Frank, the first, though not an
absolute limit, was clearly ascendant. The second was only
peripheral. Camara, echoing Little, gave independent status
to the personal privacy aspect. For the first time, an invasion of either of the interests protected by the fourth amendment was held sufficient to condemn a warrantless search.
The Court then considered, in light of this view, the other
justifications offered in support of the inspection statute. First,
the inspections are "designed to make the least possible demand on the individual occupant." They are hedged with procedural safeguards (similar to those in Frank) and the inspector's decision to enter must be reasonable even though he need
not obtain a warrant. Second, the warrant procedure could
not function effectively here since the decision to inspect an
area is based on legislative consideration of broad factors not
properly reviewable by a magistrate. The most stringent requirement of an administrative warrant would be obtaining
the judge's rubber stamp.
These are the arguments of the Frank majority. They are
rejected.
In our opinion these arguments unduly discount the purpose behind the warrant requirement contemplated by the
Fourth Amendment. Under the present system, when the inspector demands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing
whether enforcement of the municipal code involved requires
inspection of his premises, no way of knowing the lawful
limits of the inspector's power to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under proper
authorization. These are questions which may be reviewed by
35 Id. at 530.
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a neutral magistrate without any reassessment of the basic
agency decision to canvass an area. . . . The practical effect
of this system is to leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the field. This is precisely the discretion
to invade private property which we have consistently circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant the need to search. . . . We simply cannot say that the
protections provided by the warrent procedure are not needed
in this context; broad statutory safeguards are no substitute
for individualized review, particularly when those safeguards
36
may only be invoked at the risk of a criminal penalty.

Finally, it was argued that the public interest in effective
enforcement of health and safety laws demands that such
inspections be permitted. The Court agreed. But, "[i]n assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a general exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement, the question is not whether the public interest justifies
the type of search in question, but whether the authority to
search should be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the
search.":"7

The Court adopted the warrant requirement urged by the
Frank dissent. Probable cause could be supplied by a showing
of adminstrative regularity. The Frank exception was gone
and along with it
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31; Id. at 532-33.
Id. at 533.
8, Again it must be stressed that such doctrinaire statements are hazarded
only because we deal with the most basic element of the fourth amendment - the reasonableness of a search at its inception. Many of the incidents of the fourth amendment can be judicially varied with no loss of
purity. But the basic command is that unreasonable searches are not
permitted, and reasonableness in a particular instance is a function of
the wairant procedure. including its exceptions. There is no way consistent with this basic command to separate and forgive either of these
requirements. The only logical exceptions, and these, it must be admitted,
have no basis in fourth amendment language, are those which involve
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to both halves of the fourth amendment in criminal and admin39
istrative searches.
One wishes that the story ended here. It does not. We
have yet to treat the case which is the occasion of this note,
Wyman v. James.40 New York law requires periodic caseworker
a waiver of the rights which would otherwise be violated or special
circumstances in which pause to obtain a warrant would frustrate the
purpose of the search. All of these exceptions excuse the need to obtain
a warrant in that particular case. They are alternative means of judging
reasonableness in particular. They do not excuse the need that such a
judgment be made in the future. No such claim can be made for the
Frank holding.
The author is not unaware of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),
which would seem to belie the all or nothing concept of the fourth
amendment attributed to the Warren Court. It was there recognized that
the problems encountered by policemen on the street are not always so
kind as to mold themselves into some convenient constitutional form.
Various street encounters call for varied police response. A "stop and
frisk" is made for the purpose of preventing crime and is clearly not
as intrusive as a full scale arrest and station house search. The two
should not be subject to the same rules. Consequently the Court adjusted
the probable cause standard downward to reflect the purpose and
necessity of the stop and frisk. In regard to the warrant requirement,
the Court pointed out that it is completely impractical in this type of
situation where the officer is dealing with people he believes to be on
the verge of committing a crime. It is very important to keep the exception to the warrant requirement separate from the adjusted probable
cause. The former is squarely in line with the other exceptions we have
seen. It depends upon an emergency situation which does not allow both
the warrant and the search. The latter, to borrow Justice Douglas' words
in Frank, is an example of probable cause taking "into account the nature
of the search that is sought."
Terry represents the intersection of the line of cases creating excepticns to the warrant requirement and the Camara principle of adjusted
probable cause. Both Camaraand Terry are manifestations of the Warren
Court's rejection of the all-or-nothing conception of searches, i.e., an intrusion is either a search requiring traditional probable cause or a nothing
reauiring nothing, and their adherence to the all-or-nothing application
of the fourth amendment. The effort is always to accommodate the interest of the state in law enforcement, civil and criminal, and the interest
of the citizenry in being free of official interference.
39 See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), billed earlier as Camara's companion,
is not discussed here. It applied principles much like those in Camara
to the inspection of commercial facilities. From See onward a line of
cases developed regarding such inspections, but they are not strictly
relevant to this discussion. The rights of privacy involved in commercial
facilities are obviously not commensurate with those enjoyed in the
home. For an analysis of these cases see Sonnenreich and Pinco, The
Inspector Knocks: Administrative Inspection Warrants Under an Expanded Fourth Amendment, 24 Sw. L. J. 418 (1970).
40 Before we do, it will be helpful to look briefly at one other case decided
by the Camara Court. Although it does not deal with administrative
inspections, it is indicative of the Court's attitude toward governmental
intrusions. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), overruled earlier
cases which had found some physical invasion of a "constitutionally protected area" necessary to constitute a search. In Katz, any situation in
which the defendant had a "reasonable expectation of privacy" was
sufficient to cloak him with the protection of the fourth amendment.
The effect was to divorce the amendment from its former dependence
on property rights and notions of trespass. The Constitution protects
people, not places. Further, there need not be a physical invasion at all.
Scientific devices which project the senses of agents into protected situations are perfectly capable of effecting a search. If electronic eavesdropping in places other than the home can be a search, it is difficult to
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visits to the home of each recipient of state aid to families
with dependent children (AFDC). Plaintiff, Barbara James, by
virtue of her son Maurice, had been receiving AFDC benefits
for 2 years prior to the dispute from which this case arose. At
the time her eligibility was first established, a caseworker visited
her home without objection.
On May 8, 1969, Mrs. James was notified that another visit
would be made on May 14. She telephoned the worker that
she would be willing to supply any information reasonable
and relevant to her continued receipt of assistance but that
any such meeting could not take place at her home. The
worker informed he.r that home visits were required by law
and refusal to allow the visit would mean termination of
assistance. Mrs. James was adamant.
The agency then notified plaintiff of its intent to discontinue assistance. Mrs. James requested and received a hearing
at which she had benefit of counsel. The review officer upheld
the decision to terminate. Plaintiff thereupon instituted a civil
rights suit under 42 U.S:C. § 1983 on behalf of herself, her son,
and all other persons similarly situated. She sought both
declaratory and injunctive relief.
4
Two opinions need to be considered: James v. Goldberg
(hereinafter James) in the district court, and Wyman v.
James4 2 (hereinafter Wyman) on appeal to the Supreme Court.

The James court found for the plaintiff. Their opinion was
a routine and very much to be expected application of Camara.
The court saw three issues, which for present purposes can be
condensed to two: (1) are warrantless home visits "unreasonable searches" so as to fall under the fourth amendment, and
(2) "assuming that [(1) is] answered in the affirmative, may
the State condition the initial and continuing receipt of AFDC
benefits upon a waiver of rights embodied in the fourth
43
amendment ?
For convenience, we can dispose of (2) first. It is taken
as settled law, for the moment at least, that the state cannot
require the waiver of a constitutional right as a condition to
imagine a situation in which the actual physical entry into a home would
not be so classified.
41 303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). prob. juris. noted, 397 U.S. 904 (1970).
42 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
4:303 F. Supp. 935, 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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the receipt of any benefit - be it right or privilege. 4 Therefore, the answer to (1) will automatically decide (2). If warrantless home visits are unreasonable searches, then the receipt
of AFDC benefits cannot be conditioned upon waiver of the
rights violated. If they are not, then there is no constitutional
right to be waived.
The first issue may be further distilled. It has two elements which were not separated in the James opinion. First,
are home visits "searches," and second, if so, are such searches
when made without a warrant "unreasonable. ' '4 , These "subissues" offer the Court the opportunity to find for the defense
in either of two ways: (1) to find, as under Boyd, that the
fourth amendment does not apply at all to this type of intrusion, or (2) to apply only half of the amendment to home
visits, i.e., to find, as in Frank, that they are reasonable and
then not impose the warrant requirement.
As to the applicability of the fourth amendment, the state
argued that the home visit could not be called a "search." Its
purpose is to verify information as to eligibility and to assure
that all needed services are being provided, not to search for
evidence of crime or fraud. Besides, continued the argument,
there may have been fraud in the procurement of benefits
which could not otherwise be uncovered. The contradiction in
the last two statements was not lost on the court.
No thorough attempt is made to document this proposition, not for lack
of belief in its accuracy, but because it can have no real effect on the
central i-sue. Before it can come into play, there must be a determination that constitutional rights are involved. It is upon this determination
that the discussion is focused. For discussions of the unconstitutional
condition issue see French, Comments: Unconstitutional Conditions: An
Analysis, 50 GEO. L.J. 234 (1961); Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and
Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 321 (1935); Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 1439 (1968); O'Neill, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 443 (1966).
45 Since the two "subissues" are not separately considered in the opinion,
efforts to choose judicial language sufficient to dispose cleanly of one
or the other are somewhat strained. Many defense arguments which the
court refers to in considering whether home visits are searches look very
much like those offered in Frank and Camara to support the reasonableness of an admitted search. Others deal more explicitly with the "searchness" of the intrusion. The combination of these two types of argument
under a single question may reflect trial tactics. After Camara it would
seem futile to argue, in the lower court at least, that an intrusion, though
covered by the fourth amendment, was reasonable without a warrant.
The more promising attack would be to attempt to qualitatively differentiate welfare home visits from administrative inspections and all other
intrusions heretofore labeled "search." For if the warrant requirement
is the inevitable concomitant of fourth amendment applicability, the
only way to avcid the former is to escape the latter. Whatever the reason
for unified treatment, there are present two distinct types of argument,
and they are treated separately in the text. It is felt thai what is lost
in precision is compensated for by increased convenience in comparison
to past cases.
44

VOL. 48

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

The Fourth Amendment . . . governs all intrusions by agents
of the public upon personal privacy and security. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889, n.15
(1968). Any unauthorized physical penetration into the premises occupied by plaintiff is a search. In view of the fact that
recent cases have expanded the scope of the Amendment so
as to eliminate the necessity for a finding of an actual physi-cal trespass upon a constitutionally protected area, Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41, 50-53, 87 S.Ct. 1873, L.Ed. 2d 1040
(1967) and cases cited therein, defendant's restrictive argument
46
[that home visits are not searches] would appear frivolous.
Like most of the Bill of Rights, the Fourth Amendment was
not designed to be a shelter for criminals, but a basic protection for everyone..... "It is the individual's interest in
privacy which the Amendment protects, and that would not
officers."
appear to fluctuate with the 'intent' of the invading
T
Abel v. United States, [362 U.S. 217, 255 (1960)].4

Similar treatment was afforded arguments designed to
show that these visits, even without a warrant, were reasonable and therefore not condemned by the fourth amendment.
In addition to the "purpose" arguments given above, the
attorney general pointed to the procedural safeguards which
surrounded the search 4 and the public importance of home
visits for effective administration of the welfare laws. The
court was unimpressed.
"Except in certain carefully defined classes of cases (footwar-
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Camara was cited for the proposition that the com-

munity interest in "inspection programs [is] not superior to
the important interests safeguarded by the fourth amendment's protection against official intrusion."

51

After discussing the question of unconstitutional conditions
the court turned more explicitly to the warrant requirement.
The public interest may demand creation of a general
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement
46 303 F. Supp. 935, 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).

4 Id. at 941. The Court quoted passages from Little to the same effect.
IS 303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). "[C]aseworkers are instructed not to
enter the home of an applicant for or recipient of benefits 'without permission by force, or under false pretenses, and not to make a search of
rd. at 940 (footnotes
the home by looking into closets and drawers."
omitted).
49 Id. at 940.
5,o
Id. at 942.
31 Id. at 941.
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only when it can be demonstrated "that there are available no
alternative means less subversive of constitutional right, narrowly drawn so as to correlate more closely with the purposes
contemplated by conferring the benefit." Parrish v. Civil Service Comm'n of the County of Alameda [66 Cal. 2d 260, 425
P.2d 223 (1967)]. . . . This court cannot with deference to the

Fourth Amendment excuse the absence of a search warrant
without a showing by those who seek exemption from the

constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation
make that course imperative52

Several alternative means of obtaining the information
supposedly sought in home visits were listed, and if these
failed, a warrant based on a Camara-like standard of probable
cause was authorized.
Notice what the court is saying. As long as alternatives
are available, no visit can be made (a warrant should not
issue). Such a visit would be unreasonable because unnecessary.
Only when the alternatives have been exhausted is any intrusion justified. This puts the welfare agency to the test. If
the purpose is really to determine eligibility, then a home visit
will rarely be indispensable. If, on the other hand, the motive
is discovery of fraud, the agency will not be able to hide
behind an administrative warrant. The opinion noted that
since caseworkers are under a statutory duty to report suspected fraud, the latter element is not completely absent from
any home visit.
In all, James reached a result which, given Camara, was
entirely predictable. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed.
But this was not the same Supreme Court which had heard
Camara. In 1967 Mr. Justice Clark retired and was replaced
by Mr. Justice Marshall, a man of more liberal leanings.
However, in 1969 Justice Fortas and Chief Justice Warren
retired, being replaced by Chief Justice Burger and, after
protracted wranglings, Justice Blackmun. The personality of
the Court had changed by the time the Wyman decision was
rendered.
The issues in Wyman are, of course, the same as in James.
Are home visits searches; if so, are they unreasonable; and, if
so, may AFDC benefits be terminated upon refusal to allow a
visit? James answered the first two in the affirmative and
the third in the negative. In alternative holdings, Wyman
answered both the first and second in the negative and therefore did not reach the third.
52 Id. at 943.
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The Wyman opinion begins with a strong statement of the
judicial tradition of jealous protection for fourth amendment
rights.5 3 We see again the Camara language that, except in
carefully defined classes of cases, any search without a warrant
or consent is unreasonable. Further, one's fourth amendment
rights do not depend upon suspicion of criminal behavior.
Up to this point, all is as it was in James. Indeed, these
propositions alone would have supported affirmance. But the
opinion goes on to say that the traditional protective attitude
is not a factor here "for the seemingly obvious and simple
reason" that no search as contemplated by the fourth amendment is involved.5 4 Lest the import of this holding slip past,
let it be repeated: A caseworker home visit - an "unauthorized physical penetration into" 55 the AFDC recipient's home
by an agent of the government - is not a search, and therefore not covered by the fourth amendment. After Camara
and Katz (see note 40 supra) it is surprising to learn that any
intrusion into personal privacy, let alone the privacy of the
home, is not a search. Perhaps the biggest surprise is that
what few reasons the Court gives in support of its conclusion
smack more of Boyd even than of Frank. For although a
Frank-type determination of the reasonableness of home visits
is later given, it is clearly an alternative ground of decision.
The primary holding centers, as in Boyd, on the criminal law
concept of searches. "It is . . . true that the caseworker's
posture is perhaps, in a sense, both rehabilitative and investigative. But this latter aspect, we think, is given too broad a
character and far more emphasis than it deserves if it is equated with a search in the traditional criminal law context."5 6
It is not difficult to quarrel with the Court's conception
of home visits. If caseworkers have a statutory duty to report
evidence of fraud in obtaining benefits, and state laws make
such fraud a crime, then a home visit is more than "perhaps,
in a sense" investigative. At the same time, it is easy to see
what the Court is driving at. There is a distinction, not in a
legal theory but in commo, sense, between a search or inspec53

Even making a sincere effort to ignore personal predilection, it must be

said that the Wyman opinion defies rational analysis. The best that can
be had is a presentation of the opinion as it appears, coupled with efforts
to assess the effect of each section.
54 This is the same "seemingly obvious and simple" argument that was
characterized as "frivolous" in James.
5 The quoted phrase is from James, and was there used to describe that
which is always a search.
.5 400 U.S. at 309, 317 (1971).
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tion of a house and the friendly visit of a concerned family
counselor. Based on this distinction, the fourth amendment
was held inapplicable to welfare visits. But the friendly visit
of a counselor is not what the Wyman facts portray. Constitutional rights come into play when the visit and the counseling
are unwanted. The picture then is conflict, not friendship.
Whatever the merit of the Court's reasoning, the fact remains that the coverage of the fourth amendment has been
limited. It applies only to intrusions which are searches. The
"searchness" of an intrusion depends upon the posture of the
intruder. If he is looking for statutory violations, civil or
criminal, his posture is investigative and he is conducting a
search. If, on the other hand, his sole, or even primary, objective is to counsel, his posture is rehabilitative and no search
is involved. The scale by which posture is measured is a search
in the traditional criminal law context. It will be recalled
that in Camara the purpose of the agent, for which posture
is surely just another word, was deemed irrelevant.
Almost as startling as the holding is the aplomb with
which it is given. The entire matter takes but a paragraph.
Not a single authority is cited. It rests solely on a policy
decision that the fourth amendment should not apply because
these visits are not really searches.
The Court touches two other factors in its primary holding
which are also used later to distinguish Camara and See.
These two cases, it is said, involved "true searches," presumably because of the investigative posture of the inspector.
Further, they arose out of criminal prosecutions for refusal
to permit inspections. Mrs. James faced no such threat. When
she denied permission to visit, there was no entry of her home
and therefore no search. The sole consequence was termination of AFDC benefits. If Mrs. James were being prosecuted
criminally for her action, these cases "would have conceivable
pertinency."
To be frank, the logic and relevance of this argument
escapes the author. Once Camara has been distinguished on
the basis of posture, of what moment are the other facts given?
Just as in Wyman, when permission to inspect was denied in
Camara, no inspection was made. The only concrete difference
is the penalty attached. If the Court is saying that an intrusion is a search because of the consequences of refusing to
allow it, they are announcing a novel doctrine indeed. Even
assuming that they are, the relative gravity of the loss of
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one's sole source of income as compared to a municipal fine
would not seem to support such a doctrine in this case. What
they are probably saying is that although home visits are not
searches and do not violate fourth amendment rights, refusal
to allow a visit cannot be made a crime. If no constitutional
rights are involved, why not? There is no satisfactory answer.
The criminal penalty/loss of benefits distinction is a convenient way of distinguishing past cases and at the same time
giving an idea of the limits of the "true search" doctrine. The
presence of these limits betrays a lack of confidence in the
flat assertion that the fourth amendment is not a part of the
conflict between the individual dual and the state in welfare
home visits.
The most obvious manifestation of insecurity about the
primary holding is the fact that the Court went on to supply
an independently sufficient alternative ground of decision. It
begins with the equivocal statement that even if it is assumed
"that a caseworker's home visit . .. somehow . . .and despite
its interview nature, does possess some of the characteristics
of a search in the traditional sense, we nevertheless conclude
that the visit does not fall within the fourth amendment's
proscription. This is because it does not descend to the level
of unreasonableness.1'5 7 Then follows a list of some eleven
factors which demonstrate the not unreasonable nature of
home visits. Suffice it to say that the list contains all of the
justifications offered in Frank and Camara - public need, procedural safeguards, not for the purpose of uncovering evidence
of crime, inappropriateness of the warrant procedure - plus
a few more unique to the welfare context - need to protect
the child, need to assure proper use of tax funds, must visit
to properly counsel, etc. The sum of these factors is reasonableness in the mathematics of the Court, and therefore no
warrant is -required. Since the assumed search is not unreasonable, no constitutional rights are put on the block as a
condition to receipt of benefits, and so AFDC benefits can be
terminated if permission to visit is refused. The midnight
raid type of welfare operation is specifically exempted, that
being "another question for another day."
Rather than quibble with the truth of the "reasonableness
factors," the more enlightening effort is to assess what the
Court has done by considering them at all, regardless of their
57 Id.

at 318.
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merit. Similar arguments in Camara were attended by little
success. The question was not whether an intrusion could be
made, but whether it could be made without a warrant. These
reasonableness arguments speak only to what the question
was not, i.e., because of these factors a home visit is reasonable in general, but nothing is known about its reasonableness
in particular. By allowing satisfaction of the first half of the
fourth amendment to suffice for the whole, the Court returned
to the Frank position on a more narrow plane. Not administrative searches, but only welfare home visits are excepted from
the warrant requirement.
Although this second holding is given in the alternative,
it is certainly sufficient on its own to dictate the Wyman
result.58 For which proposition does Wyman stand? Are caseworker visits not searches, or are they reasonable searches?
The former is clearly the primary holding, but it is inconceivable, especially in view of the distinction made between
criminal penalties and loss of AFDC benefits, that home visits
can never involve fourth amendment rights. Perhaps future
cases will determine which of the Wyman arguments is the
"true" view of home visits. From the standpoint of the welfare recipient, the legal theory upon which their benefits are
terminated is of little importance.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Two constructs of the fourth amendment can be assembled
from the cases examined. Although we have seen more than
two distinct results, each falls under one of two conceptions
of the amendment's prohibition against unreasonable search
and seizure. The dividing line is the view taken of the warrant requirement. For convenience, the reference will be to
the Camara and Wyman views.
In Camara, the fourth amendment appears as one of the
major tenets of the individuals relationship with the state.
As was said in Little, the amendment is not a limit imposed
on some preexisting power of the state to intrude, but rather
an expression of the right, inherent in the people, to be absolutely free from governmental intrusion. A necessary exception to this right is made in the warrant procedure. This is
,s Support for the independency of the alternative holding is found in the
vote of Justice White. He concurred in the decision and with the opinion
excluding that portion which contained the primary holding. This is a
curious vote for the author of the Camara opinion when it is remembered
what the question there was not.
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a grant of power to intrude pursuant to an established procedure, and, therefore, any intrusion not so made is ultra
vires the government. It is absolutely powerless to act outside
Such an interpretation transcends
the warrant procedure.-_
any consideration of purpose, nature, extent, etc. The fourth
amendment embodies a personal right which inheres in every
individual and governs all of his contacts with the state. If
the state has a reasonable need to intrude, then it is provided
for in the warrant exception.
The Wyman conception of fourth amendment rights is
more difficult to assess. All the traditional statements of
reverence are intoned like a liturgy at the first of the opinion,
yet the result is to the contrary no matter which holding is
chosen. The fundamental difference in the Camara and
Wyman views is that the latter does not regard the warrant
procedure as a grant of the only permissible power to intrude.
In the primary holding, the warrant requirement is not a
factor at all in certain types of intrusions. The boundary of
coverage is for the moment unimportant. What is important
is that a boundary can be drawn. The alternative holding sees
the warrant requirement as a fungible means of control on
government power, which may, in appropriate cases, be replaced by an advance judicial determination of reasonableness
The Court is free to decide which intrusions are subject to
which control. Again, although the two holdings take different routes to the same result, both reject the grant of
power view of the warrant requirement.
It should be emphasized that these constructs are merely
judicial attitudes toward the fourth amendment. They are not
laws between which a judge must choose and then be bound.
Rather, they are descriptions of what a judge with a given
attitude feels himself free to consider in reaching a decision.
The question becomes which attitude is it more desirable that
a majority of the Court adopt.
The Camara construct is more restrictive, and more protective of personal freedom. In any given case, the rule would
be that all intrusions are searches, and all searches outside
the warrant procedure are unreasonable." It is still possible
that some opposing interest could overbalance fourth amend.,The established exceptions to the warrant requirement are once again
an obstacle. All that can be said is that they must be considered a part
of the warrant procedure. Any reference to that procedure is intended
to countenance the exceptions.
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ment rights, but such an interest would have to be absolutely
vital to the performance of an indispensable state function.
On the other hand, a judge with the Wyman attitude feels
free to consider the quality of the intrusion to determine
whether it is a search or, alternatively, whether it is a reasonable search.
The effect that this difference in approach can have is
tremendous. When a judge considers the quality of an intrusion, his decision is bound to be colored by personal preconceptions about the situation in which it occurred. Evidence
of such preconceptions at work in Wyman is not difficult to
find. In the list of factors given to show the reasonableness
of home visits, the Court draws an analogy between the welfare program and the charity of a private philanthropist. The
public should have the same right as a private benefactor to
see how charitable funds are put to work. Recent literature
has thoroughly discredited the charity notion of welfare. 60
Social conditions operating in American society tend to relegate whole classes of citizens to a status of dependency. Those
who benefit from these same social forces should compensate
those oppressed. No loss of constitutional dignity is involved
it is a purely economic matter.
This is not meant to be a debate on the subject of welfare. Many may accept Justice Blackmun's view. But this is
an example of the kind of consideration that inevitably creeps
in when the Wyman conception of the fourth amendment is
applied to a set of facts. An even more glaring example appears in one of the Court's footnotes." The Court says that
its examination of Mrs. James welfare file discloses that hers
is a "sad and unhappy" picture. She has never really satisfied the eligibility requirements; has been uncooperative; has
a bad attitude; has made repeated demands; and has occasionally been belligerent. The note broadly implies that she beats
her son. All this may be true. But should this report card
information affect the constitutional rights of not only Mrs.
James, but all other welfare recipients? Suppose, for instance,
that the situation were reversed so that the caseworker and
not the recipient was of questionable character. After Wyman,
the receipient has no protection against abuse of welfare agency
power so long as that power is exercised through home visits.
60 E.g., Reich, The New Property,73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
61 400 U.S. 309, 322 n. 9 (1971).
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In many areas of the law, maximum judicial flexibility to
consider various kinds of information is essential if legal
norms are to continue to reflect changing social needs and
goals. However, when fundamental rights are involved, especially when those rights are a primary source of individual
protection from governmental encroachment on personality and
dignity, flexibility may be a risk not worth taking. Prior to
Wyman, the fourth amendment had offered blanket protection. Even if the contraction of protection in Wyman is not
personally objectionable, the potential for future contraction
must be frightening when considerations like those given above
can have a significant effect on decisions rendered under the
6 2
Wyman attitude.

III. THE COURT
The furor over the Nixon "strict constructionist" appointments and the widespread curiosity about what their effect
will be make a prediction of future Court performance irresistible. We move now into the realm of conjecture and generalization. No specific prediction can be made even in fourth
amendment cases. All that can be gauged is the Court's
apparent frame of mind.
Wyman indicates that individual rights will not carry the
same weight as they did before the recent personnel changes.
This is not an hysterical prediction of the total withdrawal
of constitutional protections. It is only to say that at the
margin, at the very limits of constitutional theory, the possibility that individual liberty may be infringed will not prove
the decisive factor. If, for instance, a case involved a conflict
between an important state interest and some constitutionally
protected individual liberty, and that liberty was only slightly
or even speculatively impinged, the Court would be less likely
than in the past to attach an almost absolute value to the
liberty at the expense of the state interest. Obviously, no court
would allow a crucial state interest to be totally frustrated.
But this new approach would be more reluctant to consign
the state to an alternative means of vindicating its interest
which was considerably more burdensome.
All this is very general, perhaps a more concrete example
of the same general frame of mind may serve to better illustrate this feeling about the Court. Lawyers sometimes argue
62

The "red scare" of the fifties comes to mind.
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in terms of a "parade of horrors" which will result from a
decision unfavorable to their client. Imagine, if you will, such
arguments as they might be made by each attorney in Wyman.
Counsel for Mrs. James would point to the destructive effects
on welfare recipients nationwide of a decision not affording
full fourth amendment protection. Second class citizenship in
the eyes of the law would, when combined with the handicap
of economic deprivation, strip those on welfare of the last
traces of human dignity. One who must open his door to the
prying eyes of the government in order to retain his only
source of funds can make little claim to the primacy implicit
in the notion that a man's home is his castle. If the cost of
maintaining constitutional dignity is economic death, then the
lofty promise of America is but a mocking rumble in the
empty stomachs of her less fortunate citizens. A man of even
moderate means can protect himself with wealth and community standing. A poor man has only the Constitution. If
the courts fail to make that shield adequate, then physical violence is his only available alternative.
Further, the power to use necessarily carries with it the
power to abuse. Welfare recipients would be without protection against agency visiting practices in the future which are
clearly unreasonable no matter how the Court classifies home
visits in general. To allow such a power without providing
an advance restraint is to invite its misuse, whether through
misanthropy or negligence.
On the other side, counsel for the agency would cite the
almost unlimited potential for welfare fraud. The unscrupulous recipient could milk the government of thousands of dollars by fabricating eligibility statistics. Children can be passed
from mother to mother, raising the entitlement of all and yet
receiving the alloted benefit from none. Separations which
never actually occurred will be used to qualify the wife for
benefits while her husband is earning a full salary or regularly
declining employment for the more luxurious "welfare cadillac" life. The hard earned dollars of the industrious American taxpayer will go down 1he drain of sloth and deceit.
Further, a major goal of the welfare program is to provide
counseling and guidance to the end that families now in
poverty will be able to better themselves and move off the
welfare roles. Home visits are essential to the attainment of
this goal. Those who resist efforts to provide the needed services demonstrate that their only real interest is continued re-
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ceipt of funds without effort on their part. It is totally unfair
to allow some members of society to demand tax money as
of right and all the while thumb their collective noses at the
benevolent government agents who seek only to assist them.
These rather lengthy parades will strike different readers
in different ways. Both have merit, and the interests contained
in each deserve protection. Almost undoubtedly, they would
be protected to some extent by either the Burger ox the Warren Court. But the difference in terms of the frame of mind
lies in which parade would most horrify which Court. It is
the author's opinion that the possibility of widespread and defiant welfare fraud would be more offensive to the sensibilities
of the Burger Court, while the human consequences of coerced
home visits would have been more obnoxious to the Warren
Court.
The old adage that hard cases make bad law has special
relevance here. There is no solution to the Wyman case which
would make "good law." The choice must be which solution,
according to a particular value structure, would make better
law, i.e., prevent the less desirable parade of horrors. Perfect
accommodation of diverse interests is always impossible. The
question in any hard case is the direction in which it is preferable to err. The Warren Court apparently felt that it was
better, if err they must, to be overprotective of individual
liberty at the risk of slighting governmental interests. If
Wyman is a valid indication, the Burger Court is more willing
to take the risk of infringing upon personal rights in order to
guard against shortchanging the government. A judgment as
to the merit of these two positions devolves to the personal
question of whether the individual or the state can better
afford to be slighted.
IV.

AFTERWARD

It seems fitting to close with a piece of judicial language
which expresses the author's opinion, and most likely that of
the Warren Court, as to the attitude most appropriate for the
consideration of cases involving fundamental human liberties.
The words are taken from a section of Boyd in which the
Court was discussing the fact that the type of search in question was at the very limit of fourth amendment protection.
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and
least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional
practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent
approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of pro-
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cedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule
that constitutional provisions for the security of person and
property should be liberally construed. A close and literal
construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads
to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more
in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against
63
any stealthy encroachments thereon.

63 116U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
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TORT OR BREACH OF CONTRACT
INTRODUCTION

No

area of the law has experienced more rapid change

than that presently evidenced in the area of products
liability.' The philosophy of products liability, perhaps best
stated in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 2 is one of
3
reallocating the risk of economic injury to the entire society.

Is this new social policy to be a universal policy, or are some
institutions and organizations to retain a favored position in
this new legal framework of consumer protection?
Blood transfusions are an invaluable aid to medical science
and doubtless save many thousands of lives each year. There
are, however, attendant dangers in the transfusion of blood,
and undoubtedly one of the most prominent of these dangers
is the contraction of homologous serum hepatitis. 4 Given both
the idea of consumer protection, embodied in the doctrine of
products liability, and the use of the blood transfusion, an
admittedly invaluable aid to medical science, who is to bear
the cost of an allegedly unavoidable injury caused by serum
hepatitis infection?
I.

SERUM HEPATITIS

Serum hepatitis is a disease of the liver caused by the
inoculation of human blood or blood products containing a
1 For excellent analyses of the growth of products liability law see: Pros-

ser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L. J. 1099 (1960); Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without
Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 855 (1963);
Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform
Commercial Code: A Commentary on JurisprudentialEclipses, Pigeonhole and Communication Barriers, 17 WESTERN RESERVE L. REV. 5 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Shanker].

59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
"[T]o insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products
are borne by the manufacturer that put such products on the market
rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves." Id. at 63, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701, 377 P.2d at 901.
4
"Serum hepatitis... is [an] exclusively man-made [disease]. It is definable as the syndrome or group of signs and symptoms produced artificially by innoculation with a filterable agent known as virus B. The
virus may be introduced through the skin by deliberate administration,
for therapeutic (curative) purposes, of human blood or certain of its
products obtained from one who is not apparently ill but is carrying virus
B in his blood. It may also be introduced ... through [the] use of inadequately sterilized syringes, needles, stylets or cutting instruments that
2

penetrate the skin or mucus membrane." 14 AM. JuR. PROOF OF FACTS

Hepatitis § 5 (1964).
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causative (SH) virus.5 Recent medical research has significantly increased the detection rate of SH virus in donor blood;
but, no test has been developed to discover all incidents of
"bad" blood.6
The disease is contracted by about 30,000 people yearly;
up to 10 percent of that number die. 7 Since this strain of
hepatitis (SH virus) is contracted primarily by the use of inadequately sterilized instruments or by transfusion of plasma
or whole blood containing the SH virus,' the cause of death or
disease in a particular case is relatively clear.
The question then becomes one of policy. Is the hospital
or blood bank, indisputably the transferor of the causative
agent, to be held legally liable for the injury sustained by the
patient? Or does the doctrine of consumer protection, embodied in the developing law of products liability, not extend
so far as to make a supplier of an admittedly valuable product
liable to an innocent consumer absent supplier "fault"? This
in essence is the policy decision with which the courts have
been forced to come to grips. They are faced with a potentially large group of litigants (patients who have contracted
serum hepatitis) seeking redress against a group of institutions traditionally favored in our legal framework.! In this
setting the courts have been forced to fashion rules to facilitate or deny recovery to patients infected by serum hepatitis.
It is the purpose of this note to explore in Part III two theories
that are available to a plaintiff seeking recovery for injuries
caused by the transfusion of infected blood. But first a look
at the theory which has prevailed for many years.
II.

THE EARLIER VIEW -

PERLMUTTER

The landmark case defining the extent of liability for
transfusion of "bad" blood is Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital.10 The court denied recovery against the hospital on the
basis that a transfusion of blood by a hospital to a patient
5 BEESON & McDERMOTT, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE, 1032 (1963).
6 M. Prince and K. Burlee, Serum Hepatitis Antigen (SH): Rapid Detection by High Velocity Voltage Immunoelechoosmophoresis, 169 SCIENCE
593 (1970).
7 Bockel, Tests for Australian Antigen Answer a Need, 97 SCIENCE NEWS
584 (1970).
S See note 4 supra.
9Hospitals and charitable institutions (non-profit blood banks) traditionally were not subject to tort liability. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 127
at 1019 (3d. ed. 1964). Although this immunity is presently breaking
down, it still persists in a number of jurisdictions. Id. at 1021-24.
10 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
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was a service rather than a sale. ' There was a strong dissent
on the grounds that to rule that the transfusion of blood was
a service and not a sale was contrary to the then existing
New York case law.1'2 The majority, however, seemed to reach
their decision not so much on the basis of the sales-service
dichotomy but rather upon the basic policy issue of exempting
a hospital from liability for the transfusion of a virus it could
13
not detect.
Although the majority opinion of Perlmutter has been
severely criticized in the literature,1 4 the service rationale has
been adopted by a number of jurisdictions both as to hospitals 15 and blood banks' 6 supplying infected blood. The underlying policy decision of denying recovery in transfusion cases
by classfying the transfusion of blood as a service rather than
a sale is made glaringly apparent by the fact that many cases
are now being decided, in other areas of the law, that are ex11 "[S]uch a contract is clearly one for services, and, just as clearly, it is
not divisable. Concepts of purchase and sale cannot separately be attached to the healing materials-such as medicines, drugs or indeed,
blood-supplied by the hospital for a price as part of medical services it
offers. That the property or title to certain items of medical materials
may be transfered, so to speak, from the hospital to the patient during
the course of medical treatment does not serve to make such a transaction
a sale. ' "Sale" and "transfer" are not synonymous,' and not every transfer of personal property constitutes a sale." Id. at 104, 123 N.E.2d at 794.
12-The three dissenting justices felt that no distinction could be drawn
between the furnishing of blood by a hospital and the case law of New
York holding that implied warranties attached to the sale of food in a
restaurant, Temple v. Keeler, 238 N.Y. 344, 144 N.E. 635 (1924); or to
the sale of drugs Hopkins & Co. v. Silverman, 234 App. Div. 224, 254
N.Y.S. 724 (Sup. Ct. 1932). Id. at 110, 123 N.E.2d at 797-98.
1:1The majority recognized that if the transfer of blood were considered
a sale, liability would attach for breach of warranty. They then made
a very obvious policy decision based upon the undetectable nature of
the hepatitis virus and declared: "The art of healing frequently calls
for the balancing of risks and dangers to a patient. Consequently, if injury results from the course adopted, where no negligence or fault is
present liability should not be imposed upon the institution or agency
actually seeking to save or assist the patient." Id. at 107, 123 N.E.2d
at 795.
14Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57
COLUM. L. REV. 653 (1957); Garibaldi, A New Look at Hospital's Liability for Hepatitis- Contaminated Blood on Principles of Strict Tort Liability, 48 CHL BAR REc. 204 (1967); Haut & Alter, Blood TransfusionsStrict Liability?, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 557 (1969); 37 NOTRE DAME LAW.
565 (1962) ; 18 OKLA. L. REV. 104 (1965); U. PA. L. REV. 833 (1955).
15 Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964); White
v. Sarascta Pub. Hosp. Bd., 206 So. 2d 19 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1968); Holder
v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1967); Dibblee vs. Dr. W. H.
Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961)
(charitable immunity a factor in transfusing incompatible blood); Gile
v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956)
(charitable immunity a factor).
16 Whitehurst v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 1 Ariz. App. 326, 402 P.2d
584 (1965) (charitable blood bank); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War
Memorial Blood Bank, 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965); Koenig v.
Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964).
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tending sales warranties to cases that admittedly involve serv1T
ice transactions.
In recent years a few courts have chosen to alter the
obviously artificial sales-service distinction involved in blood
transfusion litigation and have held that a cause of action
exists in either tort"s or under the Uniform Commercial
20
Code,1" on the theory that either a hospital, a blood bank ,21
or both*-'" have made a sale of blood within the respective
definitions of "seller" established by the two doctrines. The
recent case of Hoffman v. Misericordia Hospital3 has gone so
far as to hold that this artificial sales-service distinction may
be immaterial. "II]t cannot be said with certainty that no recovery is permissible upon the claim here made, even if it
should ultimately be determined that the transfer of blood from
24
a hospital for transfusion into a patient is a service.
The subsequent discussion will deal with those recent cases
deciding upon what grounds a cause of action may be stated
in a suit predicated on contraction of serum hepititus by
transfusion.

§ 242 b (1948) (Sale of food in a restaurant justified imposition of an implied warranty of fitness); Amacorp
Indus. Leasing Co. v. Robert C. Young Assoc., Inc., 47 Cal. Rptr. 294, 237
Cal. App. 2d 724 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (leasing of equipment implies
warranty); Newark v. Gimbel's Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 279, 246 A.2d 11
(1968) (injury as a result of the application of a permanent wave hair
dressing, court allowing recovery on the basis of implied warranty
despite the service character of the application); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck
Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965) (implied warranty in leasing agreement for trucks). Cantra, Epstein v. Giannattasso,
25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (C.P. 1963) (denying recovery on the
basis of rendition of services rather than the sale of goods); see Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L.

17 WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON SALES

REV.

653 (1957).

18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
1

OF TORTS

§ 402A (1965).

§ 2-103 (d).
20 Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 113 Ill.
App. 2d 74, 251 N.E.2d
733 (1969), alf'd Ill. Sup. Ct. Nos. 42526, 42578 cons. (Mar. 1970) (finding
that plaintiff had stated a cause of action on the basis of a sale).
21 Russell v. Community Blood Bank Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla.
1966), aff'd 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967); Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205
(Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1967); Carter v. Inter-Faith Hosp., 60 Misc. 2d 733,
304 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (Perlmutter "sales-service" rationale
rejected as to commercial blood bank); Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp.,
439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 86 (1970) (not determining the issue of sale but
implying that the absence of a sale should not in itself bar recovery).
='Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969).
) UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

23 439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970).
24

Id. at page 505, 267 A.2d at 870.
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CAUSE OF ACTION

Breach of warranty under the Code25 and the tort law's
counterpart, strict liability, 6 are the modern doctrines that
have developed in the law to facilitate an injured party's recovering without a showing of fault or negligence on the part
of a seller.2 7 While the pleading of a cause of action in strict
liability does not preclude a pleading of breach of an implied
warranty of merchantability, or vice versa, an examination of
the recent blood transfusion cases shows that often only one
of the two causes of action-strict liability-has been advanced.
A. Strict Liability

Strict liability in tort is a concept first developed to avoid
the injustices created by the earlier sales laws requiring the
presence of privity of contract for one to recover for injuries
caused by deleterious products intended for human consumption and intimate bodily use. 28 Drugs entered the developing
body of law on the analogy that they, like food and drink,
were intended for human consumption and that the same social
policy supporting liability for furnishing unwholesome food
25 The sections of the Uniform Commercial Code pertinent to stating a

cause of action for breach of implied warranty are: "a warranty that
the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale
if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind." UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(1). And secondly, ". . . goods to be merchantable must be at least such as are fit for the ordinary purposes for which
such goods are used." Id. § 2-314 (2) (c).
26 The strict liability cause of action referred to here is that set out in
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1965). Although it may be
argued that there are two distinct causes of action for strict liability in
tort, i.e. implied warranty or strict liability absent warranty, it is felt
that the two causes are identical and that although a case predicated on
a cause of strict liability in tort may talk of implied warranty, "the
'warranty' is a very different kind of warranty from those usually
found in the sale of goods, and that it is not subject to the various contract
rules which have grown up to surround such sales." Id. at Comment m.
It is not necessary then to allege an implied warranty to state a cause of
action in strict liability but neither does talk of implied warranty mean
that a cause of action is being stated on a theory other than that stated
by § 402A supra. See Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 113 Ill.
App. 2d 74, 251 N.E.2d 733 (1969), aff'd Ill. Sup. Ct. Nos. 42526, 42578
cons. (Mar. 1970); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d
182 (1965); Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65
(1969); Leavell, The Return of Caveat Venditor as the Law of Products
Liability, 23 ARK. L. REV. 355, 360 (1970).
"[Fireedom from negligence is not a defense to a breach of warranty
or to an action based on strict liability in tort.... If the facts show a
defective condition constituting a breach of the applicable warranty or a
breach of the duty to provide a truck fit for use, and the condition produces injury or damages, liability exists." Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing
& Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 452, 212 A.2d 769, 779 (1965).
2_sProsser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REV., 791 (1966).
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was equally applicable to the furnishing of defective drugs. 2 9
The case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.30 expanded the doctrine of strict tort liability to the manufacturers
of products intended for human use, and the earlier criterion
of products intended for human consumption was abandoned
in favor of a general body of products liability law. The
emphasis was on avoidance of technical rules that had often
barred recovery on a contract theory.-" The result was that if
pleaded in tort, lack of privity would no longer defeat recovery
32
for anyone reasonably expected to use the warranted article.
The basic policy of the new tort was to insure that the manufacturers of defective products would be required to bear the
losses from injuries caused by these defective products rather
than the innocent consumer who was powerless to protect him33
self against such losses.
The courts of Florida have decided three cases seeking
recovery on a theory of strict liability in tort and have
reached different conclusions as to the possibilities of imposing liability depending upon the status of the defendant. As
against a hospital both Hoder v. Sayet34 and White v. Public
Hospital Board' 5 held that no cause of action was stated
for breach of an implied warranty in tort. While in Hoder
and Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc.3" (appealed and
reversed on other grounds) it was held that a cause of action
was stated against a commercial blood bank. 7 This means, at
least in Florida, that although the sales-service theory of Perl29 Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1960). This case involved the ingestion of vaccine containing
a live virus which caused the polio it was designed to prevent. The Court
stated:
In view of the established California rule that the consumer of
a food product may recover from the manufacturer upon implied
warranty, is there any reason to apply a different rule to the
vaccine here involved? We think not. The vaccine is intended for
human consumption quite as much as is food. We see no reason
to differentiate the policy considerations requiring pure and
wholesome food from those requiring pure and wholesome
vaccine.... The vaccine here involved is, like food products,
designed solely for introduction into the body of a human being.
Id. at 607, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
:1159 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
:1 Id. at 61-62, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701, 377 P.2d at 901.
32 Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 436, 191 N.E.2d
81,82 (1963).
33 Shipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 90, 207 A.2d 314, 325 (1965).
34 196 So. 2d 205, 208 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1967).
35 206 So. 2d 19, 22 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1968).
31;185 So. 2d 749 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1967), rev'd 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967).
37 Id. at 756.
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mutter has been abandoned as to blood banks,38 it is still very
much a factor in litigation against hospitals. 3
The Russell case is the leading case in Florida defining a
blood bank's potential liability for the transfusion of blood.
The court of appeals stated that the blood bank could be held
liable only for failure to detect a substance capable of detection and removal, and that if in fact the SH virus was not
capable of removal, no liability would attach. 40 The opinion
went on to say that the burden of proving an inability to
detect the virus would be on the defendant blood bank. 41 That
decision was modified by the Florida Supreme Court 42 on the
basis that both the trial court and the district court of appeals
had gone beyond the controlling question-was there a sale
43
by the blood bank which could support a cause of action.
The supreme court opinion stated:
The question of whether there is a recognized method of detection was premature since that question is one of fact, and it was
error for the trial court to settle it with a pronouncement of law.
For that reason it was premature and error for the District Court
to undertake to settle as a question of law that, which under the
pleadings, would be a question of fact. We do not here review,
consider or decide as a question of law whether or not there is
a recognized method of detection... nor have we considered
whether, if established by the fact, such would constitute a legal
defense as that question is premature for the same reason. (em44
phasis added)

The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts is especially
interesting in that he felt that the court should have decided
the issue of detectability as a matter of law. 45 Relying on
Green v. American Tobacco Company,40 Justice Roberts stated
after reviewing the Florida products liability cases:
These decisions stand for the proposition that the seller of
a product intended for human consumption is liable for injurious
consequences resulting from the consumption of a defective or
adulterated product, even though it was at the time of the sale
38 Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205, 208 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1967).
39 Id.

40 185 So. 2d at 755, rev'd 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967).
41

Id.

42

Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967).

43 Id.at 117.
44
45
46

Id.
Id. at 121 (Roberts, J., concurring opinion).
154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963). "[A] manufacturer's or seller's actual
knowledge or opportunity for knowledge of a defective or unwholesome
condition is wholly irrelevant to his liability on the theory of implied
warranty ...." Id. at 170. No reasonable distinction can, in our opinion,
be made between the physical or practical impossibility of obtaining
knowleldge of a dangerous condition, and scientific inability resulting
from a current lack of human knowledge and skill." Id. at 171.
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and consumption of such product practically or scientifically im47
possible to discover the defect or adulteration of such product.

B. Breach of Warranty
In Perlmutter the majority in holding that the transfusion
of blood was a service and not a sale reasoned that if the
transaction were to be considered a sale, liability would automatically attach, and the hospital would become an insurer of
injuries from "bad" blood transfusions.4 S In view of this belief
-that liability would be automatic for a breach of an implied
warranty of merchantability-it is interesting that this theory
of liability has not been more frequently advanced. The only
other reported case that rests directly on the Code's warranty
of merchantability is another New York case, Carter v. Inter49
Faith Hospital.
In Carter the court worked around cases apparently extending the service rule of Perlmutter to commercial blood
banks and concluded that if the no-sale rule of Perlmutter had
in fact been extended to commercial blood banks these cases
were overruled in that respect.5 °1 The court said that Code
warranties attached to the sale by a blood bank and that: "If
in fact the blood sold by the blood bank contains serum
hepatitis and causes injury, it is not fit for the ordinary purpose for which it is used and would in turn give rise to a claim
for breach of warranty.' '
The fact that the plaintiff in Carter was not in privity with
defendant blood bank was held not to bar his recovery under
the Code.52 The relied on Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,;' as authority for the proposition that privity is
not required if plaintiff is one reasonably contemplated to be
part of the distributive chain of the product.;4 Although this
was an easy way to circumvent the privity doctrine of the
code, it is submitted that the Kollsman decision is one based
47 196 So. 2d 115, 119-20 (Fla. 1967)

(Roberts, J., concurring opinion).
106, 123 N.E.2d 792,

48 Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100,

795 (1954).
49 60 Misc. 2d 733, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
50 "The basis of the Perlhnutter decision was that the supplying of blood
by a hospital to a patient is incidental to the services rendered and is
not a sale. In the instant situation, we have solely a transfer of blood and
no services are rendered by the blood bank to the hospital." Id. at 735,
304 N.Y.S.2d at 99-100.
51Id. at 736, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 101. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314

(2) (c).
52 60 Misc. 2d 733, 736, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97, 101 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
53 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
54 Id. at 436, 191 N.E.2d at 82.
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on strict liability in tort rather than on a warranty of merchantability, 55 and although the Code is not intended to restrict the development of case law on the question of privity,5"
the court for the sake of clarity should have recognized
Kollsman for what it is.
Upon deciding that a cause of action had been stated for
breach of warranty, the Carter court did not grant judgment
summarily, 57 as the majority in Perlmutter reasoned would be
the case. '8 Rather, the case was sent back to trial for the
development of a record on the issue of detectability of serum
hepatitis virus in blood so that the court might weigh "[a]ll
factors in regard to public policy . . . a weighing of interest
between the unfortunate patients who contract the disease and
the general public who are in constant need of blood from
these commercial blood banks. ' '51 Given this summation it is
difficult to predict whether the courts would in fact strictly
apply the warranty of merchantability or make some judicial
exception on the basis of social policy to deny plaintiff's apparent statutory relief.
While Carter is the only recent case to rest solely on the
basis of an implied warranty of merchantability, the case of
Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital'" contained a claim of both a
breach of an implied warranty of merchantability and a cause
of action premised on strict liability in tortc" The trial court
dismissed both claims and the intermediate appellate court
affirmed but remanded for consideration of the negligence
issue. "- The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a further development of the record to justify such
dismissal."'
5Id.
§ 2-313 Comment 3.
This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions the family, household and guests of the purchaser. Beyond
this, the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge, or
restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in
the distributive chain. Id.
It is then possible for a party to be brought under the Code by the
development of case law and the courts are free to eliminate the requirement of privity as to all non-purchasers, even those outside of the
distributive chain. Shanker, supra note 1, at 25.
60 Misc. 2d 733, 737, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97, 101 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
5S See note 13 supra.
59 60 Misc. 2d 733, 737, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97, 101 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
60 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (1967), rev'd 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65
(1969).
4;1Id. at 321, 232 A.2d at 882.
42 Id. at 333, 232 A2d at 890.
63 53 N.J. 138, 142, 249 A.2d 65, 67 (1969). A later New Jersey case which
5; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
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The courts have then had occasion to deal with Code warranties of merchantability of fitness; but the two decisions
since Perlmutter construing such fitness warranties have been
influenced by policy factors, and both courts have essentially
denied recovery on a warranty theory by either remanding
for more information6 4 or by asking that a trial court record
concerning the detectability of SH virus be made (indicating
that their decision would be one of policy based on that
finding) .65
While it would seem that once the warranty of merchantability was breached liability would automatically attach,66
the Carter case indicates that this may not be so in relation to
transfusions of blood.'
Perhaps a more important consideration in evaluating the
application of liability under the Code would be a review of
the provisions for disclaimer of implied warranties of merchantability. The question of disclaimer of an expressed or
implied warranty has been litigated only once in connection
with the transfusion of impure blood, but with the increasing
number of cases holding that a possibility exists for liability
to attach to a transfusion of infected blood, disclaimers of liability for the presence of hepatitis virus are likely to become
more common. In Jackson there was an express disclaimer of
this type.6 8 The court relied upon the inability to detect the
virus and declared the disclaimer reasonable under section 2-316
of the Code"' without making reference to the issue of unconscionability of disclaiming physical injuries developed by
2-719(3).70 This seems to be more of a policy decision than
a strict interpretation of the Code. This is quite surprising in
referred to Jackson mentioned that Jackson never came to trial after
remand but was amicably settled between the parties and the action was
dismissed with prejudice. Baptista v. Saint Barnabas Medical Center,
109 N.J. Super. 217, 223, 262 A.2d 902, 906 (1970).
64 Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 53 N.J. 138, 142, 249 A.2d 65, 67 (1969).
Carter v. Inter-Faith Hosp., 60 Misc. 2d 733, 737, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97, 101
(Sup. Ct. 1969). "This court feels that the approach taken by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital... is correct."
Id. at 737, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
66 See note 13 supra.
"i7 60 Misc. 2d 733, 737, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97, 101 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
48 "Despite the utmost care in the selection of donors, human blood may
contain the virus of Homologous Serum Hepatitus. Therefore Eastern
Blood Bank does not warrant against its presence in this blood." Id. at
320, 232 A.2d at 882.
69 Id. at 329, 232 A.2d at 888.
70 On further appeal the case was reversed and remanded for other reasons.
Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 53 N.J. 138, 142, 249 A.2d 65, 67 (1969).
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light of the fact that the New Jersey courts have traditionally
not been overly impressed by disclaimers seeking to limit liability from injury caused by defective products."' The protection against disclaimer provided by section 2-719(3) should be
considered an important part of plaintiff's case based on warranty theory, and although Jackson is an indication to the contrary, arguably, such liability may not be capable of disclaimer under the Code.
While it has been claimed that strict liability has not been
attained within the framework of the Code,7 2 a review of the
applicable sections and the case law would seem to indicate
the opposite conclusion. Even though section 2-316 provides
for the disclaimer of implied warranties attached to a sale of
goods, 73 section 2-719(3) states that any attempt to limit consequential damages involving personal injuries is prima facie
74
unconscionable.
The test to be used in determining whether a contract or
clause is unconscionable is to be resolved by an examination
of the needs of the trade and the relative bargaining positions of the parties at the time of the making of the contract.7 5
The presumption that a disclaimer of liability for physical
injuries is prima facie unconscionable is an attempted move
toward strict liability for breach of warranty,7 6 and a review
of the cases before and since the formulation of the Code
lends support to the proposition that section 2-719(3) is an
attempt to prohibit the manufacturer or someone in a superior
bargaining position from defining his own liability for personal
77
injury.
71 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960)

is an example of this attitude. In that case there was an express warranty
to make repairs for defects of materials and workmanship and a disclaimer of all other warranties regarding an automobile. The car was
defective and injury was sustained by the plaintiff. The court held
that such disclaimers were not favored and were to be strictly construed against the manufacturer. Id. at 373, 161 A.2d at 77-78. The court
stated further that the types of disclaimers contemplated by the Sales
Act were those disclaimers arrived at by relatively equal parties with
some real freedom of choice as to the type of contract selected. Id. at
404,161 A.2d at 95.
72 Comment, The Application of the Doctrine of Unconscionability to Warranties: A More Forward Strict Liability within the Uniform Commercial Code, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 75-76 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Comment].
73 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316.
7 Id. § 2-719 (3).
t- Id. § 2-302 Comment 1.
76 Comment, supra note 72 at 80.
77 Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1949) (unequal bargaining power); Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 430 S.W.2d 778
(1968); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960) (unconscionable disclaimer).
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C. Comparison of the Two Doctrines
The theories of warranty under the Code and strict tort
liability have been discussed; the question remains whether
there are any real differences between them. Both theories
generally require a sale by a person normally engaged in selling such a product, and both strict liability and the Code
have overlapping rules to govern the liabilities which arise. 78
Strict liability in tort requires that the injury result from
the use of a "defective" product, while the Code requires that
the injury result from goods not of merchantable quality; but
the definitions "defect" and "non-merchantability" are apparently synonymous. 71 One writer has even suggested that all of
the cases decided under the theory of strict liability could have
been decided exactly the same way under the Code.80
Privity of contract has traditionally been a stumbling
block to recovery for injuries. Under contract theory the Code,
however, has expanded the scope of implied warranty to include not only the buyer but members of his household and
guests who may be reasonably expected to use the product."'
Some variations of the Code are much broader than this in
their abolition of privity.8 2- The Code makes it clear that its
provisions governing privity are not to preclude the development of case law redefining the warranties created by a sale
within the definition of the Code," ' and the decision in
Carter was seen to be an application of this principle.8 4 The
latitude left to the courts in developing the requirements of
78

Shanker, supra note 1, at 13.

Rapson, Products Liability Under ParallelDoctrines: Contrasts between
the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L.
REV. 69 (1965). "This definition of defect, appearing in cases involving
strict liability in tort, is closely related to the concept of defect as it appears in cases dealing with breach of implied warranty." Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 179 N.W.2d 64, 69 (Minn. 1970).
80 Shanker, supra note 1, at 13.
81 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318.
79

155-2-318 (1963).
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be
affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this
section. Id.
8" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318 Comment 3.
This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions the family, household, and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or
restrict the developing case law on whether a seller's warranties,
given to the buyer who resells, extends to other persons in the
distributive chain. Id.
84 60 Misc. 2d 733, 737, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97, 101 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
82 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
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privity is felt to be very broad.85 Thus, privity, in a suit on a
breach of warranty theory, should not be a major problem
in suing a blood bank and is definitely no bar to a suit by a
86
patient against a hospital.
One distinction between the Code warranty of merchantability and a cause of action in strict liability is the applicable
statute of limitations. Should the statute of limitations run
from the time of the sale or from the time of the injury?
Under the Code the time of breach of an implied warranty is
the date of sale"7 while under a tort theory breach occurs at
the time of the injury.88 The time of the running of the
statute of limitations can be a very important aspect of a case
when a latent defect is the cause of injury. Different jurisdictions have treated the problem differently-some have
created a new warranty action in tort,"' while others have
limited recovery to the time specified in the Code. °
Although the causes of action labled "strict liability in
tort" and "breach of warranty of merchantability" are strikingly similar and may present identical causes of action in
the average case, there is one distinct difference in attempting to recover against a supplier of blood using a strict liability
approach as opposed to a warranty approach. While the Code
makes no allowance for the present state of human knowledge,
comment k of § 402 A, Restatement of Torts (Second) makes a
85 "It thus seems clear that the courts, if they wish to do so, may eliminate

the privity requirement as to all non-purchasers, even those outside
the distributive chain." Shanker, supra note 1, at 27.
86 The only state to decide that such a cause of action may be stated against
a hospital is Illinois in the case of Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial
Hcspital, 113 Ill. App. 2d 74, 251 N.E.2d 133 (1969), aff'd Ill. Sup. Ct. Nos.
42526, 42578 cons. (Mar. 1970). The court stated that the sales-service
dichotomy of Perlmutter and other decisions was "too simple and that
to maintain an artificial barrier around blood is not sensible." Id. at 80,
251 N.E.2d at 135. The Cunninghan court, however, did not hold as a
matter of law that an inability to detect serum hepatitis in blood would
not be a defense in law. Id. at 86, 251 N.E.2d at 139. The Cunningham
case, therefore, does not appear to extend the possibility of recovery
on the theory of strict liability further than other decided cases. See
notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra, and notes 92-100 and accompanying text infra. Cunningham is, however, important for it is the first
case to hold that the transfusion of blood is a sale of a product and
recovery for the transfusion of contaminated blood by a hospital on a
strict liability theory is not precluded where there is the presence of a
sale. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, supra at 86.

s8Mendel v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 342, 305 N.Y.S.2d

490, 492, 253 N.E.2d 207, 208 (1969).
ss Holifield v. Setco Indus., Inc., 42 Wis. 2d 750, 755, 168 N.W.2d 177, 180
(1969).
81)Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d
149 (9th Cir. 1962); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
1 0 Mendel v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 342, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490,
492, 253 N.E.2d 207, 208 (1969).
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specific exception for some products from the application of
the rules of strict liability by classifying them as unavoidably
unsafe."'
There are several possible ways of avoiding the classification of the transfusion of blood containing the serum hepatitis
virus as unavoidably unsafe under comment k. The first of
these methods is an argument that would take blood out of the
category of products intended to be exempted by comment k.
If blood can be made reasonably safe by the detection of the
virus in the blood of the donor "2 the fact that the virus cannot be conclusively detected in blood should not be considered
relevant in classifying the product as unavoidably unsafe. The
Restatement standard is not that products must be capable of
being made absolutely safe; it is something less; the product
must be reasonably safe. To allow a product that is capable
of being made reasonably safe to be categorized as "unavoidably unsafe" is to defeat the purpose of the Restatement by
sanctioning the non-use of preventive measures while research
goes on in a search of the "ultimate" test capable of determin3
ing the presence of the virus in blood.1
The application of comment k to the transfusion of blood
seems to be weak on another basis. The example of an unavoidably unsafe product used by the Restatement is the
Pasteur treatment for rabies. The Pasteur treatment does not
involve the use of a defective product, rather it involves a risk
attendant to a product which, although not defective, is capable of causing serious consequences despite the fact that the
product is "pure" when used. 94 Blood is not an analogous
product. In its usable form it does not contain the SH virus
and unlike the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment it is the
additive defect in the blood itself rather than the particular
idiosyncrasy of the recipient that causes the danger.
A third line of reasoning that might be advanced to overcome the comment k defense is the concept presented in the
tobacco cases deciding liability for the contraction of lung
cancer. In Green v. American Tobacco Co.": the tobacco company defended on the ground that at the time plaintiff contracted lung cancer the state of current scientific knowledge
91 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
112 See note 6 supra.

OF TORTS

§ 402A, comment k (1965).

Boland, Strict Liability in Tort for Transfusing Contaminated Blood,
23 ARK.L. REV. 236, 241-42 (1969).
94 Id. at 242.
95 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
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could not determine the causal link between smoking and lung
cancer. The Florida court put the practical impossibility of
obtaining knowledge of a dangerous condition (e.g. tainted
meat in a can or faulty mechanism inside a steering column)
and scientific inability resulting from a lack of human knowledge and skill (e.g. causal link between smoking and lung
cancer) on the same level and decided that the policy reasons for applying strict liability to one set of circumstances
were the same as for the other. 6 It was also stated that "a
manufacturer's or seller's actual knowledge or opportunity to
know of a defect or unwholesome condition is wholly irrelevant to his liability on the theory of implied warranty." 97
This theory was advanced by Justice Roberts in his concurrence in Russell !' and seems a viable method of attacking
the theory of denial of recovery on the basis of the undetectable nature of the hepatitis virus. It should be noted, however, that the Green case has not been adhered to consistently and was modified by Louisiana in Lartigue v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co."' where the court said "it is necessary
to show that the warranted product contained an element from
which, on the basis of existing human knowledge a harm
might be expected to flow."' 100
Because of the problems presented by a possible classification of blood as a product included in the Restatement's comment k and the questionableness of Green being good precedent for the denial of a distinction between practical and
scientific impossibilities of discovering a defect, plaintiff's case
might be made more tenuous and recovery more easily deniable under a tort theory of pleading. An action tried under a
theory of breach of warranty of merchantability would seemingly make no exception for liability on the basis that the
product is incapable of being made absolutely safe.
CONCLUSION

Although in a particular case a plaintiff may be armed
with adequate theories for legal recovery for injuries sustained
!16Id. at 171.
97 Id. at 170 (emphasis added).
' 196 So. 2d 115, 119 (Fla. 1967).
,:317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
1"" Id. at 35. This modification appears to require that whether or not a
harmful substance is detectable, and whether or not the language of
Green is the accepted test, before liability can attach a showing must be
made that the harmful agent must be one known to produce the resulting harm.

TRANSFUSION OF SH VIRUS

as the result of an infected blood transfusion, the ultimate
issue is one of balancing opposing policy considerations. On
the one hand blood banks and hospitals are considered to be
institutions which should be given more than the normal
amount of protection from the growing doctrines of products
liability law than is afforded other enterprises.' 0 ' Yet to deny
recovery to individual persons injured is to subvert the very
doctrine of spreading consumer losses which is at the heart
of products liability law.
The question of liability for the transfusion of impure
blood is an issue that has aroused enough medical institution
concern to have been the impetus in 19 states for the adoption
of statutes specifically exempting the suppliers of infected
blood from liability. 0 2 The courts have stated that the question of liability in this area is more properly one that should
be defined by the legislature. 10 3
It is submitted that the attitude of the legislatures is incorrect. The imposition of liability on blood banks and hospitals for transfusion of infected blood would induce these
institutions to make the very adjustments which products liability precipitates. To force hospitals and blood banks to
absorb the loss of injury to innocent patients is to force them
to spread the loss by increasing prices to consumers of the
product. One method would be to insure against consumer
loss through liability insurance.1 04 This solution avoids the
untenable consequence of placing the whole burden upon a
singularly injured party whose unfortunate fate has placed
him in the position to be injured. This approach is directly
in line with the philosophy of spreading risks embodied in the
emerging law of products liability.
101 See note 9 supra.

tit. 7A, § 2-314 (1970); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1151 (1970);
1606 (West 1970); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5A,
§ 2-316 (Spec. UCC Pamphlet 1968); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1764 (West
1970); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-108 (1970); MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN.

102 ALA. CODE

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §

ch. 106, § 2-316 (1971); MicH. Comp. LAWs ANN. § 691.1511 (1968); Miss.

CODE ANN. § 7129-71 (1971); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-400 (Supp. 1969); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 12-12-5 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-33.3 (1969); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2151 (1970); ORE. REV. STAT. § 97.300 (1969); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 32-55-9 (1970); S.D. CODE § 57-4-33.1 (1970); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 146.31 (1970). Colorado has enacted but has not yet published
such a measure, S. 83, 48th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1971); it has been reported that Utah has done likewise, Wall Street Journal, Mar. 2, 1971,

at 1, col. 1.

103 Carter v. Inter-Faith Hosp., 60 Mis. 2d 733, 737, 304 N.Y.S. 2d 97, 102
104

(Sup. Ct. 1969).
Additional advantages of this policy would be an increased emphasis in
research and development, higher standards of donor screening, and a
reluctance of hospitals to deal with blood banks of questionable reputation.
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Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).

A

POKER game in the home of John Gladson was inter-

rupted when three or four armed masked men broke into
the basement and robbed each of the six poker players of
money and personal property. The robbers then fled in a car
belonging to one of the victims. The stolen car was discovered
in a field and later that morning three men were arrested
near the car. Petitioner, Ashe, was arrested separately some
distance away. All four were charged with seven separate
offenses - armed robbery of each of the six poker players
and car theft.
In May of 1960, Ashe stood trial for the armed robbery
of Knight, one of the poker players. The prosecution's evidence as to the fact of the robbery and the items taken was
unassailable. But the evidence establishing Ashe as one of the
robbers was weak and inconsistent. Defendant's cross-examination brought out the inconsistencies of the identification testimony. He offered no testimony himself and waived final
argument. The jury in an unusually general verdict found
Ashe not guilty due to insufficient evidence.
Six weeks later, Ashe was tried for the robbery of Roberts,
another poker player. The jury this time found Ashe guilty
and he was sentenced to a 35-year term in the state penitentiary. The evidence with respect to Ashe's identity was
much stronger at the second trial. A witness who had previously identified the other three men charged, but not petitioner, was not called at all. A second witness who had maintained there were only three robbers identified Ashe as one
of them at the second trial. A witness who could only identify Ashe by "size, height and actions" in the first trial remembered his voice and a peculiar movement of his mouth
in the second trial.'
Petitioner's appeal and collateral attacks were unsuccessful. In 1969, the United States Supreme Court granted
2
certiorari.
I

See Justice Stewart's statement of the facts, Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S.
436, 437-40 (1970) and Justice Brennan's statements at 457-59.

2393 U.S. 1115 (1969).

COMMENT
I. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL:
THE NARROW GROUND OF DECISION IN

ASHE

The Supreme Court in Ashe held 3 that the doctrine of collateral estoppel, one peculiarly applicable to multiple prosecutions growing out of the same set of circumstances, 4 was
embodied in the fifth amendment guarantee against double
jeopardy.,, Under the Court's definition, collateral estoppel
"means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once
been determined by a valid and final judgment, 7 that issue
cannot again be litigated between the same parties" in any

3 Only eight Justices participated in the decision; Justice Blackmun did
not take his seat on the Court until June 9, 1970, approximately two
months after the Ashe decision. Justice White adopted the opinion written
by Justice Stewart; Justices Black and Harlan concurred separately, and
Justices Marshall and Douglas joined in Justice Brennan's concurrence;
Chief Justice Burger dissented. Thus, references to the "opinion" of the
Court refer to Justice Stewart's plurality opinion which was fully
adopted only by Justice White.
4 See, e.g., United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961); Carson
v. People, 4 Colo. App. 463, 36 P. 551 (1894); State v. Hoag, 21 N.J. 496,
122 A.2d 628 (1956), aff'd, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
5 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970).
6 A "fact 'distinctly put in issue' and not merely collaterally in question,"
is an ultimate fact. People v. Cornier, 42 Misc. 2d 963, 967, 249 N.Y.S.2d
521, 526 (1964). People v. Lo Cicero further explains that "collateral
estoppel applies only to questions that were actually litigated ..... " 17
App. Div. 2d 31, 34, 230 N.Y.S.2d 384, 388 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
Once the defense of collateral estoppel is sustained in a criminal
proceeding, one of two effects is possible. The doctrine may operate
as a complete bar to the subsequent prosecution if the issue previously
decided in defendant's favor "would be essential to the case against
him on the second charge." United States v. Kenny, 236 F.2d 128, 130
(3d Cir. 1956). If the issue previously decided is not decisive of the
outcome in the second prosecution, the doctrine of collateral estoppel
"accords to the accused the right to claim finality with respect to a
fact or group of facts previously determined in his favor . . . ." United
States v. Carlisi, 32 F. Supp. 479, 482 (D.C.N.Y. 1940). However, there is
no complete bar to the subsequent prosecution. United States v. De
Angelo, 138 F.2d 466, 469 (3d Cir. 1943).
7 The valid and final judgment required can be acquittal by a judge,
United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 87 (1916); a jury verdict
of not guilty, Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 465 (1958); or a conviction, Carson v. People, 4 Colo. App. 463, 465, 36 P. 551, 552 (1894).
However, "a defendant, who procures a judgment against him upon
an indictment to be set aside, may be tried anew upon the same indictment ...for the same offense of which he had been convicted," the
defense or collateral estoppel notwithstanding. United States v. Ball, 163
U.S. 662, 672 (1896).
8 "[l]t is essential that the party sought to be estopped be identical to,
or a strict privity with, the party who previously had his day in
court and lost." People v. Lo Cicero, 14 N.Y.2d 374, 380, 251 N.Y.S.2d
953, 957, 200 N.E.2d 622, 625 (1964). Thus, "[w]hen the same act is an
offense against both state and federal governments, its prosecution
and punishment by the latter, after prosecution and punishment by
the former, is not double jeopardy. United States v, Lanza, 260 U.S.
377 . . . ." Under the same reasoning, successive prosecutions by municipal governments and the federal government cannot be barred by the
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future lawsuit."u
To understand fully the meaning of collateral estoppel
in the guarantee against double jeopardy, it is
embodied
as
necessary to differentiate between these two defenses. While
both require identity of parties,"' the defense of collateral
estoppel ordinarily attaches only to a judgment," while the
defense of double jeopardy may be sustained in the absence
of a judgment.' 2 A second distinction is that "'[f]ormer jeopardy' involves identity of offenses, while 'collateral estoppel'
(an extension of res judicata) . . . is conclusive as to matters actually litigated and determined by the judgment....
Finally, the defense of double jeopardy, if successfully interposed, is a complete bar to subsequent prosecution. Its "protection is not . . . against the peril of second punishment, but
14
A successagainst being again tried for the same offense.'
may
hand,
other
the
ful defense of collateral estoppel, on
operate as a complete bar if the issue previously decided
5
would be decisive of the outcome in the second prosecution,'
or it may solely preclude further litigation of certain facts or
issues decided in the former prosecution.'" The practical effect
of the differences between the defense of double jeopardy
and that of collateral estoppel is that the latter "may have
defense of collateral estoppel. Smith v. United States 243 F.2d 877, 878
(6th Cir. 1957).
Similarly, "a judgment in the principal felon's case whether of
conviction or acquittal, is not admissible for any purpose in an action
against the accessory." Roberts v. People, 103 Colo. 250, 261, 87 P.2d
251, 256 (1938).
"397 U.S. 436. 443 (1970).
10 See note 8 supra.
11 "[I]n order for the doctrine to apply, there must have been a definite
determination of an issue favorable to the defendant in the prior trial
. .. either expressly or by necessary implication." United States v.
Perrone, 161 F. Supp. 252, 258 (D.C.N.Y. 1958). See note 7 supra.
':-The defense of double jeopardy is available to "one who has been
acquitted by a verdict duly rendered, although no judgment be entered
on the verdict...." Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 130 (1904).
"[A] defendant is placed in jeopardy once he is put to trial before a
jury so that if the jury is discharged without his consent he cannot
be tried again." Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957).
13 United States v. Wapnick, 198 F. Supp. 359, 359-60 (D.C.N.Y. 1961).
A similar statement with regard to the applicability of the doctrine
of collateral estoppel is that it "is not affected by the existence of
two separate and distinct crimes, although this does render the double
jeopardy plea.., often raised in these cases, without merit." Adams v.
United States, 287 F.2d 701, 703 (5th Cir. 1961).
14 Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 130 (1904).
15 United States v. Kenny, 236 F.2d 128, 130 (3d Cir. 1956).
1,;See, e.g., United States v. De Angelo, 138 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1943);
United States v. Carlisi, 32 F. Supp. 479 (D.C.N.Y. 1940).
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determining effect in situations where double jeopardy is un17
questionably inapplicable."
The expansion of the defense of double jeopardy to include collateral estoppel allowed the court to apply the constitutional doctrine to Ashe, which concerned a situation not
involving an "identity of offenses." After holding that collateral estoppel was embodied in the fifth amendment guarantee, the first step was then a determination by the Court
of the questions actually decided in the first prosecution.
The Supreme Court had previously
ficulty of this first step: "In numerous
state and federal courts have declined
estoppel because it was not possible to
tainty which issues were decided by the
8
dict of acquittal.'

recognized the difcriminal cases both
to apply collateral
determine with cerformer general ver-

In Ashe, the Court deftly completed this first and most
important step in the application of collateral estoppel, over
the objections of Chief Justice Burger," by finding that "[t]he
single rationally conceivable issue in dispute before the jury
was whether the petitioner had been one of the robbers. And
the jury by its verdict found that he had not."2 0 The Court
here was clearly aided in its determination of the issue before
the jury by defendant's inaction at the trial. Ashe conceded
for all practical purposes the robbery and the identity of
Knight as one of the victims. His only activity was crossexamination of the witnesses as to the identity of the robbers.
He did not present an alibi and waived final argument.
The second step in the application of collateral estoppel
was to decide if the determination made at the first trial
17 Yawn v. United States, 244 F.2d 235, 237 (5th Cir. 1957). See United
States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 (1951); United States v. Oppenheimer,
242 U.S. 85 (1916); United States v. De Angelo, 138 F.2d 466 (3d Cir.
1943).
IsHoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 472 (1958).
19 397 U.S. 436 (1970).

To me, if we are to psychoanalyze the jury, the evidence adduced
at the first trial could more reasonably be construed as indicating that Ashe had been at the Gladson home with the other three
men but was not one of those involved in the basement robbery.
Accordingly, even the facts in this case which the Court's
opinion considers to 'lead to but one conclusion,' are susceptible
of an interpretation that the first jury did not base its acquittal
on the identity ground which the Court finds so compelling.
The Court bases its holding on sheer 'guesswork'....
Id. at 467-68 (Burger, C.J., dissenting opinion).
2397 U.S. 436, 445

(1970).
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would be a complete bar to further prosecution.
Court had decided that the acquittal meant that
not one of the robbers, his second prosecution was
cause his identity as one of the robbers would
21
essential for conviction.
II.

APPLYING

THE DOCTRINE

OF COLLATERAL

Since the
Ashe was
barred behave been

ESTOPPEL

The Supreme Court recognized in its opinion the similarity
of the circumstances as presented by Ashe to those in Hoag v.
New Jersey.22 However, the decision in Benton v. Maryland
which held "that the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth
Amendment ... should apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment" 23 was seen to put Ashe in a quite different perspective. The question was "no longer whether
collateral estoppel is a requirement of due process, but whether
it is a part of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against double
jeopardy. '24 The Court found that it was, and that applicability of the doctrine was "no longer a matter to be left for
state court determination within the broad bounds of 'fundamental fairness,' but a matter of constitutional fact [which the
Court] must decide through an examination of the entire
record."2 5 While the Court did not join in the Justice Black's
view that the due process test of "fundamental fairness" has
no relevancy today in constitutional law, 26 it may have advanced that view by explicitly refusing to use the test under
essentially the same facts as were presented in Hoag.
The new stature given to the doctrine of collateral estoppel
by Ashe could be seen to raise again the question of whether
all of the pronouncements concerning the doctrine in the civil
setting, where it first developed, should apply in the criminal
sphere as well. Chief Justice Burger in dissent briefly raised
21 Id. at 446.
22 356 U.S. 464 (1958).

23
24
25

26

Hoag was first tried for the armed robbery of three
men, who with others had been held up in a tavern. The prosecution's
proof as to the identity of Hoag as one of the robbers was weak, and
Hoag interposed an alibi. The jury found him not guilty. Hoag was
brought to trial for the robbery of a fourth victim, and was convicted.
The Supreme Court, relying on the fact that the failure of posecution's
witnesses to identify Hoag at the first trial when they had previously
identified him, affirmed Hoag's conviction, finding that retrial under
those circumstances did not amount "to a denial of those concepts constituting 'the very essence of a scheme of ordered justice, which is due
process.' " Id. at 470.
395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969),
established the retroactivity of the rule.
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 442 (1970).
Id. at 442-43.
Id. at 447 (Black, J., concurring opinion).
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the issue of mutuality of estoppel when invoked in criminal
cases. -7 However, the plurality opinion, relying upon a passing
statement in United States v. Kramer,"-s declined to confront
the issue of mutuality, intimating perhaps that it is not applicable, but failing to resolve clearly the confusion in the law2"
as to when the prosecution may invoke the doctrine against
the interests of the accused.
The Court does offer some direction as to the manner in
which the doctrine of collateral estoppel is to be applied in
criminal cases. The application must be one of "realism and
rationality"'' and requires the court to " 'examine the record of
a prior proceeding, taking into the account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether
a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue
other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from
consideration.' 131 The inquiry as to issues determined by the
jury, finally, " 'must be set in a practical frame and viewed
with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings.' ",32
Implicit in the Court's insistence in Ashe upon a practical
application of the doctrine is the realization of the difficulties
Id. at 464-65 (Burger, C.J., dissenting opinion). United States v. RangelPerez, 179 F. Supp. 619 (D.C.Cal. 1959) concluded, after a lengthy review
of both case and secondary sources, that "[a]lthough it is the rule in civil
cases that collateral estoppel is applied mutually in favor of and against
both the plaintiff and the defendant, it is much less clear whether the
doctrine is to be applied with the same mutuality in criminal cases."
Id. at 624. The court did find, however, several instances in which the
doctrine was "applied against the interests of the accused ...." Id. at 623,
and applied it against petitioner in that case as to the issue of nationality
status. Id. at 625. See Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 505 (1925) (doctrine used against petitioner with regard to previously decided issue of
constitutional validity of warrant); United States v. Wainer, 211 F.2d 669
(7th Cir. 1954) (previous conviction of illegal production and sale of
liquor held conclusive as to defendant's proprietorship in later prosecution); Collins v. United States, 206 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1953) (previously
decided issue of voluntary waiver of counsel held conclusive).
2s 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961). "Itis much too late to suggest that this
principle is not fully applicable to a former judgment in a criminal case
...because of lack of 'mutuality..." Id. at 913.
29 In United States v. DeAngelo, the court stated: "Nor can there be any
requirement of mutuality with respect to a criminal judgment's conclusiveness. An accused is constitutionally entitled to a trial de novo
of the facts alleged and offered in support of each offense charged
against him and to a jury's independent finding with respect thereto."
138 F.2d 466, 468 (3d Cir. 1943). Accord, United States v. Carlisi, 32
F. Supp. 479, 481-83 (D.C.N.Y. 1940). However, cases have applied the
doctrine against the interests of the accused. See cases cited note 27 supra.
3 0397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970).
31 Id. at 444, quoting from Mayers and Yarborough, Bis Vexari:
New
Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1, 38-39 (1960),
[hereinafter cited as Bis Vexari].
::"
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970), quoting Sealfon v. United
States, 332 U.S. 575, 579 (1948).
27
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necessarily encountered in trying to determine the issues decided in a general verdict of acquittal. " ' Only a very small
class of accused persons will be able to avail themselves of
the doctrine of collateral estoppel because of the requirements
necessary to invoke it,: 4 and they may ultimately find their
efforts unrewarded if the court finds it impossible to apply the
doctrine.37 Though there will be some defendants for whom
the Court's holding in Ashe will afford protection from the
burden of successive prosecutions, it is suggested that merely
endowing the doctrine of collateral estoppel with constitutional
status does not make its application any easier, and instances
of application for defendants' benefit will not increase appreciably. Two scholars, commenting 10 years ago on the effect
of giving the doctrine of collateral estoppel constitutional stature, concluded: "With the concept firmly established as a part
of federal jurisprudence, a constitutional basis would be relevant only as a deterrent to the overruling of former cases or as
a block to legislative attempts to eradicate it-both seem' ' 36
ingly remote possibilities.
III. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S

CONCURRENCE

Justice Brennan avoids the problems of mutuality, interpretation of a general verdict, and the limited protections
afforded by collateral estoppel, by suggesting an alternative
means of applying the double jeopardy clause3 7 He first agrees
with the constitutional status given to the doctrine of collateral
estoppel in the plurality opinion, but he states that the doctrine has limited availability.:
The fifth amendment provides
that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ."1' Application of
the protection is determined by the "same evidence" test in
most jurisdictions. The use of this test to define "same offense"
33 The Court in Ashe explicitly recognized the problem when it found that
any application "more technically restrictive would.., amount to a
rejection of the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings, at
least in every case where the first judgment was based upon a general
verdict of acquittal." 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970).
34 See notes 6-8 supra, and the Court's definition of collateral estoppel, 397
U.S. 436, 443 (1970).
8, Schaefer, Unresolved Issues in the Law of Double Jeopardy: Weller
and Ashe, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 391, 394 (1970).
6 Bis Vexari, supra note 31, at 39.
37 Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring
opinion).
38 Id. at 459.
" U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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first occurred in Morey v. Commonwealth" and has been refined over the years. The "distinct elements" variation of the
test, used in the federal system, and adopted in actuality or in
effect in many states, was defined in Gavieres v. United States:
"A single act may be an offense against two statutes; and if
each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the
other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute
does not exempt defendant from prosecution and punishment
under the other."'4' Justice Brennan finds that use of the "same
evidence" test to apply the protection against double jeopardy
"virtually annuls the constitutional guarantee," 42 since reprosecution is possible in a variety of situations. If several victims
are involved during commission of a single criminal episode,
separate prosecutions may be brought as to each one.4 3 Multiple prosecutions may be brought where a single course of
conduct can be theoretically divided into chronologically separate crimes. 44 A single act may lead to multiple prosecutions
if seen from the viewpoint of different statutes. 45 Successive
prosecutions are permissible if undertaken by separate sovereigns. 46 Even these few examples show that "the opportunities for multiple prosecutions for an essentially unitary
criminal episode are frightening. '47 The weakness of the "same
evidence" test and its variations is that they are "so narrowly
drawn as not to afford any real protection against cumulation
of the number of prosecutions, the number of convictions, or
'4
the amount of punishment.
Brennan states his alternative to the "same evidence" test
as follows: "In my view, the Double Jeopardy Clause requires
the prosecution, except in most limited circumstances, to join
108 Mass. (12 Browne) 433 (1871). "A conviction or acquittal upon one
indictment is no bar to a subsequent conviction and sentence upon another, unless the evidence required to support a conviction upon one of
them would have been sufficient to warrant a conviction upon the
other." Id. at 434.
41 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911), quoting Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass.
40

(12 Browne) 433 (1871).

42 397 U.S. 436, 451 (1970).

Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958); State v. Hoag, 21 N.J. 496, 122
A.2d 628 (1956), aff'd, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
44 Johnson v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 314, 256 S.W. 388 (1923).
45 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
4" Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187
(1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359
U.S. 121 (1959). In a decision announced the same day as Ashe, Waller
v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970), the Court held that a municipality and
a state are not separate sovereigns for the purposes of multiple prose43

cutions.

47 Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 452 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring
opinion).
4 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(2), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956),
[hereinafter cited as M.P.C].

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 48

at one trial all the charges against a defendant which grow out
of a single criminal act, oc'urrence, episode, or transaction."4 9
This approach has been criticized as one which begs the ques
tion by changing the problem of defining "offense" to one of
defining "transaction"'" since "any sequence of conduct can be
defined as an 'act' or a 'transaction'. ' ' -".' Justice Brennan
recognizes the definitional problem and would seek guidance
from cases interpreting "same transaction," for example, as used
in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and cases which
53
have construed the phrase in civil proceedings.
This alternative does not forbid separate charges or separate punishments; the only requirement under Brennan's alternative test is that if the charges arose from a single transaction, they must be adjudicated in one trial. Chief Justice
Burger's suggestion that Brennan "totally overlooks the significance of there being six entirely separate charges . . ..54
must be seen as a misreading of the test. Brennan's test does not
affect (nor is it affected by) the number of charges which
may be filed, but only by the number of trials which may
be held.

IV.

THE

ALTERNATIVES

TO

Ashe

Compulsory joinder of charges arising out of the same
transaction is the essence of Brennan's alternative. It is subject to varied criticisms levelled by prosecutors. Two of these
appear to be valid: confusion of the jury because the charges
are complicated, and prejudice to the prosecution with regard
4' 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970). (footnote omitted). For cases in which the
same transaction test was applied, see, e.g., Triplett v. Commonwealth,
84 Ky. 193, 1 S.W. 84 (1886); Paxton v. State, 151 Tex. Cir. 324, 207
S.W.2d 876 (1948); Connelly v. D.P.P. [1964] A.C. 1254, 1347 (Opinion
by Lord Devlin).
-0 Haddad and Mulock, Double Jeopardy Problems in the Definition of
the Same Offense: State Discretion to Invoke the Criminal Process
Twice, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 515. 516 (1969).
51 "Offense" is not usually considered to be synonymous with "act." I
AND PROCEDURE § 145 (Anderson ed. 1957).
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW
Note. Twice in Jeopardy. 75 YALE L. REV. 262, 276 (1965).
397 U.S. 436, 454 n. 8 (1970). Since many of the possibilities for abuse
of the criminal process have evolved because of the specificity attempted
both in statutes and in the definitions of the "same evidence" test, it is
conceivable that scholars and judges find it not only possible but perhaps
desirable to eschew a precise formulation of the elements involved in
a "same transaction." "same conduct," or "same criminal episode" test.
The American Law Institute in its Comment to M.P.C. § 1.07 (2) coneluded with reference to the "same conduct" test: "In view of the
infinite number of possible factual variations, no effort is made to be
more specific. The courts must be entrusted with interpretation of the
term in light (,'ile evident purpose of the section to eliminate undue
harassment by successive trials, so far as that is feasible." (Tent. Draft
No. 5. 1956).
:397 1 .S.436. 468 (1970) (Burge'.C.J.. dissenting opinion).
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to the time necessary to prepare very dissimilar charges for
a single trial.;- Justice Brennan's formulation does not expressly account for these objections to compulsory joinder
under the "same transaction" test, but it would probably not
be applied under these circumstances.2"
Support for this alternative to the "same evidence" test
may be found in various areas of modern legal thought. The
proposed official draft of the American Law Institute's Model
Penal Code incorporates a compulsory joinder provision and
substantially embodies the "same transaction" requirement. 7It also provides for separate trials if the court "is satisfied
"The penalty for failure to join an
that justice so requires."'
offense, unless the court granted leave, is that the state is precluded from subsequently charging the defendant with that
offense." 51 When deciding whether separate trials should be
granted, the Court must apply the "distinct elements" varia55 Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L. REV. 262, 286-93 (1965).
56 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970). The two exceptions he does explicitly recog-

nize are: 1) "where a crime is not completed or not discovered, despite
diligence on the part of the police, until after the commencement of a
prosecution for other crimes arising from the same transaction, an
exception.., should be made to permit a separate prosecution." 2) "Another exception would be necessary if no single court had jurisdiction of
all the alleged crimes." Id. at 435 n. 7.
57 M.P.C. § 1.07 (2)
(Proposed Off. Draft 1962).
(2) Limitation on Separate Trials for Multiple Offenses. Except
as provided in Subsection (3) of this Section. a defendant
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses
based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal
episode, if such offenses are known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first
trial and are within the jurisdiction of a single court.
M.P.C. § 1.09 (Proposed Off. Draft 1962).
When Prosecution Barred by Former Prosecution for Different
Offense. Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different
provision of the statutes than a former prosecution or is based
on different facts, it is barred by such former prosecution
under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or
in a conviction.., and the subsequent prosecution is for:
(a) any offense of which the defendant could have
been convicted on the first prosecution; or
(b) any offense for which the defendant should have
been tried on the first prosecution under Section 1.07, unless
the Court ordered a separate trial of the charge of such
offense ....
58 M.P.C. § 1.07 (3) (Proposed Off. Draft 1962),
(3) Authority of Court to Order Separate Trials.
When a defendant is charged with two or more offenses
based on the same conduct or arising from the same
criminal episode, the Court, on application of the prosecuting attorney or of the defendant, may order any such
charge to be tried separately, if it is satisfied that justice
so requires.
M.P.C. § 109 (1)(b) Comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
Joinder is also excused if the acquittal or conviction in the first prosecution has been reversed.
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tion of the "same evidence" test,' ' and a requirement that the
law defining each of the offenses is directed at a substantially
different evil must be met before a subsequent prosecution
can be had. 1
The ABA Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice provide for a weaker compulsory joinder of offenses which are
within the jurisdiction of the same court and are based on
the same conduct or arise from the same criminal episode,
since a timely motion for joinder must be made by the defendant when he knows in advance of the first trial that he
has been charged with related offenses. 62 The ABA commentary adopts the Model Penal Code comments and states that
the purpose of the standard is to protect defendants from "successive prosecutions based upon essentially the same conduct,
whether the purpose in so doing is to hedge against the risk
of an unsympathetic jury at the first trial, to place a 'hold'
60M.P.C. § 1.09 (1)(c)(i):

"[T]he offense of which the defendant was
formerly convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted [must each require] proof of a fact not required
by the other .. "
61 M.P.C. § 1.09 (1)(c)(i): "[T]he law defining each of such offenses
[must be] intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil
.... " The comment to this section states that "[it]" is designed to provide minimal protection if for any reason the compulsory joinder
provision does not operate. It adopts for this purpose the federal rule."
(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
MINIMUM STANDARDS

6-ABA

ANCE,

FOR CRIMINAL

JUSTICE, JOINDER

AND

SEVER-

§§ 1.1, 1.3 (App. Draft, 1968).

1.1 Joinder of offenses.
Two or more offenses may be joined in one charge, with
each offense stated in a separate count, when the offenses,
whether felonies or misdemeanors or both:
(a) are of the same or similar character, even if not part
of a single scheme or plan; or
(b) are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts
connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme
or plan.
1.3 Failure to join related offenses.
(a) Two or more offenses are related offenses, for purposes of this standard, if they are within the jurisdiction
of the same court and are based on the same conduct or
arise from the same criminal episode.
(b) When a defendant has been charged with two or
more related offenses, his timely motion to join them for
trial should be granted unless the court determines that
because the prosecuting attorney does not have sufficient
evidence to warrant trying some of the offenses at that
time, or for some other reason, the ends of justice would
be defeated if the motion were granted. A defendant's
failure to so move constitutes a waiver of any right of
joinder as to related offenses with which the defendant
knew he was charged.
(c) A defendant who has been tried for one offense may
thereafter move to dismiss a charge for a related offense,
unless a motion for joinder of these offenses was previously denied or the right of joinder was waived as provided in section (b)....
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upon a person after he has been sentenced to imprisonment, or
simply to harrass by multiplicity of trials. 0' 3
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide for permissive joinder of offenses which "are of the same or similar
character or are based on the same act or transaction or on
two or more acts or transactions connected together or con' 64
stituting parts of a common scheme or plan.
In 1964, the House of Lords in England was faced with
much the same problem as was our Supreme Court in Ashe. 5
England had not adopted the use of collateral estoppel in
criminal cases, and while it may have applied under the circumstances of the case, Lord Devlin in his opinion chose an
alternative. The problems he found with applying collateral
estoppel in criminal cases were similar to those discussed by
Justices Brennan and Burger in Ashe.66 "The main difficulty
about its application to criminal trials is that . . . there is no

determination by the jury of separate issues ....67 . . . [F]or
estoppel on issues to work satisfactorily, the issues need to be
formulated with some precision. ' 68 Lord Devlin recognized
the problem of "whether [collateral estoppel] should be made
available to the prosecution in criminal law."69 As an alternative to the use of collateral estoppel, the English courts were
directed by rule of court "that the prosecution must as a general rule join in the same indictment charges that 'are founded
on the same facts, or form or are part of a series of offences
of the same or similar character . . .'" and the courts were
given "power to enforce such a direction . . . by staying a

second indictment if [they were] satisfied that its subjectmatter ought to have been included in the first."70 Thus, Justice Brennan notes: "England, to . . . abandoned its surviving
63
64

M.P.C. § 1.08 (2) Comment p. 34 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
FED. R. CraM. P. 8 (a). Rule 13 provides that "[t]he court may order

two or more indictments or informations or both to be tried together
if the offenses ... could have been joined in a single indictment or
information." Rule 14 provides for severance of offences or defendants
if either the prosecution or the defense would be prejudiced by joinder
or if justice otherwise requires it.
65 Connelly v. D.P.P., [1964] A.C. 1254. The fact situation in this case was
more difficult because defendant's first trial resulted in a conviction
for murder which was reversed on other grounds at the appellate level.
His second prosecution, at which he raised the defenses of double
jeopardy and collateral estoppel, was for robbery.
66 397 U.S. 436, 459-60 (1970) (Brennan, J. concurring opinion). Id. at 46468 (Burger, C.J., dissenting opinion).
67 Connelly v. D.P.P., [1964] A.C. 1254, 1344.
68 Id.at 1345.

19 Id. at 1346.
70 Id. at 1347.
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rules against joinder of charges and . . . adopted the 'same
transaction' test.'
Though Justice Brennan voiced his concern about prosecutorial abuse of the criminal process more openly than did the
remainder of the Court, it is fair to infer that all of the Justices are concerned with what has been called the "vanishing
constitutional right" against being twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense. 7' The plurality opinion finds that the prosecution in Ashe "refined his presentation in light of the turn
[and that] this is precisely
of events at the first trial . .
forbids."'7 3 If the position is
guarantee
what the constitutional
accepted that giving the doctrine of collateral estoppel constitutional stature will not afford any additional protection to
the great majority of defendants facing a second prosecution, it
is necessary to ask whether Justice Brennan's alternative would
protect defendants to any greater degree.
To determine the practical effect of the various tests which
have been used to bar subsequent prosecutions, each test might
be applied to a set of facts which was presented to the Supreme
Court in 1958.
Petitioner was charged in four separate indictments with
murdering his wife and three children, all of whom, with bullet
wounds in their heads, were found dead in a burning building ....
In three successive trials, petitioner was found guilty of the first
degree murder of his wife and two of his children. At each of the
trials the prosecution introduced into evidence details of all four
deaths.... At the first two trials, involving the death of the wife
and one of the children, the jury fixed the penalty at 20 and 45
the
years' imprisonment respectively. At the third trial, involving
74
death of a second child, the penalty was fixed at death.

Considering petitioner's claim that the subsequent prosecutions violated the due process clause of the 14th amendment,
the Court in 1958 found that "[t]he State was constitutionally
71 397 U.S. 436, 454 (1970).
72 Note, Double Jeopardy: A Vanishing Constitutional Right, 14 How. L.J.

360 (1968). See Haddad and Mulock, Double Jeopardy Problems in the
Definition of the Same Offense: State Discretion to Invoke the Criminal

Process Twice, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 515 (1969); Horack, The Multiple
Consequences of a Single Criminal Act, 21 MINN. L. REV. 805 (1937);
Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J.
513 (1949) ; Bis Vexari, supra note 31; Nate. Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE
L.J. 262 (1965); Note, Multiple Prosecution: Federalism v. Individual
Rights 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 355 (1968). These articles discuss fully the
vagaries of the "same evidence" test, the multiplicity of similar criminal
statutes which allow almost unlimited discretion in filing charges, the
dual sovereignty exception, and a host of similar substantive and procedural exceptions to the guarantee against double jeopardy which
have combined over the years to limit severely its protection of the
individual and to establish in actuality its position as a vanishing
constitutional right.
73 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970).
74 Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571, 572 (1958).
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entitled to prosecute these individual offenses singly at separate trials, and to utilize therein all relevant evidence, in the
absence of proof establishing that such a course of action entailed fundamental unfairness. ' '7-- In the Court's opinion, there
was no such unfairness either as to the successive prosecutions
or as to the apparent "jury shopping" of the prosecution. 7"
If the circumstances of this case had been brought to the
Court in 1969, following the decision in Benton v. Maryland17
which applied the protection against double jeopardy to the
States through the 14th amendment, the result would probably
not have been any different. Double jeopardy requires identity
of offenses if it is to be successfully interposed as a defense,7' ,
and petitioner was charged in the subsequent prosecutions with
the murders of family members other than his wife. Conviction in the second and third prosecutions required proof of
additional facts, i.e., establishing the children as victims, and
therefore reprosecution would have been allowed.
The Ashe decision incorporating collateral estoppel into the
fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy would also
be of little or no use to this defendant in 1970. His initial
prosecution resulted in a conviction, and it would seem impossible for a court to glean anything from a general verdict of
"guilty" which might be of benefit to petitioner. Indeed if collateral estoppel were invoked at all, it would be likely that
the prosecution would seek to use the doctrine to prevent relitigation of issues previously decided against petitioner. If, on
the other hand, petitioner's first trial had ended in an acquittal,
collateral estoppel could have been invoked to prevent relitigation of issues decided by the jury at the first prosecution. This
assumes that the court could rationally determine what those
issues were. It is possible that the defense of collateral estoppel
would bar the later prosecutions in much the same way as
petitioner Ashe's second prosecution was barred.
Under the alternative proposed by Justice Brennan, the
prosecution would have been required to join at one trial all
of the charges against petitioner, since it appears from the
-5 Id. at 573.
Id. Acccrding to various newspaper reports, the prosecution expressed
extreme dissatisfaction with the prison sentences which resulted from
the first two trials and announced a determined purpose to prosecute
petitioner until a death sentence was obtained. These newspaper articles
were not part of the record and the Court refused to consider them.
395 U.S. 784 (1969).
United States v. Wapnick, 198 F. Supp. 359, 359-60 (D.C.N.Y. 1961),
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 48

facts of the case that the four alleged murders grew out of a
single criminal episode." Since the charges were not joined,
the subsequent prosecutions would be barred unless one of the
exceptions to the rule of compulsory joinder could be invoked
by the prosecution.'" It is to be noted that Brennan's alternative would not force the prosecution to limit the number of
offenses charged in one trial, nor would it preclude different
or consecutive sentences from being imposed for the various
offenses charged." It would only require that all four indictments for murder be prosecuted at one trial.
The above applications of the various tests show that collateral estoppel is of little benefit to defendants who were convicted at their first prosecutions. It is also clear that one of
the elements of abuse not solved by Justice Brennan's alternative is the prosecutor's discretion to charge a defendant with
several offenses under several statutes, even though they all
arose out of one criminal transaction and must be adjudicated
2
at one trial.1
It is suggested that the Supreme Court will soon have to
recognize broader grounds than those of collateral estoppel on
which an accused can base a plea of double jeopardy if the
guarantee is to retain any meaning at all. Justice Brennan's
alternative may prove persuasive to a majority of the Court
in the future. He was joined in his opinion by Justices Douglas
and Marshall,8 3 and only two members of the Court, Chief Jus79

"Episode" has been defined as "an occurrence or connected series of

occurrences and developments which may be viewed as distinctive and
apart although part of a larger or more comprehensive series .... "
WEBSTER, TmRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTONARY 765 (1961). This definition is adopted by ABA MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
JOINDER AND SEVERANCE, 1.3 (a) Commentary (App. Draft 1968).

80 397 U.S. 436, 453 n. 7, 455 n. 11 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring opinion).
s, It should further be noted that the protections afforded by Brennan's
alternative do not prevent these abuses where statutes are so written
as to allow prosecutions for essentially the same acts under various
statutes. Thus, as in Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958), a narcotics violator was prosecuted for possession of unstamped narcotics
under three separate statutes in each case, the mere fact of possession
being required as proof. New York alleviates this problem by statute,
providing for non-consecutive sentencing "[wjhen more than one
sentence ... is imposed on a person for two or more offenses committed
through a single act or omission...." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.25 (2) (McKinney 1967). Clearly it would not benefit the New York prosecutor to
charge any but the most serious provable offense thus eliminating any
multiplicity in charging or sentencing and avoiding the harassment
discussed in Ashe.
' The American Bar Foundation Project suggests that prosecutors will not
amass more counts under a required joinder rule than they do when
joinder is permissive. Prosecutors will select those charges which they
feel they can best prove. The Administration of Criminal Justice in the
United States, 6 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION 129 (pilot project report).

83

397 U.S. 436, 448 (1970).
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tice Burger and Justice Harlan, expressly rejected Brennan's
alternative.s4 It is possible that the two Justices in the plurality opinion felt only that on the facts in Ashe, a broader
holding than that incorporating collateral estoppel would have
constituted "reaching out" on the part of the Court to establish new guidelines. Perhaps the limited effect in practice of
the use of the defense of collateral estoppel will in the future
sway the majority to Brennan's view that the "correction of
the abuse of criminal process should not in any event be made
to depend on the availability of collateral estoppel."8 5

S4 Id. at 448, 468.
s5 Id. at 459.
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TRANSACTIONS-Description of
Collateral in a Financing Slatement. - In re Lehner, 303 F.
Supp. 317 (D. Colo. 1969), aff'd, 427 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1970).
COMMERCIAL

LAW-SECURED

O

N August 18, 1967, Household Finance Corporation (HFC)
made a loan to Lowell Louis Lehner of $827.33 which was
secured by a tapedeck and a portable television set. Pursuant
to the statutory requirement for perfecting security interests,
HFC duly filed a financing statement in which the secured
collateral was described only as "consumer goods." On November 6, 1967, Lehner filed a petition for voluntary bankruptcy.
HFC sought leave to foreclose on its security interest. The referee ruled the lien invalid on the ground that the term "consumer goods" did not describe the secured collateral sufficiently to perfect HFC's interest in the television set and tapedeck. On petition to the U.S. District Court (D. Colo.), held,
affirmed. The term "consumer goods" is too broad, general and
meaningless to fulfill the demand of UCC § 9-402(1) that the
financing statement describe the items secured, or at least indicate their type.'
I.

NOTICE FILING UNDER THE UCC

Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code 2 provides
three legal devices by which a security interest in personal
property may be perfected,: i.e., rendered impervious to defeat
by a trustee in insolvency proceedings 4 or unsecured creditors
in general. Of these, the most important is that of notice
filing9' Indeed, § 9-302 provides that with certain specified
exceptions, a financing statement must be filed to perfect a
security interest in personal propertyY
From a functional point of view, the filed financing statement serves to place a prospective creditor on inquiry notice
I In re Lerner, 303 F. Supp. 317, 320 (D. Colo. 169). On appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the decision of the district court
was affirmed per curiam. In re Lehner, 427 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1970).
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Colorado Code will be
designated "UCC" and will omit the complete statutory citation. Citation
to "Comments" are those accompanying the 1962 Official Text.
UCC §§ 9-302, 9-304, 9-305, 9-306.
4 Federal Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 96, 1106
(1963); UCC § 9-301.
-- UCC § 9-302.
6 d. §9-302(1).
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that the named secured party may have a security interest in
the collateral described.' Further inquiry from the parties concerned is necessary to disclose the complete state of affairs.,
To be effective, a financing statement must contain, inter
alia, "a statement indicating the types, or describing the items,
of collateral."" For the purpose of this requirement, "any
description of personal property . . . is sufficient whether or
not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is described."'u
In adopting this simple and flexible test for determining the
sufficiency of a description, the Code has abandoned the highly
technical and rigid formalities that unduly burdened secured
transactions under pre-Code law.1 1 Thus the Comment to §
9-110 states that in applying this test "courts should refuse to
follow the holdings . . . that descriptions are insufficient unless
they are of the most exact and detailed nature, the so-called
'serial number' test."1 2
To date, the relatively few courts which
to pass on the sufficiency of description in
ment, have, for the most part, been willing
monition of the Code drafters. Adverting
7 Id.

have had occasion
a financing stateto follow the adto the functional

§ 9-403, Comment 2.

8 Id.

9 Id. §9-402(1).
'OId. § 9-110. It should be noted that Colorado has adopted a nonuniform
amendment to § 9-110. The Colorado version, as found in COLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 155-9-110 (1963), as amended, (Supp. 1969), reads as

follows:

II

12

For the purposes of this article, any description of personal
property is sufficient if it specifically identifies and itemizes
in the security agreement what is described as to consumer
goods, and whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is described as to all other personal property.
Thus Colorado, in the interest of consumer protection, has stifled the
Code's attempt to abolish the pre-Code formalities which required
the security agreement to contain the most detailed and particularized
description of collateral. However, as the Colorado amendment clearly
applies only to the security agreement, it seems safe to conclude that
the language of the Official Draft, as quoted in the text, still controls
the sufficiency of a description in a financing statement. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the language of the Official
Draft is reproduced in Comment 1 of § 9-402 as the proper determining test for the sufficiency of description under that section. Thus
what follows in the text applies to Colorado as well as to those states
which have adopted the uniform version of §9-110.
In Colorado, three statutes governed most transactions in personalty:
they were the Chattel Mortgage Act, the Inventory Mortgage Act, and
the Assignment of Accounts Receivable Act. Each of these statutes
had its own formal requisites, differing means of perfection, and
required elaborate and precise descriptions of collateral. The history
of cases decided under such statutes is replete with examples of
ostensibly perfected security interests set aside because of failure to
comply with a minute, technical requirement of form.
UCC § 9-110, Comment.
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approach taken by the Code, they have generally permitted
the use of broad, indefinite descriptions.' 3 This trend has
been particularly noticeable in the field of inventory and accounts receivable financing, where broad descriptions of collatteral are of particular utility. Thus, a financing statement
containing the description, "all present and future accounts
receivable submitted," was held sufficient." Also, the word
"inventory" was held not to be too vague to satisfy the requirements of § 9-402(1). 15
While the floating lien and after-acquired property aspects
of inventory and accounts receivable financing make mandatory the use and judicial validation of very broad descriptions
where such financing is concerned, the same considerations are
not applicable to consumer goods financing. Nevertheless, at
least one court has refused to set a different standard of sufficiency for description of stable, as opposed to shifting, collateral. Thus it was held in In re Trumble0 that the description "consumer goods" was sufficient in a financing statement
utilized to perfect a security interest in household goods, two
rifles and a shotgun. The court in In re Trumble acknowledged
that the term "consumer goods" was possessed of broad, and
to an extent, indefinite meaning, but concluded that since it
was sufficient to do the job assigned to it, i.e., to place a prospective creditor on inquiry notice, it was also sufficient to
17
perfect the secured party's interest in the secured collateral.
Outside of Colorado, In re Trumble is the only other reported case dealing with the precise issue before the court
in the instant case.' Clearly, the two cases are irreconcilable.
In what follows an attempt will be made to show where the
Colorado court erred in not aligning itself with the decision
in In re Trumble. The gist of the discussion is that requiring
itemization in the financing statement militates against certain
In re Platt, 257 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Security Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Hlass, 246 Ark. 1084, 441 S.W.2d 91 (1969); National Cash Register v. Firestone & Co., 346 Mass. 255, 191 N.E.2d 471 (1963); Evans
Products Co. v. Jorgensen, 245 Ore.362, 421 P.2d 978 (1966); Thompson v. O.M. Scott Credit Corp., 28 Pa. D. & C.2d 85 (1962).
14 Industrial Packaging Products Co. v. Fort Pitt Packaging International,
Inc., 399 Pa. 643, 161 A.2d 19 (1960).
15 Thompson v. O.M. Scott Credit Corp., 28 Pa. D. & C.2d 85 (1962).
16 Bankruptcy No. 88n, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 543 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
17 Id. at 546.
18 It should be noted that in rendering its decision in In re Lehner, the
District Court was not exactly dealing with an issue of first impression
in Colorado. In re Bell, Bankruptcy No. 68-13-658, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 740
(D. Colo. 1969), the referee came to precisely the same conclusion as
the U.S. District Court with regard to the insufficiency of the term
13

"consumer goods."
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policies underlying Article Nine and does not safeguard any
interest of the consumer.
II. IN RE LEHNER

AND UNDERLYING CODE POLICIES

In reaching its decision in the instant case, the court stated
that, "I w]hile the comment [to § 9-402] states that the finaning statement is sufficient if it puts potential creditors on
inquiry notice, the statutory language of § 155-9-402 clearly
requires some specificity of description-the financing statement must indicate the type or describe the item of collateral."'" It then concluded that "It ihe use of the term 'consumer goods' fails . .. to satisfy this section. It is too broad,
general, and meaningless to fulfill the demand of § 9-402(1) that
the financing statement at least reveal the 'types.' ,.,
The court distinguished those cases holding that the requirements of § 9-402(1) are satisfied by the use of such broad
descriptions as "inventory" and "accounts receivable" on the
ground that they involved commercial rather than consumer
transactions. According to the court, those decisions were based
on "the fact of commercial policy applicable to inventory
financing which discourages the filing of new statements each
time new inventory and accounts receivable are acquired - a
consideration which is not present in an individual loan case
like the present one.121 The court here intimates, without stating, specific affirmative policy considerations in support of the
proposition that a higher degree of specificity of description
is required in the financing statement where a consumer, as
opposed to a merchant, is the recipient of a loan.
As has previously been observed, the function of the financing statement is to put potential creditors on inquiry notice
that the named secured party may have an interest in the
described collateral.22 To this end
9-402(1) provides that
"[a]

financing statement is sufficient if it . . . contains a state-

ment indicating the types, or describing the items of collateral."' ;! Inasmuch as the language quoted uses the disjunctive
or with respect to identification of the collateral, it is clear
that the financing statement would be sufficient if it contained
nothing more than an indication as to the types of collateral
secured. The question then becomes, is the term "consumer
N9303 F. Supp. 317, 318 (D.Colo. 1969).
Id. at 320.

20
21

Id.

22 UCC § 9-402, Comment 2.

23 Id.§ 9-402(1).
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goods" sufficiently descriptive of a "type" of collateral so as
to meet the requirements of . 9-402(1)?
Section 9-109 provides that "goods are: (1) 'Consumer
goods' if they are used or bought for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; (2) 'Equipment' .
.
,24 In addition,
(3) 'Farm equipment' . . . ; (4) 'Inventory'
the Comments to § 9-109 state that:
[t]he classes of goods are mutually exclusive; the same property
cannot at the same time and as to the same person be both
equipment and inventory. In borderline cases-a physician's car
or a farmer's jeep which might be either consumer goods or
equipment-the principal use to which the property is put should
be considered as determinative. Goods can fall into different
of a
classes at different times; a radio is inventory in the hands
25
dealer and consumer goods in the hands of a householder.
This language clearly indicates that it was the intent of the
drafters that the term "consumer goods" have some functional
meaning and content. The widespread use of the Code definition of the term, especially in recently proposed consumer
oriented legislation,'2" indicates that the intent of the drafters
has not been frustrated..2 7 In light of this, it seems safe to
conclude that the term "consumer goods" does indeed represent
a type of goods for the purposes of § 9-402(1); and its use in a
financing statement would thus be sufficient to place a potential creditor on inquiry notice as to the possibility of the existence of a prior interest in any collateral reasonably within the
scope of the term. Clearly then, the financing statement filed
by HFC in the instant case was sufficient to put potential
creditors on inquiry notice as to the existence of a security
interest in Lehner's tapedeck and television set.
If the above analysis is correct and the description "consumer goods" is sufficient to place a prospective creditor on
inquiry notice, requiring any greater degree of description is
not justified unless some overriding policy consideration demands greater specificity. It is true, as the court indicated,
that inclusion of the notice filing concept, accompanied by use
of broad descriptives, was motivated by a commercial need for
24

2."

Id. § 9-109.
Id. § 9-109, Comment 2.
NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT § 1, 301 (68) (1970 first final draft)\, UNIFORM CONSUMIER CREDIT CODE § 3-104(1) (b) (1969 revised final draft),
and TRUTH IN LENDING ACT § 103(h), 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (Supp. V, 1970).

-;Cf.
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The court in In re Trumble, in deciding that the term "consumer goods"
was sufficiently descriptive, adverted to the widespread use of the

term in stating that it could nct "close its eyes to the fact that this
use of 'consumer goods' is now fairly common so this term must serve
some purpose." 5 U.C.C. Rep. 543, 546 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
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inventory financing. " 1 However, the absence of those policy
considerations in the consumer transaction does not seem to be
an acceptable basis for differentiation; the UCC is a uniform
body of law, applicable to all classes of goods, buyers, and
sellers.*-'" While use of notice filing may have been prompted
by the needs of one segment of the commercial world, the Code
clearly makes the device available in all kinds of transactions
The question becomes, then, does requiring itemization in
the financing statement safeguard some interest of the consumer within the context of the individual loan case? It should
be noted at the outset that the Code does not totally neglect
consumers, although it is not designed primarily to protect
consumer interests. The Code draws distinctions between consumers and merchants where it is felt strict application of a
single rule would result in injustice and abuses. :'" No such distinction was included in those sections under discussion with
respect to the degree of description required in a financing
statement filed to perfect an interest in consumer goods. Also,
it should be reiterated that the principal function of notice
filing is to protect potential creditors by providing notice
of the existence of a prior security interest in the debtor's
property.
A possible argument in support of itemization is that consumers should b? aware of the extent to which their personalty
is encumbered. Of course, the extent of a security interest is
not controlled by the financing statement no matter how broad
the description, but by the security agreement. :" The UCC,
as enacted in Colorado, requires itemization in the security
argeement where an interest is taken in consumer goods.:2'-' If
the debtor is not aware of those items of his personalty subject to a lien, reference to the security agreement is possible. : :
In addition, the UCC provides means whereby a debtor may
4
force a creditor to disclose the extent of the secured property.:3
2S

UCC § 9-402, Comment 2.

"

1.

GILMORE.

SECURITY

INTERESTS

IN

PERSONAL

PROPERTY

§ 15.3

(1965).

3"UCC § 2-104, Comment 1.
:11
Id. § 9-203.
32 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155-9-110 (1963), as amended, (Supp. 1969).
33FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b) (5) (1970) requires a "clear identi-

fication" of property on the disclosure statement in which a creditor
retains or acquires a security interest arising from a consumer credit
transaction. Although this provision was not applicable to the transaction
involved herein, promulgation of Reg. Sec. 226.8 would appear to weaken

arguments for future application of the rule in the instant case. If
disclosure of the extent of a security interest is required as an incident
of a transaction, there would seem to be little reason for continuing to
distort the function of the financing statement by requiring itemization.
34 UCC § 9-208.
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A more serious argument for requiring a higher degree of
descriptive specificity with respect to consumer goods concerns
monopolization of a particular debtor's credit by "first filing"
"5
creditors. Under the "first-to-file" rule of the Code, where
both security interests are perfected by filing, priority between
conflicting security interests in the same collateral is determined by the order of filing, regardless of when the interests
attached. A security interest may, under § 9-203(1), be perfected by a filing previous to attachment, although the interest
is not perfected until attachment., 6 Therefore, where a prior
security interest is perfected by filing a financing statement
utilizing a broad description, the single filing is sufficient to
perfect any later attaching security interests in property
covered by that description. And such interests have priority
under the first-to-file rule over security interests which may
have attached earlier in point of time. There is nothing to
prevent a second secured creditor from having his security
interest subordinated to a later attaching security interest in
the same property which was perfected by an earlier filing.
It is argued that a debtor, faced with financial difficulties, may
be tempted to borrow from creditor A, securing the loan with
an item of personalty in which creditor B has a security
interest. Under the provisions discussed above, if a debtor has
previously engaged in secured transactions with A, who in
perfecting his interests utilized a descriptive statement broad
enough to include the item in which B has an interest, A's
interest will have priority. Therefore, a subsequent creditor
may be hesitant to extend credit to a debtor where previous
creditors have filed statements describing collateral in such
terms as "consumer goods."
This problem would not seem to pose as great a difficulty
when the former debts are not outstanding. Under the UCC
a debtor may compel a creditor to file a termination statement when the debt has been settled.3 7 Where the loan is
still outstanding, it is conceivable that the first-to-file rule
would inhibit extension of credit by subsequent sources in the
manner described. However, there is no empirical evidence
indicating that monopolization of a debtor's business is a "real"
problem; certainly, none was introduced in the instant case
to support a conclusion that consumers are experiencing dif:5 Id. § 9-312(5) (a).
36 Id. § 9-203(1).
37 Id. § 9-404.
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ficulty in obtaining credit from multiple sources because of
broad descriptions in financing statements.3s
Use of descriptions otherwise satisfying the requirements
of § 9-402(1) should not be denied, absent a showing that
requiring itemization in financing statements facilitates extension of consumer credit. Indeed, it is arguable that, even if
monopolization of a consumer's credit were a real problem,
this would not be sufficient grounds to require itemization. As
Gilmore has noted, the same result could be obtained by a
carefully drawn financing statement in which the collateral
was described in the most specific terms.:"' Requiring itemization would not alleviate any burden upon the consumer which
could not be imposed through some other legitimate application of Code provisions.
CONCLUSION

The ruling in In re Lehner denied use of a descriptive
statement which appears to satisfy the requirement of § 9-402
that a description merely place a prospective creditor on inquiry notice. In requiring itemization in the financing statement, the court has misconstrued the function of the financing statement, denied use of common commercial parlance,
dysfunctionally segmented varieties of commercial transactions, and introduced a needless technicality. Clearly this
decision is antagonistic to the underlying Article Nine policies
38

3

Information imparted by local counsel associated with the small loan
industry indicates that the first-to-file rule does not in fact deter

subsequent creditors from making loans to debtors who have entered
into a prior secured transaction perfected by a financing statement
containing a broad description of collateral. As a general rule, consumer
finance companies require collateral in order to acquire "leverage" in
the debt collection process, not to provide a pool of assets from which,
upon default, a debt may be recouped. In addition, many of the loans
granted by consumer finance companies are debt consolidation loans.
Once the -funds advanced have been used to liquidate outstanding
debts, the debtor is requested to require prior creditors to file termination statements, cancelling financing statements by which a prior indebtedness was perfected.
Gilmore, Security Law, Formalism and Article Nine, 47 N.B. L. REV.
659, 672 (1968). By way of illustration, local finance companies typically
file a notice containing a descriptive statement which is aptly referred
to as a "shotgun" financing statement. The statement describing the
collateral consists of an exhaustive enumeration of specific items of
consumer goods. These notices are used even though a present security
interest is not taken in every item listed. Apparently, such shotgun
financing statements have found favor with the local bankruptcy
courts, as no reported cases have been discovered denying their use.
Local counsel indicate that the "shotgun" financing statement has
been tacitly approved on the ground that the UCC permits use of a
single financing statement to perfect a security interest in personalty
described therein attaching subsequent to a filing. In effect, it is
permissable to set forth in the financing statement property which
may be subject to future security agreements as well as property
subject to a present security agreement. See UCC § 9-402(1), 9-303(1).
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of functionalism and simplicity. This effect cannot be justified
in terms of protecting some interest of the consumer. In fact,
it would seem as if the only party who benefits by requiring
itemization in the financing statement under Colorado law is
the trustee in bankruptcy. The voided security interest is
preserved for the benefit of the estate-the bankrupt's exemption under state law only attaches to his equity in the property.
The instant decision effects a return to the state of affairs
existing under prior security law; legitimate security interests
are rendered susceptible to attack by a voracious trustee for
failure to comply with a legal technicality serving no function.
It is to be hoped that other jurisdictions look before imitating
this misguided leap upon the consumer bandwagon.
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CRIME IN AMERICA
BY RAMSEY CLARK

New York:

W

Simon and Schuster, 1970. Pp. 346
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HAT Ramsey Clark has to say about the empirical dimen-

sions of crime seldom extends beyond the factfinding accomplished by President Johnson's crime commission in 1967.
Indeed, it is not unfair to characterize Crime in America as a
popularized and personalized critique of The Challenge of
Crime in a Free Society, the basic report of that commission.'
Mr. Clark reiterates the conventional (liberal) tenets:
"crime" is a complex and varied phenomenon; we do not know
how much crime really occurs, as opposed to how much is reported to and by police departments; crime rates seem to be
linked to social change; "organized crime" may be largely a
product of our own paternalistic proscriptions (and would you
prefer that narcotics distribution be unorganzed?); marijuana
use should be legalized; the number of guns in society should be
reduced; police departments are the dumping ground for every
social problem that political "leaders" cannot face up to; police
performance during riots can be improved by prior training;
the Chicago convention police riot was caused by intemperate
remarks of the city administration; police spokesmen greatly
overstate the need to rely on confessions to obtain convictions;
wiretapping does not produce an adequate return to offset its
social and economic costs; the bail-or-jail system needs drastic
overhaul; the office of the prosecutor should be taken out of
the political spoils system; courts would benefit from updated
administrative techniques; judicial insistence on due process for
criminal suspects does not handcuff the police; prisons do not
rehabilitate; the death penalty should be abolished-and so on.
The popularization of facts and traditional analyses is well
done, and that is probably the chief value of the book.
Mr. Clark can, at times, be poignantly persuasive, as he
is, for example, in making his point that the bail system
actually needs reform:
1 THE PRESIDENT'S

COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967).
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Ronnie Brown was five years old when his mother brought
him north to Brooklyn from rural South Carolina. Before he
was arrested on July 25, 1969, for robbery at the age of seventeen,
police had taken him into custody twice-once for assault, later
for car theft. He had never been convicted of a crime. On August
14, 1969, at 5:20 A.M., he was discovered dead, hanging from a
light fixture in his Rikers Island prison cell-a belt looped
around his neck. He had been in jail nineteen days, though no
grand jury had indicted him and no lawyer had advised him of
his rights, when his aunt heard of his death on the radio. She
told his mother, a nurse in a VA Hospital, twelve hours before
the police found time to advise her.
Ronnie had written his mother, "Dear Mom, This is not the
life I want. I am not really bad ....

I want to get out and work

and do something good." He didn't explain
to go to the bathroom." To persons familiar
it was not necessary. He did not want to
2
sexuals.
Soporific Colorado is not without its

why he was "afraid
with American jails,
be raped by homoown Ronnie Browns.

Several years ago in a Denver District Ccurt, a young defendant who had been convicted for possession of marijuana awaited
sentencing. He evidently hoped for probation but feared imprisonment. When the prison sentence was announced, he shot
himself to death in the court room. The official response was
to institute procedures to make sure that those facing sentencing are not armed. Today, that sentence would probably have
been probation. Tomorrow, one would hope, we will turn our
efforts from criminalization of our youth for their petty vices
and turn to important problems. But a decade of irrational use
of power must have lasting effects on parents, their children,
and anyone else concerned with the ability of the state to
administer justice.
The basic flaw in Mr. Clark's view of the crime problem
is not his acceptance of the thesis that crime is an evitable
concomitant of our cultural components. It is, instead, that
crime eradication should be the objective. By hypothesis,
then, our culture must change.
On the causes of crime:
If we are to deal meaningfully with crime, what must be seen
is the dehumanizing effect on the individual of slums, racism,
ignorance and violence, of corruption and impotence to fulfill
rights, of poverty and unemployment and idleness, of generations of malnutrition, of congenital brain damage and prenatal
neglect, of sickness and disease, of pollution, of decrepit, dirty,
ugly, unsafe, overcrowded housing, of alcoholism and narcotics
addiction, of avarice, anxiety, fear, hatred, hopelessness and injustice. These are the fountainheads of crime. They can be controlled.' (original in italics)
2R. CLARK,
3

Id. at 17-18.

CRIME IN AMERICA 298

(1970)

[hereinafter cited as CLARK].
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Having identified the causes of crime, his solutions follow:
To insist on the dignity of the individual, to assure him health
and education, meaningful employment, decent living conditions,
to protect his privacy and the integrity of his personality, to
enforce his rights though he may be the least among us, to give
him power to affect his own destiny-only thus can we hope
to instill in him a concern for others, for their well-being, their
safety and the security of their property. Only thus can we bring
to him a regard for our society, our institutions and our purposes
as a people that will render him incapable of committing crime.'
(original in italics)
Public ignorance of the problems of crime and crime control may not be as critical or detrimental as the recrudescence
of utopianism in an influential political liberal. Nor is it as
unexpected. The view that crime will cease to be a major problem only when America undergoes
character results from identifying
of crime. Eradication of crime is
It is depressing, as well, to believe

a metamorphosis of national
the task as the elimination
a pretentious political goal.
that improvement is condi-

tioned on a national denial of avarice.
It would be happier to believe that change in crime control
methods is possible in the name of self-interest. Does our selfinterest compel a national economic policy that depends upon
a twenty percent unemployment rate among young black
males? Is it really necessary to insist upon public monopolization of education which permits the educational bureaucracy
to perform at substandard levels? Do we really need a change
in national character to reduce killing by police? (The actual
number of deaths is interestingly unascertainable.)
Do we
really need massive research projects to tell us that a kid's best
chance for rehabilitation after committing a crime is when he
is not caught?
The problem is not "national character." The problem is
inadequate political leadership. Local examples, again, are not
wanting. Suburban Thornton's police department managed to
wreck their entire fleet of cars trying to run down a petty
violator. The Denver City Council, during the tense summer
of 1968, debated for weeks the merits of legislation requiring
topless dancers to wear pasties. Colorado State Senator Hugh
Chance in 1971 strongly urged that the state legislature not
pass the proposed updating of the Colorado criminal code because penalties for fornication had been left out. These are
4 Id. at 20.
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trivial concerns compared to the death of Ronnie Brown. But
they are all symptoms of the same dearth of leadership. We are
not facing a crime crisis; we are facing a crisis in government.
Both crime and contemporary notions of criminal justice are
symptoms.
A pervasive and lasting sense of outrage on the part of
the public may not solve all of the problems of the criminal
process, but it appears unlikely that significant change will
occur in its absence. And it is difficult to escape a cynical
sense of deja vu if that observation is true. Given the squalid
conditions of our policy-making machinery-especially state
legislatures-it will take loud and lasting pressure for any
change to be made, especially any change requiring money.
Perhaps Crime in America will help to inform the uninformed.
One hopes, however, that even the uninformed will recognize
excessive idealism when they see it.
Mr. Clark feels that spending much more money on crime
control would be beneficial. There is reason to suppose the
contrary to be true. Given the present ambitions of criminal
justice systems, it may be well that most systems are relatively powerless compared to what they could be. The zeal of
reformers to build better prisons without better "correctional"
leadership may well result in larger-and architecturally
more pleasing-but equally crowded, inept and brutal warehouses of social problems. Right now the most important restraining influence on governmental use of coercion to solve
the crime problem is the lack of sufficient resources to become
more efficient. It is an old argument: Sir Robert Peel made
the same objection to modernization of the English system in
the last century. His point went unheeded. It still is. "
Without either a massive infusion of funds or an unforeseeable change in "national character," improvements can be
made. We cannot solve the bail problem, but we certainly
have the requisite knowledge to ameliorate greatly its deleterious impact."' We cannot eliminate feuding between spouses, but
we know how to reduce significantly its frequency and deadliness.7 We cannot get handguns out of society, but we do know
how to reduce their number. We cannot eliminate bad-check
writing, but it may be fair to assume that removal of counter
OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 365-66 (1968).
ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE App.

H. PACKER, THE LIMITS
"See e.g., AMERICAN BAR

Draft, 1968.
TCLARK, supra note 2, at 140-43.
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checks from bars has helped. We cannot eliminate theft and
forgery of government checks, but again it may be fair to
assume that access to them might be significantly reduced by
staggering mailing dates.
There are obviously many other things that can be donemany with no costs at all. A close "cost-benefit" analysis of
some present practices might even indicate areas of possible
savings in money and lives. What benefits are perceived in the
practice of engaging in high-speed chases of traffic violators in
congested urban areas? What costs do we incur through that
practice?
At times, Mr. Clark reveals a tendency to overlook offsetting costs that are implicit in his proposals for reform. Consider, for example, his suggestion for prevention of crime by
anticipatory intervention: "Professionals could find 90 percent
of the children likely to become delinquent. We may have to
live with the rest; we do not have to live with most."' Proposals for pervasive testing programs of our youth to predict
probable future criminality and proposals for initiating programs to defeat our predictions are no longer rare. Ultimately,
one would suppose that force must be involved either against
the child or parent who disagrees with a diagnosis of probable
future criminality and refuses voluntary treatment or removal.,
Immoderate zeal for-reform is no less dangerous today than
it was 70 years ago when we launched our largely disastrous
experiment with creation of juvenile control systems. Professor
Norval Morris has put the matter well:
Whenever by state authority we limit a citizen's physical freedom, we are disposing of the greatest powers (capital punishment apart) that the collective exercises over its members.
When this is done for the citizen's own good, or to protect others
from predicted harm at his hands, a decent respect for our own
ignorance should give us pause.' 0

Unsupportable faith in the ability of social scientists to predict
future human behavior could cause more misery than all of
our present practices combined.
What we need at this point is neither a hopeless and distracting campaign to change the American scene nor a heavyhanded, counterproductive insistence on higher levels of en8 Id. at 242.
1'And, of course, the broader the criteria of inclusion in the program, the
higher will be the apparent rate of "cures."
V) N. Morris, Foreword to R. ROCK WITH M. JACOBSON AND R. JANOPAUL,
HOSPITALIZATION

AND

DISCHARGE

OF

THE MENTALLY

ILL

at xv

(1968).
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forcement power. If we use what we do know, significant improvements are currently possible, provided that we recognize
the limits of our knowledge.
The introduction to Crime in America characterizes Mr.
Clark as a dreamer, unafraid of the rebukes of "practical"
men." Publication of the book is some evidence of both points.
So is his conclusion: "Guided by reason, America will soar on
''12
wings of humane concern.
Lawrence P. Tiffany*

11 CLARK, supra note 2, at 9.
Id. at 346.
* Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.

12

AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE COURT
BY THOMAS HOLTON

Martinus NijhoJJ: The Hague, 1970. Pp. xii, 112.

T

HE prevention, regulation and control of international conflicts is a desirable objective. Aptly enshrined in the preamble and the first two articles of the United Nations Charter,1
this objective has been repeatedly affirmed in various U.N.
resolutions and declarations, including the recent "Declaration
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations,"2 which was adopted without
vote in the General Assembly on October 24, 1970.
However, the almost universal condemnation and prohibition of the use of interstate violence is not reflected by state
conduct. Nor has this consensus on prevention of violence, as
codified in the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, 3 the League of Nations Covenant, 4 and the U.N. Charter,5 been translated into
structuring authoritative institutions providing adequate pacific
means of settling international disputes. The result is the
prevalence of major and minor conflicts, spread over every
continent and involving not only super powers but various
middle and small states, and even mini states. And the goal
of world peace seems as illusory as ever.
It is not that statesmen and publicists do not recognize the
problem. But the fact is that notwithstanding such recognition states (which continue to be major actors in the international arena) have thus far stubbornly refused to permit thirdparty decisionmaking from becoming an effective disputesettlement mechanism. Witness, for example, the discouraging
record of the International Court of Justice in settling inter1 See also U.N. CHARTER chs. VI, VII, and VIII.
2 See Resolutions of the General Assembly at its Twenty-Fifth Regular
Session, 15 September-17 December, 1970, U.N. Press Release GA/4355,
pt. VIII, at 1 (Dec. 17, 1970).
3 46 Stat. 2343; 94 L.N.T.S. 57. The Kellogg-Briand "Pact of Paris" became
effective July 24, 1929. Article 1 reads: 'The High Contracting Parties
solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they

condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies,

and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations
with one another."
4 See especially art. 12, 13, 15, and 16 of the Covenant.
5 See especially the preamble and chs. I, VI, VII and VIII of the Charter.
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state conflicts,' or the total collapse of the collective security
machinery and measures in the U.N. Charter,7 which were envisioned as the mainstay of international peace and security.
It is against this background that one should analyze and
evaluate Professor Holton's recommendation to establish an
International Peace Court - a tribunal with compulsory jurisdiction in respect of state-sponsored transnational violence which he believes will be a "first step toward the deterrence
of violence."" For settling international conflicts he prefers a
judicial tribunal to the presently available political forums the Security Council and the General Assembly - because a
tribunal provides "a forum of judgment which features visible
safeguards against obvious partisanship, which excludes the
veto, and which specializes in impartiality." Among the various alternatives - a national court, the International Court of
Justice, and a special tribunal - he favors a permanent peace
court which would constitute a "symbol of deterrence and a
standing reminder of the international community's readiness
for judgment."10
In offering this suggestion Professor Holton challenges the
traditional premise that a state's consent is a prerequisite to
exercising judicial jurisdiction over its international conduct."
He considers "sovereign unaccountability" as an "outmoded
dogma,""'2 which he would replace by compulsory jurisdiction.
Similarly, he would rely more on the moral judgment of the
international community to influence a state's behavior than on
the traditional strategies military, economic, and diplomatic.'" He contends that a significant base of influence, the
people, who have the power of "moral censure," should not be
overlooked. "And this is a power which, if released and channeled, can reach any violator and penetrate the shield of
any material defense.' 4 He offers a new premise: "An
international Peace Court will harness moral power to legal
structure."'
,;For an excellent survey see Gross, The International Court of Justice:
Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing its Role in the International Legal Order, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 253 (1971).

7 See U.N. CHARTER ch. VII.
S T. HOLTON, AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE COURT 17 (1970).
9 Id. at 27.
" Id. at 30.
''Id. at 79-80.
12 Id. at 83.
Id. at 77-78.
Id. at 78.
15 Id. at 79.
'3
14
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In two other areas Professor Holton departs from customary thinking. First, he rejects the premise that "if the great
powers fail to take the initiative against the menace of international violence, the other nations are powerless to take the
initiative." ' Arguing that "[i]nternational participatory democracy is evolving in the assembly of man,"" he observes that
both the authority structure and the resource structure of the
international community are so designed as to allow the other
nations to assume and exercise communal responsibility and
initiative for peace. Secondly, he surmises that the "world
community's immediate need for physical enforcement" is perhaps "less clearly established than its need for authoritative
procedure.' 'ls He anticipates that the "most compelling incentive [to governments] for compliance with the law of peace
and security" might be provided by the "certainty of judgment" that the proposed Peace Court would offer. 19
Professor Holton's new premises form a theoretical foundation for the Peace Court. The court's jurisdiction will extend
to cases of "state-sponsored violence,"20 and both the plaintiff
and the defendant will be states. The court's membership
would be open to all states; it would be "structured for action"
and "the product of the action will be the judgment ... [which
will be] produced in the process of applying the law to a de21
terminate set of facts."
On the nature of the judgment: "the judgment will award
no compensation. It will pronounce no sentence of physical
punishment. But a judgment of censure will constitute an
authoritative condemnation of the responsible party. And when
the responsible party is the government of a sovereign state
this is punishment enough.12 2 Professor Holton believes that
this condemnation should prove effective. In his words: "The
central premise is that the governmental mind is sensitive to
moral power when it is applied. In the present design moral
power is applied by way of concentration through the judicial
process and dissemination through the communication process.
The output of this dual process will be the legal judgment of
2 3
censure broadcast to the world.1
Id. at 76.
at 77.
IsId. at 82.
19 Id. at 82-83.
"0 Id. at 39.
16

17Id.

21
22

23

Id.
Id. at 56.

Id. at 92.
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Professor Holton models the proposed statute of the Peace
Court 2 on the Statutes of the International Court of Justice
and the European Court of Justice. He provides the necessary
due process safeguards, '- , ensures "competence and impartiality
[on the bench] combined with broad cultural and geographical representation,'"-" and suggests elaborate rules for an efficient functioning of such a court.
One could perhaps take issue with Professor Holton's restructured premises. For example, the recent Czechoslovakian,
Cambodian, and Laotian invasions, all vehemently protested,
demonstrate the fragility of moral censure in deterring a state
from using force in its international conduct were it to perceive the issues involved to be of "vital interest." Similarly,
the concept of compulsory jurisdiction without a state's consent is not only without precedent but its practical utility may
also be questionable.
But there are perhaps even more substantive objections
to Professor Holton's bold and innovative proposals. First, it
will be exceedingly hard, if not outright impossible, to establish the facts of state-sponsored violence, especially in view of
the preponderance of the indirect form of aggression through
volunteers and infiltrators. Second, even if sufficient evidence
were produced to show a state sponsorship of violence, the
court might be hard put to pass judgment again a state, for
there is no consensus on what constitutes aggression and what
amounts to permissible self-defense. Third, in a majority of
the current conflicts, it is hard to distinguish between its domestic and international components, for invariably both the elements might be present. If the proposed court's jurisdiction
extends to merely interstate conflicts, it will not be instrumental in accomplishing Professor Holton's goal, that of preventing international violence. On the other hand, to advocate
the extension of the court's jurisdiction to internal conflicts
would be merely an exercise in futility. And finally, there
may even be some validity in the contention that the Western
fascination with the adjudicatory machinery and procedures is
neither as widely nor as enthusiastically shared by other nonWestern cultures and peoples in Asia and Africa.
However, the foregoing comments should not obscure the
fact that Professor Holton's thesis offers an innovative and
24 Id. at 98-109.
25 Id. at 90.
26
Id. at 87.
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imaginative approach which seeks to depart from "customary
nonthinking.""7 Second, his provocative ideas contain valuable
insights both for the scholar and the statesman. And finally, he combines a new model28 with a new approach and
the result is an outstanding study which deserves serious
consideration.
Ved P. Nanda*

Id. at 75.
s A well known model is G. CLARK & L. SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH
LAW (3d. enlarged ed. 1966).
* Professor of Law and Director of International Legal Studies Program,
University of Denver College of Law.
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ONCERN with international protection of human rights is

one of the most significant developments in recent history,
especially in the post-World War II period. Perhaps the most
dramatic advancement in this realm is the growing recognition
of the individual as a subject of international law.'
Since its inception, the United Nations has led the movement
to initiate and further this development.2 Even the U.N. Charter
refers to human rights in its preamble and in several articles
as well.' Secretary-General U Thant has recently stated that in
a very real sense, the promotion and protection of human rights
form the very essence, and provide the deepest meaning and
motivation, of the United Nations as an international and intergovernmental Organization. For, in the last analysis, a recognition of the "dignity and worth of the human person," in the
words of the Charter, is a symbol of all the other activities and
purposes entrusted to and pursued by the world Organization:
peace, the security of future generations from the scourge of war
and the promotion of social progress and better standards of life
4
in larger freedom.

The U.N. record in enumerating and defining human rights

is impressive. Since 1948, the year the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights was adopted by the General Assembly without
dissent, various declarations, resolutions, and conventions embodying such rights have been formulated at the United Nations.' Of special importance are those legally binding multi1 See generally P. JEsSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS (1948); Brownie,

The Individual Before Tribunals Exercising International Jurisdiction,
11 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 701 (1962); Korowicz, The Problem of the International Personality of Individuals, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 533 (1956).
2 See generally Rolz-Bennett, Human Rights, 1945-1970, U.N. Office of
Public Information, OPI/407 (May 1970); The United Nations and
Human Rights, U.N. Office of Public Information (1968); McDougal &
Bebr, Human Rights in the United Nations, 58 Am. J. INT'L L. 603
(1964).
2 See E. SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
78-81 (1964).
4 U Thant, Foreword to The United Nations and Human Rights, supra
note 2.
'See generally sources cited note 2 supra.

BOOK REVIEW

lateral treaties embodying these rights, such as the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights," the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 7 and the Optional
Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," all
adopted by the General Assembly in 1966.
Despite this notable legislative fervor which is invariably
accompanied by expressions of lofty idealism, state conduct
nonetheless reflects little enthusiasm to provide and support
adequate implementation machinery. There is a general apathy
toward ratifying the two Covenants and the Optional Protocol,
all of which contain measures for implementation. Equally significant, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are politically unresponsive toward the entire U.N. human rights program.
As a result, widespread practices denying human rights persist, which the U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs has recently termed as "matters of grave concern to
the international community."9 Without further state action to
ratify and implement these covenants and other U.N. human
rights instruments, one may be apprehensive that these measures might remain mere empty rhetoric.
Luis Kutner, the editor of The Human Right to Individual
Freedom, and president of the Commission for International Due
Process of Law, offers world habeas corpus as a device to implement the right to individual freedom contained in article 9 of
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,1' and reaffirmed in
article 9 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 12 In Mr.
Kutner's words: "World Habeas Corpus is a proposed legal
remedy suggesting that the security of the individual against
arbitrary detention or imprisonment is a paramount concern in
a world public order embodying the optimum and maximum for
human dignity. It is a competent remedy that prevents or cor'1 3
rects wrongful individual detention.
It has been over 40 years since Mr. Kutner first proposed
this concept. Ever since, he has persistently and vigorously ad6 The Covenant is reprinted in 61 AM. J.
7 Id. at 870.
8
Id. at 887.
9 Rolz-Bennett, supra note 2, at 11.
10

INT'L
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ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Kutner].
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detenthe Declaration is reprinted in E. SCHWELB,

THE HUMAN RIGHT TO INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM:

(L. Kutner
11 The article reads: "No one
tion or exile." The text of
supra note 3, at 81-86.
12 See 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 874
13 Kutner at 18-19.
HABEAS

CORPUS

L. 861 (1967).
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vocated its adoption. Moreover, on various occasions, he has had
opportunity to put the idea into practice. For instance, in 1952,
he served the "U.N. writ of habeas corpus" upon Czechoslovakia
which tried and convicted the Associated Press correspondent in
Prague.1 4 Earlier, he had written a brief in behalf of Cardinal
Mindszenty.' 5 And in 1967, he filed a petition for world habeas
corpus with the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in behalf
of Madame Ruth Tshombe, acting for her husband Moise
Tshombe, former Prime Minister of the Congo. In the Tshombe
case, Algeria was the principal respondent, since it was there
that Tshombe was detained and ordered for extradition to the
Congo, where he had already been tried in absentia and sentenced to death for treason.1"
Mr. Kutner has found enthusiastic response, as "some 90
presidents or chief judges of the courts of the signatory states
[to the U.N.] have endorsed and are sponsoring the structuring
of World Habeas Corpus as a permanent institution."1 7 The
Symposium contains essays by several eminent jurists and lawyers from all over the world who support the world wide
acceptance of habeas corpus or similar procedures to protect
individual freedom. It should also be noted that at the U.N. a
committee of the Commission on Human Rights undertook a
study of the "right of everyone to be free from arbitrary arrest,
detention and exile." The committee submitted its revised draft
to the commission in 1962. The commission is expected to take
action on that draft this year,ls and the recommendation should
eventually be adopted by the General Assembly in the form of
a resolution.
The foreword by former Justice Arthur Goldberg,19 the introduction by late Dean Roscoe Pound,2° and an essay by Mr.
Kutner, "World Habeas Corpus and the Rule of Law"2 1 comprise the introductory part of the symposium and should provide
the reader adequate background to understand and appreciate
the desirability and necessity of the implementation of the concept by adequate universal and regional measures.
14 Id. at 23.
15Id. at 22.
16 Id. at 168.

17 Id. at 24.
18 See U.N. ECOSOC, Commission on Human Rights, Note by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1055, 4 Feb. 1971, Annex 1, at 6.

111
Kutner at 7.
20 Id. at 11.
21 Id. at 17.

BOOK REVIEW

Part I of the Symposium includes expressions of endorse22
ment by the Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Cassation, Italy;
the Chief Justice of Uganda; 23 the Chief Justice, Constitutional
Court, Federal Republic of Germany; 24 Prince Norodom Siha27
26
and Tunisia. 28
nouk; 25 and Jurists from Taiwan, Columbia
In Part II Justice William Brennan forcefully argues for the
obvious utility of world habeas corpus as a tool for the avoidance of the dangers of the police state, and its great promise as
a contribution toward preserving and furthering world peace by
repudiating, through an enforceable international rule of law,
systematic and deliberate denial of human rights. The plan requires no surrender of national sovereignty to a supranational
state ....29
Professors Myres McDougal3" and Harold Lasswell3 eloquently provide a policy-oriented analysis of the concept. McDougal concludes: "For the larger community of mankind genuinely aspiring toward improved implementation of human rights
the proposal for internationalizing habeas corpus would appear
to offer plausible hope for remedying the greatest defect in its
present armory of institutional practices.13 2 Dr. Egon Schwelb,
a pioneer in initiating international protection of human rights
as a regular law school course, discusses the U.N. efforts in
the protection of personal liberty.3 3 In a reprint from the Denver
Law Journal, Leonard v. B. Sutton, former Chief Justice of
Colorado Supreme Court, offers a comprehensive survey of the
past, present, and future of habeas corpus. 34 He predicts that
"regional international courts of world habeas corpus are within
reach, and once created and obeyed, will permit those who in
good faith adhere to the precepts of the U.N. Charter to see to
it that at least in their countries there is protection against
arbitrary arrest and unlawful detention."3 5
In a meticulously researched and well documented essay,
Professor Cherif Bassiouni demonstrates the applicability of the
Id. at 31.
Id. at 35.
24 Id. at 44.
25 Id. at 47.
26 Id. at 49.
27 Id. at 51.
28 Id. at 55.
29 Id. at 88.
30 Id. at 90.
31 Id. at 94.
32 Id. at 92-93.
33 Id. at 117.
34 Id. at 170.
35 Id. at 180.
22
23
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concept to Islamic countries.)" Among other contributors are the
late Professor Quincy Wright,;"7 Professor Gustavo Salgado from
4
Ecuador,3 8 Dean Andrew Lee from Taiwan,311 and Tran Tam, 1'
Secretary-General of the International Association of Criminology.
Although the essay by Justice William Douglas 41 is only
peripherally related to habeas corpus, it provides good reading
on the rule of law in world affairs. Concluding the Symposium
is Mr. Kutner's succinct and incisive summation of the history
and evolution of the concept, "The Legal Ultimate For the
Unity of Mankind. '42 In his essay Mr. Kutner compares habeas
3
and deals
corpus with a similar procedural remedy, amparo,4:
with questions pertaining to the structure and procedure of the
proposed international court of habeas corpus and of the proposed regional courts, 44 standards against which the detention
should be tested, 45 and the enforcement of the decisions of the
proposed tribunal. 46 He also addresses himself to the practical
question of how to establish such a court. He urges the United
Nations to
exercise vigorous leadership to persuade member nations to
accept a treaty establishing an international court of habeas
corpus. Once a sufficient number of states have adopted the
treaty so as to institute the circuit courts in three arenas, the
international court of habeas corpus system should become effec47
tive, and the established circuit courts may begin to function.

Mr. Kutner is under no illusion that his proposal for an
international court of habeas corpus will "offer ideal protection
of human rights immediately. '48 However, he believes that "its
structure would permit the different peoples of the world, each
in its own fashion, to work toward the maximization of values
4'
and ultimate goals of all humanity.
The Appendix-, contains the proposed treaty-statute of the
international court of habeas corpus, which Mr. Kutner had
36

Id. at 98.

3T Id. at 159.
38

Id. at 189.

39 Id. at 184.
40 Id. at 127.
41 Id. at 59.
42

Id. at 201.

43 Id. at 212-15.
44 Id. at 215-20.
45 Id. at 220-23.

Id. at
at
48 Id.
49 Id. at
50 Id. at
46

4T Id.

223-26.
227.
228.
241-49.
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originally presented before the American Bar Association in
1959.
It is obviously impossible to do justice in a short space to
the rich material presented in this volume. However, it should
be noted that almost all contributors realize the practical difficulties in the creation of the proposed international and regional courts of habeas corpus or equivalent machinery. They
also realize that, even if such a machinery were to be established by agreement, compliance with the decisions of the proposed tribunals would still be principally on a voluntary basis.
It should also be mentioned that there are perhaps two subjects which should have been given a more thorough treatment
in the symposium. The first pertains to the evaluation of state
responses, especially that of non-Western, developing states, to
the nature of the right to individual freedom. States with differing ideologies, for example, may have a different perception of
the extent to which the right is inalienable. In some countries
"collective rights are stressed, rights intended to strengthen
state power to permit governmental modernization programs."'
Thus, if there is no universal consensus on the content or extent
of the right to individual freedom, it will be exceedingly difficult to arrive at an international agreement to devise adequate
procedures to implement it.
The second subject that requires further exploration is the
analysis of the various remedies presently available in different
countries to protect the individual right to freedom. For instance, a 1962 U.N. "Seminar on Amparo, Habeas Corpus and
Other Similar Remedies,"52 provides some excellent insights on
various approaches to accomplish the goal of protection of individual freedom.
Mr. Kutner deserves credit for advocating this worthwhile
cause. The Symposium should provoke further discussion on
human rights, especially on the question of protection and
51 E. HASS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL AcTIoN 15 (1970).
52

Seminar on Ampara, Habeas Corpus and Other Similar Remedies,
Mexico. D. F., 15-28 August 1961, U.N. Doc. ST/TAO/HR/12 (1962).
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implementation, 3 and should accelerate the acceptance, regionally in the first instance, then universally, of habeas corpus or
similar such practical remedies.
Ved P. Nanda*

53 There is extensive literature on human rights. See generally Schwelb,

The International Protection of Human Rights: A Survey of Recent
Literature, 24 INT'L ORGN. 74 (1970). For selected recent writing in the
area, see Bilder, Rethinking International Human Rights: Some Basic
Questions, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 171; Buergenthal, Proceedings Against
Greece Under the European Convention of Human Rights, 62 AM. J.
INT'L L. 441 (1968); Cabranes, The Protection of Human Rights by the
Organization of American States, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 889 (1968); Carey,
Proceduresfor InternationalProtection of Human Rights, 53 Iowa L. REV.
291 (1967); del Russo, InternationalLaw of Human Rights: A Pragmatic
Appraisal, 9 WM. & MARY L. REv. 749 (1968); Henkin, The Constitution,
Treaties, and International Human Rights, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1012
(1968); Lillich, Intervention to Protect Human Rights, 15 McGILL L. J.
205 (1969); MacChesney, Should the United States Ratify the Covenants? A Question of Merits, Not of Constitutional Law, 62 AM. J.
INT'L L. 912 (1968); McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, Human Rights and
World Public Order: A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, 63
AM. J. INT'L L. 237 (1969); Newman, Ombudsmen and Human Rights:
The New U.N. Treaty Proposals, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 951 (1967).
* Professor of Law and Director of International Legal Studies Program,
University of Denver College of Law.
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William L. Standard. New
York: Random House, 1971. Pp. xi, 228. $6.95. Although slightly
out-of-date, Aggression is a lucid, well-documented review of
the U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the resulting political
ramifications at home. Sharply critical of American intervention, the author traces the difficulties of our involvement to
the continuing American adherence to the Truman Doctrine of
containment. Citing numerous statements by the present administration, the author discusses Vietnamization, the Cambodian invasion, the legal basis for the U.S. involvement, and
the military-industrial establishment's stake in the warfare.
Standard warns that the use of tactical nuclear weapons in
Vietnam is a real possibility and documents their disbursement
in Southeast Asia. He concludes that if we are to avoid a
possible nuclear holocaust American withdrawal is necessary
in the very near future. The book offers few novel insights
but is worthwhile as a recent summary of American involvement in Vietnam.
AGGRESSION:

CONSCIENCE

OUR ASIAN DISASTER.

AND

COMMAND:

JUSTICE

AND

DISCIPLINE

IN

THE

James Finn, ed. New York: Vintage Books, 1971.
Pp. 325. $1.95 (paperbound). This book extends the general
theme of the editor's previous works (Protest: Pacifism and
Politics and A Conflict of Loyalties: The Case for Selective
Conscientious Objection) which has centered on the problems
inherent in the American military subculture. Conscience and
Command is a compilation of articles and interviews characterizing the nature of military justice in America today, drawing
upon the points of view of participants in the system: military
lawyers and figures in the military underground movement.
The final product is both a factual treatment and moving
dialogue on the problems of a society beset with conflicting
systems respecting the administration of justice.
MILITARY.

William 0. Douglas. New York: Vintage Books, 1971. Pp. 155. $1.95 (paperbound). In a succinct
essay, Supreme Court Justice Douglas conjures up visions of a
nuclear Armageddon to admonish that the "War System" must
be supplanted by an international "Regime of Law." Conceding
that nation-states will never be entirely harmonious, Douglas
INTERNATIONAL DISSENT.
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argues that survival dictates that the governments must resort
to collective cooperation in the form of treaties, international
conventions and organizations, and an international judiciary
system to settle their differences. Douglas states that inclusive
reforms will alienate statesmen, because "the only way to get
a consensus is to start with modest and probable agreements."
To commence this peaceful settlement of disputes, Douglas
proposes six preliminary steps that acknowledge the pervasiveness and complexity of the task. The steps are: 1) terminate
all military alliances, 2) liberate all colonies, and abolish
all protectorates, 3) recognize communist China, 4) establish
an international regulatory body to govern the control and use
of the ocean floor for the common heritage of all nations,
5) help developing countries enter the technological age, 6)
enumerate rules of law to govern international relations. The
brevity and eloquent style of this book make it eminently readable in an afternoon.
LEGAL LIMITS

ON THE USE OF CHEMICAL

AND

BIOLOGICAL WEAP-

Ann Van Wynen Thomas & A. J. Thomas, Jr. Texas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1970. Pp. 332. $10.00. The authors have undertaken to present a comprehensive overview of
the international law respecting chemical and biological weapons. Starting with pre-World War I efforts beginning in 1899,
they have documented the various attempts at CB weapons control as a historical perspective on which to base their thorough
discussion of the development of customary legal limitations
that may be presently applied to such weapons. Their analysis
involves an examination of the customary law of war, the practices and legal policies of major nations, and the general principles of international law as each relates to the control of
chemical and biological weapons. Although a new proposal for
CB weapons control is not presented, the authors have provided
the necessary groundwork of present law on which a formulation of new CB weapons control law may be based.
ONS.

AND VIETNAM:
AN AMERICAN
TRAGEDY.
Telford
Taylor. New York: Bantam Books, 1970. Pp. 207. $1.25 (paperbound). Although there has been a veritable cornucopia of
literature that has emanated from the Vietnam conflict, General Taylor's penetrating analysis is more than a reiteration of
past efforts. After tracing the historical development of war
crimes which culminated in the Nuremberg trials, Taylor-the
U.S. Chief Consul at Nuremberg-cites population transfers,
NUREMBERG
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"zippo" raids, body count tactics, "free fire" zones, reprisals,
mistreatment of prisoners, and the systematic destruction of
terrain as blatant violations of the the Nuremberg principles.
Although he does not condone aerial bombardment, he is careful to note that it does not constitute a violation of established principles of international law. Taylor suggests that
these war crimes are not isolated incidents but rather the intended products of a "criminal pattern of practice" that evolved
from the training of American soldiers. While acknowledging
the difficulties and hazards of the war itself, Taylor avers that
guerilla warfare was foreseeable and that better planning could
have ameliorated the present situation, thus shifting the onus
from subalterns to their leaders. Taylor argues persuasively
that since the Japanese general Yamashita was convicted for
crimes that his troops committed without his orders, and in
the midst of a disorderly retreat, American generals should
be held directly responsible for crimes that were committed by
American soldiers in accordance with the "mere Gook rule."
Recognizing that an issue remains with respect to which nation
is the aggressor in a technical legal sense, he nonetheless concludes that the ultimate responsibility for the tragedy of
atrocities in Vietnam rests with the politicians who have attempted to solve ideological and sociological problems with unharnessed fire-power tactics.
LAW OF DISSENT AND RIOTS.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed.
Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1971. Pp. xii, 498. This
comprehensive volume includes sections on dissent, civil disobedience, riots, police control of riots, and legal controls of
rioting. It is a compilation of reprinted and original articles
by numerous authors, and most of its chapters are extensively
documented and current. Although the book serves primarily
as a text and reference for public and law enforcement officials, it also provides the researcher with a well-annotated,
comprehensive introduction to the law of dissent and riots and
law enforcement, including an extensive bibliography. The
lawyer already versed in First Amendment litigation would find
this to be a worthwhile source of empirical research on police
practice in riot control.
THE

THE

LIMITS

OF

COERCIVE

DIPLOMACY.

Alexander L. George,

David K. Hall, William E. Simons. Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1971. Pp. ix, 253. $7.95. The authors, a team of
political scientists and strategists, characterize coercive diplo-
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macy-a mixture of diplomatic concessions and military pressures-as a political strategy with limited potential. Their analysis centers on the successful use of coercive diplomacy in
the Laotian and Cuban crises of 1961 and 1962, and its failure in
dealing with North Vietnam. The authors conclude that certain
conditions are necessary for coercive diplomacy to be effective,
among which must be considered the strength of American
motivation, asymmetry of motivation favoring the United
States, the clarity of American objectives, the sense of urgency
to achieve the American objective, adequate domestic and political support, viable military options, the opponent's fear of unacceptable escalation, and clarity concerning the precise terms
of settlement. Alexander George notes that wise statesmen employ restraint in their cautious use of military force and in the
limited demands they make on other nations. The success of
the strategy eventually devolves upon the skill of the diplomat
and his ability to preceive these pre-conditions. The book assumes a moderately high level of competence in the area of
diplomatic strategy and should appeal to political science theorists, diplomatic strategists, and those with a strong interest
in international law.
THE

MILITARY

ESTABLISHMENT:

ITS

IMPACTS

ON

AMERICAN

Adam Yarmolinsky. New York: Harper & Row, 1971.
Pp. xiv, 434. $10.00. Military Establishment is the result of a
study sponsored by the Twentieth Century Fund and directed by
the author. It includes a wealth of data on the rise and estabment of military dominance in American society. This volume
is not primarily concerned with the nature of the military
establishment nor with its history, but rather with its impact
on American society and the extent to which the society is
affected and shaped by military purposes. Among these effects
are the military's "automatic priority" over national resources
and the government's subsequent ineffectiveness in meeting
vital domestic needs; the role of the military in foreign policy;
the impact of the military on the economy; and the absorbtion
of military values and priorities in the American mainstream.
The militarization of civilian life-and the corresponding civilanization of the military-is without doubt among the central
domestic issues of the day.
SOCIETY.

THE NLRB AND THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT. John E.
University of Pennsylvania, 1971.
Abodeely. Pennsylvania:
Pp. 239. $5.95. This book seeks to analyze the major bargaining
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unit decisions of the NLRB by discussing post-bargaining unit
issues in the context of various special bargaining unit situations which have come before the board. The analysis is premised on a discussion of the various factors-many of them
negative in character-which determine an appropriate labor
bargaining unit, including the absence of congressional guidelines, inconsistency of NLRB decisions, management pressure,
and labor union rivalry. NLRB delineation of the bargaining
unit affects the choice of which union, if any, will gain representation rights. This volume, the third of a series published
by the Industrial Research Unit of the University of Pennsylvania, extends the scope of the first two volumes, Compulsory
Arbitration and the NLRB and Union Authorization Cards and
the NLRB, published in February 1968 and January 1969,
respectively.
THIS ENDANGERED PLANET.

Richard A. Falk. New York:

Ran-

dom House, 1971. Pp. 495. $8.95. This timely book beckons
man to rediscover his finiteness in the total scheme of the
environment by rejecting the concept of "man versus nature"
and recognizing a concept of "man in nature." Falk deliniates
four major factors contributing to the dimensions of that finiteness, in terms of the present world ecological crisis: 1) the
war system, 2) overpopulation, 3) the waste of natural resources, and 4) the deterioration of the entire environment to
such a degree that it no longer can sustain life. While the
author approaches the environmental problem from philosophical, economic, and political perspectives, it must be kept
in mind that he is a scholar writing primarily in the area of
international law. Falk feels that the world environment problem is exacerbated by the fragmentation of the planet into
numerous sovereign states. Consequently, he offers specific
proposals as an initial step in dealing with the world environmental problem. This book is recommended for lawyers and
laymen as both readable and instructive.
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the publication of a new law magazine of
great interest to lawyers and laymen.
The magazine will consist of articles written
by people from all walks of life; people like
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